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2ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the agricultural policies of the 
Acheampong military regime towards rice farmers in Dagbon, a 
traditional area in the Northern Region of Ghana, and the 
relationship that developed between the farmers and the regime 
as a result. Commercial rice production expanded rapidly when 
the regime’s policy of self-sufficiency in food parcelled out the 
North as the main rice production zone. All farmers were expected 
to participate in the programme, but in consequence of the nature 
of the policies employed to encourage rice production it was the 
big and well-connected ones who gained at the expense of the smaller 
farmers.
The relationship between these privileged rice farmers and 
the government was further enhanced by their membership of, or 
support for, the local ruling chieftaincy faction which was in 
turn supported by the regime. It was a reciprocal arrangement by 
which the regime in turn received the full support and co-operation 
of that faction, especially during the referendum on Union 
Government in 1978. However, it was the prominent rice farmers, 
working in collaboration with the ruling chiefs, and operating 
mainly through local institutions, who acted as local agents and 
ambassadors of the regime. Of course it was not all big rice 
farmers who supported the regime, but those who did not found it 
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain assistance from local 
farming agencies, and represented the main source of opposition 
to government policies.
In return for their support for the regime the farmers were 
rewarded with import licences, huge bank loans, access to all 
available farming inputs, and even officials* co-operation in 
smuggling. On their part the farmers cultivated vast rice farms 
for commissioners and senior officials posted in the South.
The fall of Acheampong in July 1978 rendered the position of 
his client farmers very vulnerable, but their initial fears were 
assuaged when the incoming regime failed to take effective action 
against those alleged to have ’abused* the system. When the ban on
political parties was lifted in 1978 and elections v/ere scheduled
3for later that year, the big rice farmers grouped themselves 
into well-defined alliances with parties which they considered 
would best represent their interest.
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INTRODUCTION
During the past ten years or so Ghana has experienced a serious 
decline in agricultural production, both as regards cocoa exports and 
foodstuffs, which has been a major cause of her more general catastrophic 
economic decline. Yet during the same period, which coincided largely 
with the Acheampong regime (1972-78), the Ghanaian government focussed 
its official economic policy on improving agricultural production, 
especially rice, through the joint strategies of Operation Feed Yourself 
and Operation Feed Your Own Industries. Their main objectives were 
to improve food production in the country as a whole, to supply raw 
materials for home based industries, and to conserve the drain on the 
country’s all-important foreign reserves. Considerable sums were 
attracted from foreign countries and were allocated by the Ghanaian 
government itself for the supposed purpose of implementing new 
agricultural projects.
As far as the North of Ghana (the Northern and Upper Regions) was 
concerned, large sums were allocated for the development of agriculture. 
The period saw the construction of two major irrigation schemes in the 
Upper Region - the Tono Irrigation Scheme, ani the Vea Dam Project - 
which were intended to facilitate round-the-ycar farming for small 
farmers. The increased importance with whidh agriculture was viewed by 
the authorities led to the decentralisation of the Ministry of 
Agriculture in that region and the establishment in 1977 of a new and 
ambitious organisation, the Upper Regional Agricultural Development 
Project (URADEP), to take over the functions of that ministry. This 
was charged to ’transform* the entire agricultural outlook of the region 
by a series of programmes supposedly intended to ’educate* the farmers 
in the use of modern farm technology and to provide them with extension
17
services and inputs. Emphasis was placed on small fanners, and the 
project, involving several millions of pounds, was financed jointly by 
World Bank countries and the Ghanaian government.
As far as agricultural development in the Northern Region itself 
was concerned, emphasis was placed on rice production. By far the 
largest agricultural project constructed in the Northern Region was the 
Northern Regional Integrated Programme (N0RR3P), which was initiated in 
1979 and based largely upon the URADEP model. There were, in addition, 
several other projects that were either already established or 
'projected' for the area in the future. Small farmers were to be 
especially encouraged and various institutions were set up to assist 
them. The Agricultural Development Bank, for example, was singled out 
by the government to assist small farmers as a whole, including rice 
farmers. Finally, a number of heavily subsidised agricultural agencies 
were set up to provide tractor and other mechanical farm services to 
the farmers.
The immediate effect of the government's agricultural policies was
a sharp increase in the total area under rice cultivation and in the
number of farmers, both large and small, who participated in rice
production. Within a few years, however, (and certainly by 1973, the
time of the initial fieldwork for this thesis), it was apparent that
the amount of rice being produced was falling far short of the original
1
projections and even more so of the needs of the domestic market. 
Moreover, in so far as profitable rice farms were established, these were 
almost entirely large farms, mostly owned by newcomers to farming.
Thus we encounter two paradoxes as far as government policies with 
regard to agriculture are concerned: firstly, the disappointingly small
increase in rice production despite the heavy expenditure allocated to 
it; and secondly, the failure to assist small rice growers despite the
18
declared policies of the government to do so. Shepherd has further
argued that the government sponsorship of commercial rice farming in
Northern Ghana was decidedly non-optimal from the point of view of the
economy as a whole, i.e. the foreign exchange and other resources spent
on rice would have been far better utilised on reviving established
2
industries, for example, cocoa. According to Shepherd, it was not
even rational from the perspective of redistribution of income, since 
the majority of small-scale farmers could not (legally at least) make a 
profit out of it.
V/hy, then, did the Acheampong regime pursue such a policy? A 
starting point might be found in the observations and arguments put 
forward by Robert Bates in Markets and States in Tropical Africa.^
Bates has suggested that declining agricultural production is a fairly 
general phenomenon in African countries which can only be understood 
through a consideration of the politics of their regimes, including the 
nature of agricultural policies. He has, at a general level, argued
that the attractiveness of such schemes lies not in their (national) 
economic rationality but in their ability (1) to attract foreign aid 
and (2) to provide increased political patronage and, more especially, 
to cement an alliance with local 'big' farmers, who might in turn act 
as patrons to small farmers and thereby contain the discontent of the 
latter.
This thesis is an attempt to examine the validity of Bates' theory 
in relation to the case of government sponsored rice-farming in Northern 
Ghana. While it concludes by accepting Bates' general theory, it seeks 
to go beyond it in analysing the specific mechanisms by which a 'class' 
of 'kulak' rice farmers was created and how this related to the 
'traditional' political and economic structure. It also seeks to 
examine the questions of to what extent this group established itself as
19
a distinct ‘class* and how they reacted to political developments 
following the fall of the Acheampong regime*
One important argument only briefly raised by Bates, i*e* that 
although the smaller farmers lose from such policies, the larger farmers 
and/or those sufficiently well connected to become large farmers can 
benefit very considerably from them, will be carried further. It will 
be shown how these large farmers in turn put pressure on the regime to 
further protect their interests. But of course, something was 
expected in return and, during the period under review, these farmers 
gave their loyal support to the Acheampong regime, especially during 
the 1978 referendum on Union Government. 52bre specifically, we will 
attempt to show how two organisations - the Bice Growers* Association 
and the Special Marketing Unit - which were set up to represent the 
broad interests of all rice farmers, in fact came to be dominated by 
the larger farmers and their supporters, and at the same time were 
transformed into the political and propaganda organs of the regime.
This study will also attempt to examine how the government's 
policies have intermeshed with the local, still heavily tradition- 
orientated politics of Northern Ghana, more particularly the Dagomba.
It examines the relationship between 'traditional' political divisions 
and status differences on the one hand, and a process of what might 
loosely be termed 'class formation' on the other. Of course 
traditional politics has always assumed an important role in Dagomba 
society, but the military regime's active sponsorship of certain groups 
and individuals, including influential chiefs, meant that those chiefs 
gained in prestige and influence, so that association with them, whether 
by blood ties or otherwise, gave considerable advantages to well-
/
connected clients.
The consideration of the above observations carries implications
20
for another important theoretical issue. Class formation in African 
societies has generally been perceived by neo-marxists to be a natural 
consequence of the increasing penetration of capital and capitalism into 
these societies via neo-colonialism. The development of a rural 
agricultural programme in general and the commercialisation of rice 
production in particular has certainly been bound to give rise to some 
form of socio-economic differentiation within the 'peasantry*. The
precise degree and form that this development has taken, at least in 
Northern Ghana, has been more the product of the State's agricultural 
policies and of its politics more generally. It is the State, rather 
than endogenous or international economic forces, in combination with the 
structure of local politics, which has been the main 'crucible' of class 
formation. The question consequently arises, however, as to how permanent 
the membership or even existence of the 'large farmer' class really is, 
since the dependence of such a class on the regime in power means that its 
position is more likely to alter with a change in regime (its power to 
reproduce itself is more limited) than is arguably the case in more 
economically developed societies. Of course the eventual answer to this 
question will be quite complex. *
The first chapter of this dissertation gives an introduction to the 
Dagomba political system. Chapter 2 provides an analysis of the general 
economic development of the North prior to the Acheampong period. Section
I of this chapter is concerned more specifically with the colonial 
strategies that were used for the development of the North, while Section
II attempts a brief analysis of the performance of the economy from about 
1950 in order to provide a background or 'setting' for the development 
strategies of the 1970s. Chapter 3 examines the official rationale of 
Acheampong's National Redemption Council for developing rice farming
in the North, while chapters and 3 are concerned with the effect of 
the regime's policy of subsidised agriculture upon small-scale and
21
large-scale rice farmers. Chapter 6 is an elaboration of the 
relevance of chieftaincy politics to being well-connected. The 
mechanisms through which big farmers become politically and economically 
very influential are examined in bhapter 7, while in chapter 8 we 
examine the small rice farmers* organisational responses to the big 
farmers* dominance. Finally, in chapter 9 we provide an analysis of 
the rice farmers* political behaviour during the 1979 elections.
Material for this dissertation was collected from a number of
sources, such as published material, archives, interviews with
knowledgeable *officials* of various kinds, and survey interviews of
farmers. But most importantly, very extensive use was made of the
anthropological method - getting to see the situation and the problems
through the eyes of the farmers themselves and getting to understand
their 'reality*. Polly Hill has pointed to the checks and safeguards
that are implicit in the 'anthropological procedure*. As she argued,
if the anthropologists' method is properly applied for a sufficiently
long period "the main features of an articulated structure" will
k
inevitably emerge. I made sin explicit attempt to follow this model.
Insights which were gained by interviews or otherwise were checked against 
observation in principle, and references to such checks are made 
wherever applicable in the thesis.
Fieldwork for this study was conducted in two parts, the first 
during my field trip to Ghana between December 1977 and November 1978, 
and the second during a return visit between July and October 1979* The 
first field trip took place at a time when the government's agricultural 
and other economic policies were generally perceived to have failed and 
when the rate of inflation, including that of domestically produced
y
foodstuffs, was at its peak. The second trip coincided with the period 
of the elections and the June k 'revolution* of Jerry Rawlings.
The object of this second trip was to study the relationship between 
farmers in the North and political parties, while it also offered a 
unique opportunity to observe public reactions to Rawlings' coup.
This important political event is outside the main scope of this 
dissertation, although allusions will be made where necessary.
The first month of my first visit to Ghana was spent working on 
documentary material from the National Archives in Accra and at the 
Library of the University of Ghana at Legon (these materials supplementing 
work which had been carried out earlier at the Public Record Office in 
London). This was immediately followed by a trip to Tamale where I 
was to conduct the bulk of my research. %  first task was to 
familiarise myself with the community, and getting to 'understand* the 
local way of life. Fortunately, that did not prove as problematic as 
I had first anticipated, for almost immediately upon reaching Tamale 
I met Mohammed Eddie, a teacher at Saca-Saca Kiddle School, and an 
impending student of the University of Ghana at Legon, who at once proved 
to be a very reliable friend and an invaluable guide. Eddie later 
became my research assistant, and it was largely through his efforts 
that I promptly met and acquainted myself witSfc several influential 
personalities in the North - farmers, ex-politicians, businessmen, chiefs, 
civil servants, expatriates, and so on.
The success of this early period of orientation and familiarisation 
was especially important in view of the prevailing tension and 
uncertainty throughout the country caused by the repressive politics of 
the Acheampong regime, as well as the uncertainties of the impending 
referendum on Unigov. Furthermore, there was the chieftaincy factor 
in the North, an extremely delicate issue which had to be handled with 
caution, diplomacy, and skill, in order to avoid being accused of
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•taking sides* - an outcome that would have destroyed any chance of 
conducting meaningful research into an already sensitive area. It was 
therefore even more necessary to gain the full confidence of potential 
informants before launching fully into the more substantive research. 
Thus, whilst I spent much time getting to •know* the North during the 
first three months or so, my data collection focussed on less sensitive 
sources - the Tamale Archives, the Ministry of Agriculture, the 
Ghanaian-German Agricultural Development Project (GGADP), the Ministry 
of Economic Planning, and the Western Dagomba District Council (WDDC), 
among others. By the time I started the interviews I was already 
familiar with the general problems confronting the farmers in the North, 
and had gained certain fundamental insights into the political attitudes 
of several of the big farmers in the district. Most importantly, 
several of the farmers and officials interviewed were already familiar 
with me, thus reducing considerably any strain or *tension* that might 
otherwise have developed. For example, during a visit to the 
Nyankpalana•s palace he introduced me to the farmers as a •friend* who 
had come to investigate into their very serious problems.
The problems posed during the second field trip were of a different 
nature, since I was returning to already familiar territory. It was 
like renewing old acquaintances. However, there was, if anything, an 
even more pronounced air of tension and political uncertainty caused by 
the events of the June coup. Several *big* men (including large 
farmers, businessmen, executives and high ranking military officers) 
had either been *rounded-up* or had fled the country to avoid public 
humiliation and arrest during the early days of the coup. It became
necessary, once again, to tread cautiously and be circumspect in the
/
course of research. It was not particularly difficult to relate'to 
respondents who were already known to me, but others were less
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forthcoming, and in many cases several visits were arranged to their 
homes before an interview or informal discussion could eventually take 
place. V/hen it became clear that the information sought was about 
their political affiliations rather than their attitudes towards the 
Rawlings regime, discussions were often uninhibited and at times 
stimulating.
During the first phase of the survey of rice farmers, a total of 
146 farmers were formally interviewed (70 large and 76 small-scale) 
while, during the second phase conducted between July and September 1979i 
a total of 288 farmers (128 large and 160 small) were interviewed. 
Interviews were confined to the Dagomba area, although most of them 
were concentrated in the environs of the quasi-urban districts of 
Tamale, Yendi and Savelugu where most rice farmers had their homes.
In most cases the interviews were conducted in Dagbani, with Eddie, 
a Dagomba, acting as interpreter and proving a great asset not only 
because of my extreme limitations in the language, but also because of 
his inclination to check even the most minute of details. A number 
of these interviews, however, were conducted in English or •pidgin* 
English. Questions were of the •open-ended* type, designed to 
encourage broad-ranging comments rather than suggest neat answers. In
fact, a great deal of valuable and interesting information was gathered 
from the general discussions that accompanied or followed interviews.
In addition to formal interviews, a large number of informal 
conversations were held with farmers and people connected with farming 
.in one way or another, among them bank officials, officials at the 
Ministry of Agriculture, chiefs, military officers and government 
representatives at the regional level. These discussions mostly took 
place in the homes of the people concerned, though also quite often in 
pleasure spots - discos, restaurants, bars - where the informality of
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the occasion proved very conducive to the gaining of information* It 
was during such an informal meeting at Old Man •Chop* (food) bar in 
Tamale with a rice farmer that I first became acquainted with the 
political, i.e. factional, divisions within the Rice Growers* Association. 
These informal discussions, especially with officials, were often used 
to cross-check facts obtained from other (especially dubious) sources.
Although the study is based on the Dagomba area and research was 
conducted largely in that area, a substantial amount of material was 
collected on the North as a whole, especially the Upper Region. The 
account of URADEP, for example, is largely supplemented by documentary 
material from the project*s headquarters in Bolgatanga and interview 
material with its officials. Discussions were also held with, several 
large farmers and other well-connected people there, such as the 
Bolga-Naba, the regional Chief Farmer, and former politician R.B. Braimah. 
The value of such work was both comparative and analytical, and it 
helped to explain and illustrate several of the issues raised in this 
study as a whole.
The period of fieldwork in Ghana was not an entirely liberal one.
The atmosphere immediately preceding and following the March referendum, 
the removal of Achearapong from office, and finally, the days of the 
June A- coup, undoubtedly hindered research, especially amongst the big 
rice farmers who were particularly affected by the later events.
Despite these setbacks, however, rapport could be established even with 
such farmers (usually after a long period of acquaintance) and, when it 
was, interviews and discussions were uninhibited and often stimulating.
By contrast, the political events of the late 1970s did not seem to 
restrict the smaller farmers who were always inviting discussion. It 
is hoped, that the analysis which follows succeeds in portraying the 
rice farmers* own view of their situation, as well as in situating this
2b
within an understanding of the reality derived from more conventionally 
academic sources.
27
NOTES
1. See Table f^.3 in Chapter 4 for a comparison of estimated and 
actual purchases of paddy by the Government Rice Mills,
Smuggling of a substantial proportion of the rice produced in the 
North was the major cause of the low official purchases.
2* A,W, Shepherd, The Development of Capitalist Rice Farming in
Northern Ghana, University of Cambridge Ph.D. dissertation, 1979,
3. Robert H, Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa; The
Political Basis of Agricultural Policies, University of California 
Press, 19&1.
Polly Hill, Migrant Cocoa Farmers of Southern Ghana, Cambridge, 
1963.
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CHAPTER ONE 
DAGOMBA POLITICAL SYSTEM AND ITS EVOLUTION
The political economy of Northern Ghana, more especially Dagbon,
cannot be adequately analysed outside the context of tradition.
Tradition and development are not necessarily antithetical concepts.
On the contrary, tradition has played a very important role in the
political and economic development of Dagbon. As we shall see in the
following chapters, every institution in Dagbon was influenced by its
relationship to chieftaincy ties. The interplay between tradition and
modernity has been observed by several scholars. Huntington, for
example, has argued that modern society is not simply modern, but it is
also "modern and traditional". Gusfield objects on grounds of
"misplaced polarities" to the dichotomy which separates modernity and
2tradition and to the assumption that they are in conflict. And finally,
Whitaker has suggested that "dysrhythmic" change (by which he means
change in one sector which is not accompanied by change in other sectors)
is a more appropriate way of perceiving political development in some
3societies, such as the emirates of Northern Nigeria.
These scholars utilise a ’synthetic* as opposed to a *displacement *
If
model, which posits more adaptability on the jiart of societies m  
general and traditional roles in particular. Change in one sector of 
society need not extend consistently or "unidirectionally", as Barrows
has observed. Modern and traditional traits wcan fuse, interpenetrate,
. 5or co-exist without systematic conflict".
Present-day Dagomba society can best be ctsmceived as an admixture 
of traditional values and modern institutions. It is also characterised 
by political conflict, but this is not conflict caused by the inter­
penetration of the two sectors: the modern ani traditional. It is
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rather the result of competition between elements or groups within the 
traditional sector to dominate this sector. In this chapter we will 
attempt a discussion of the Dagomba political structure and its evolution, 
and then proceed to explain why the institution of chieftaincy was so 
important to these people. We will also hope to explain the origins 
of gate politics in Dagbon and the motives influencing people*s support 
for one side over another.
Origins of the Dagomba State
The Dagomba state, an area of some 8,000 square miles, was founded 
around the fifteenth century by a group of migrant cavalrymen travelling 
south. It was one of several states founded by these invaders in the 
area of present-day northern Ghana: others being Mamprusi, Gonja and
Nanumba.
There has been some doubt as to the exact origins of these
conquerors. It has been suggested that the Dagomba are related to
Egyptian Coptic exiles who supposedly arrived at some date before the
fourteenth century.^ Some Northern administrators, notably Eyre-Smith,
. . 7were for a time in agreement with the notion of an eastern origin.
Most of the authorities seem to agree, however, that the founders of the 
Dagomba State were pagans of Hausa origin, perhaps from Zamfara.
According to Fage, these migrants moved Westwards as they supported
g
themselves by raiding the towns of the Niger valley. They were 
pushed further South during the fifteenth century and settled at Pusiga 
in Northern Ghana. The head of the settlement there was Na Gbewa who 
was said to have seventeen children. The eldest, Zirile, succeeded 
him at Pusiga while the others moved away to establish kingdoms throughout 
Northern Ghana. One of the brothers, Toshagu, founded the Mamprusi 
state at Nalerigu, while another, Sitobu, established the branch which
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subsequently controlled the Dagomba. After further conquests one of
Sitobu's sons, Nyagse, was invested by his father as head of the new
9
kingdom, and became in effect the first Ya Na of the Dagombas.
The period following the conquest of Dagbon was marked by one of 
consolidation during which new institutions were created or old ones 
modified to give stability and continuity to the state. Indigenous 
tindanas (earth priests) were either killed or removed and replaced by 
members of the royal dynasty. But the institution itself was not 
destroyed, and in some places the tindana was allowed to remain as a 
village chief under a Dagomba divisional chief. The Tamale chief known 
as the Dakpema appears to be a descendant of the earlier tindana. The 
imposition of new chiefs did not destroy the jurisdiction of the tindana. 
In fact the Dagomba chiefs assumed some of the authority of the earth 
priests.
Dagomba political structure
Dagbon has all the characteristics of a traditional state: 
territorial sovereignty, a political and administrative machinery, and 
of course a class system. Dagomba society consisted of two basic 
classes: the 'commoner* class or dagbandaba, and a ruling class of
chiefs, Class membership has remained more or less hereditary from the
very earliest days. With the exception of elders of the Ya Na's court 
and some chieftaincies held by descendants of earth priests, political 
office in Dagbon is monopolised by the descendants of the founders.
The Ya Na, a figure surrounded by rituals of avoidance and deference, is 
the sovereign head of the Dagomba. He is also the lineage head of the 
dynasty and is responsible for appointing chiefs and elders for conducting 
the affairs of the state.
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The Dagomba class system was not rigidly structured and it allowed
a certain degree of interrelationship between the two main strata.
Staniland has noted that intermarriage took place between the commoner
10and ruling classes. This does not suggest, however, a convergence of
the two strata; it is simply a manifestation of the non-rigidity of the 
Dagomba class system.
Dagbon was divided into a hierarchy of chiefdoms which consisted of 
three provinces - Mion, Karaga and Savelugu - ruled by royal dukes, i.e. 
senior chiefs of royal heritage. The importance of these three 
provinces lay in the fact that they constituted "gates" to Yendi. Thus 
one had to be an occupant of one of these skins or "gates" in order to 
qualify for selection as Ya Na. There were also several units, or 
divisions - twelve in number - which were ruled by dukes. Each division 
was subdivided into a number of villages, each having its own chief.
Thus, an hierarchical system of rule developed in Dagbon starting at the 
lowest level with the village chief, progressing to the divisional and 
provincial levels, and culminating with the Ya Ha.
The system of chiefly promotion or appointment was an important 
feature of Dagomba politics. Generally speaking a candidate started with 
an appointment to a small village and moved upwards until he reached the 
divisional level. Depending upon his qualifications (and luck), a 
candidate might even reach the paramountcy. Eht promotion was limited 
by the important rule that no man could rise higher than his own father.
As a result, only the sons of Ya Nas could aspiare to become Ya Na. This 
rule has in recent years been manipulated by factional •interests' so as 
to include the grandsons of Ya Nas. While chieftaincies were held 
predominantly by members of the royal family, t&ere were other political 
offices in Dagbon that were held by commoners, especially those who could 
trace some links to earlier kings. These constituted the elders who,
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in the case of elders of Yendi, were officially appointed by the Ya Na
to serve in his Court. The divisional and village chiefs also had
their own councillors. Every chief had his own court, consisting of a
group of elders and other attendants who followed him closely and also
depended upon him for spiritual guidance and material support, but who
also provided the chief with a local power base. As Staniland has
observed, these officials had immense power at court and acted as
11advisers, judges and patrons.
The Council of Elders of the Ya Na consisted of some twelve main
. . 12officials and about three or four minor ones. The Kuga-Na and
Zohe-Na were the two principal advisers to the Ya Na, while Mbadugu was 
the official linguist whose main responsibility was to conduct all 
audiences with the Ya Na. Some of these officials also had the additional 
responsibility of selecting a Ya Na. Among these were Kuga-Na, Zohe-Na,
Mba Malle, Tuguri-Nam and Gomli. Besides, most of the Ya Na*s elders 
acted as intermediaries for lesser chieftaincies. Zohe-Na, for example, 
acted on behalf of all the royal dukes, i.e. the Yo Na (Savelugu),
Karaga-Na, and Mion Lana, as well as several divisional chiefs including 
Gushie-Na, Sunson-Na, Demon-Na,Yelzori Lana and Bamvim Lana. Kuga Na, 
who claimed to be a descendant of a brother of Na Sitobu, acted on behalf 
of some minor chieftaincies, but was also vested with the crucial role 
of administrator of state affairs during a period of interregnum.
The elders were therefore generally responsible for maintaining and
protecting the authority of the royal court in the day-to-day government 
of the State. At the same time, their relationship to the King gave
them a position of immense power and influence since they acted as patrons 
in his court. As a rule, elders extracted large sums in fees from
chiefs before the latter were allowed an audience with the Ya Na. They 
also received a share of tax revenues paid to the king. One of the most 
lucrative sources of wealth and power, however,., was from payments by
33
candidates seeking appointment to an important skin. In addition, some
elders such as Kuga Na and Mba Malle directly appointed candidates to
(lesser) chieftaincies for which they charged fees.
The influence of the Yendi elders has not diminished over the years.
On the contrary, the political importance of some of these officials,
especially the principal elders such as Kuga Na and Zohe Na, has been
reinforced with the political and economic development of Dagbon. This
process of change has involved increased communication between the central
government and the traditional authorities, especially the Ya Na. But
since the Ya Na can be reached only via his appointed officials, any
developing relationship between him and the authorities could only have
enhanced the position of these officials. As the secretary to former
Ya Na Mahamadu Abudulai IV explained:
MThe Ya Na does not have to take advice given by his councillors; 
his decision is always final. He is the one that the Government 
will listen to. But the elders are important, especially Kuga 
Na, Mbadugu and Zohe Na. They are experienced, sometimes more 
than the Ya Na, and he will always expect an opinion from them.
But there are also occasions when the elders can take decisions 
without consulting the Ya Na. That is mainly v/hen they 
involve matters pertaining to inferior chiefs.
It was not only at Yendi that influential elders were to be found.
Each division had its own Court based broadly «rn the Yendi model. Like 
the Ya Na*s elders, these were generally recruited from outside the 
royal family. The elders of the divisional courts were also assigned 
roles similar to those of Yendi. For example the Wulana was broadly 
equivalent to Kuga Na, and functioned as chief administrator who 
supervised the work of subordinate officials. As at Yendi, the elders 
also took on the role of patron for chiefs, i*e. village headmen, visiting 
the capital. But as Staniland has demonstratted, there was one 
important distinction between the state and divisional levels of
administration: there was no equivalent to the State Council at the
divisional level. Instead, subordinate chiefs came to salute their
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superior and discuss problems individually, with elders simply advising 
the divisional chief.
Political Instability in Dagbon
Despite its complex administrative structure, Dagbon was not a 
strong state, either militarily or politically. Its vulnerability was 
the result of two main factors. Firstly, it did not possess a strong 
and centrally-controlled sunny and was consequently weak in self defence, 
as demonstrated by its poor performance during the wars against the Gonja 
and Ashanti during the 19th century when it depended largely upon the 
services of mercenaries. Secondly, Dagbon exhibited strong
15characteristics of the ‘segmentary state* as formulated by Southall.
The central government was limited in its capacity to control outlying
centres of power. The Ya Na did not have an effective monopoly of
force so that, as Staniland has pointed out, the institution of
16government tended to be replicated at lower levels.
Rattray described Dagbon as a “loose federation of semi-independent
provinces’*, each having its own ruler, and with the Ya Na as a kind of
17primus inter pares. The constitutional weakness of the Ya Na was also
emphasised by Eyre-Smith who wrote that the paramount chief had “little
or no executive authority in the government of the semi-independent
states" and received little or nothing other than occasional tribute,
18
normally in the form of slaves, from his distant sub-chiefs. The
administrative independence of chiefs at the divisional and village levels
has also been supported by Manoukian who writes that "decentralisation
19was the rule in the original native administration". Under this
system divisional chiefs were left to manage their own affairs with very 
little interference from the Ya Na. The divisional chiefs in turn left
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the local affairs of the villages in the hands of sub-chiefs.
As Staniland has already noted, there have been several recorded
occasions when divisional chiefs or dissident royals took up arms against
21the king or called upon outside powers to intervene. The procedure
for selecting a Ya Na by providing consultation of divisional chiefs
before the successor was publicly nominated could be seen, therefore, as
implicitly recognising the danger of conflict. In principle a Ya Na
could neither abdicate nor be deskinned once he had been appointed.
There have been cases, however, when at least one Ya Na was killed by
rivals (Sumani Zoli around the middle 19th century), while others have
22been threatened by intrigue and open rebellion.
Yet, paradoxically, the vulnerability of the state was also the key 
to its survival. The disputes which were such a feature of its 
existence both arose from and validated its structure. Goody has 
demonstrated that where a large dynasty is involved in the military and 
civil government in a country, any element of ambiguity or uncertainty 
in the selection of a successor does not only provide "a spur to effort", 
but also "gives expression to the *corporate* character of the royal kin
23group".
Disputes over succession in Dagbon were structurally prescribed:
the rule that the Ya Na should be chosen from three contenders - Savelugu,
Karaga and Mion - allowed for competition, while that which prescribed
that no man should rise higher than his father is said to have added
2k
"urgency" to the contest.
Staniland has noted that the structure of selection was the result
of persistent tension between senior and junior generations - between
uncles who were anxious to secure titles for t&eir lines, and nephews
25determined to succeed their fathers. Such pattern was already 
evident in the 19th century, in the struggle between Na Yakubu*s sons and 
their uncles, and the ensuing combat between fh Abudulai’s son and his
3b
uncles and cousins. The same pattern was repeated at lower levels in
the competition for divisional and even village skins. As Staniland
explains, 11 these were the dynamics of competition within the dynasty,
supplementing (and to some extent coinciding with) the dynamics of tension
26between central government and the peripheral centres of power".
Effects of External Wars
Eastern Dagomba was conquered at a later period than the West, and
a final settlement took place around the seventeenth century when the
capital was finally established at present-day Yendi. The Konkomba who
occupied vast areas of Eastern Dagomba were pushed back by the conquerors.
However, they were administered by the Dagomba, although never assimilated.
But the threat to the Dagomba kingdom did not come directly from the
subjugated Konkombas. It was created, instead, by periods of prolonged
aggression from the Gonja and Ashanti.
The Gonja wars were caused by the seizure of Daboya, a town situated
27to the north-west of Tamale, by a Gonja overlord, Sumaila Jakpa.
Jakpa appointed his son as chief of Daboya and moved south to attack the
Dagomba. Daboya was important both for its trade, especially in kola
nuts, and as a main caravan route. As a result of its crucial economic
importance the Dagombas were not willing to surrender it. But it was
not until the early eighteenth century under the reign of Ya Na Zangina
that the Gonjas were finally evicted from Dagomba territory.
Soon after the expulsion of the Gonjas the kingdom became subject
to raids from the Ashanti. According to Fage, these raids were spread
28over a period of some fifty years. These wars were caused by internal
strife within the Dagomba kingdom when Ziblim, the chief of Kpatina who 
was a grandson of a former Ya Na, Zangina, invited the Ashantis to attack 
the reigning king, Na Gariba. The King was seized but later released
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on the intervention of some Dagomba princes. According to some
authorities, the Dagomba in return were required to send to the Ashantis
30a fixed number of slaves, cattle, sheep and cloth to Kumasi each year.
An Ashanti representative was stationed in Yendi, and it was only about
187 ,^ with the decline of the Ashanti power, that the tribute ceased.
During this period the Ashanti influence over the Dagomba must have
been considerable. Both Wilks and Fage claim that Dagbon was made into
31a protectorate, the payments being a form of tribute. According to
32Tamakloe, Dagbon was a "vassal state”. But some authors have argued
that the Ashanti influence was more limited. Iliasu, for example,
suggests that the relationship between the states was mutually beneficial,
33It is seen as one of "politico-economic symbiosis rather than conquest". 
According to him, the Asantehene did not interfere with the internal 
affairs of the Dagomba, and the payments made were not tribute "but
3*f
instalments for the ransom paid for the return of Na Gariba".
The Ashanti influence had some effect upon the internal politics of
the Dagomba since it gave rise directly to the creation of a wing of
Ashanti-trained musketeers within the Dagomba army. This resulted in
the formation of some chieftaincies (about five in number) with very
strong Ashanti influence. These chiefs sat on stools rather than the
skins used by Dagomba chiefs. Tait and Strevens also emphasise the
33prevalence of the Akan language in Dagomba military usage.
One consequence of the Ashanti influence seems to have been the 
stimulation of factionalism within the royal family. According to Iliasu, 
the annual tribute was a significant factor in factional competition 
because of the immense opportunities it afforded for intrigues against 
the paramountcy:
"Unsuccessful candidates to the paramountcy, chiefs and princes 
who desired to court favour in Kumasi and others who, for a 
variety of reasons, wanted to score points against the paramount 
chief, invariably sneaked out to Kumasi where, with little
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difficulty, they were able to persuade the Asantehene to be more 
assiduous in demanding slaves from Yendi
As we shall see, factional politics centring around the royal family 
came to dominate Dagomba politics from the early colonial period, but 
reached its culmination in the period following independence when 
national parties started to manipulate and exploit the various factions 
for political gains.
The Dagomba State under Colonial rule
A further major threat to the internal unity of the Dagomba State 
came with its partition in the late 19th Century. This was accompanied 
by a weakening of the authority of the Ya Na over his divisional chiefs. 
The partition had its origins in the settlement of two foreign 
expeditionary forces in the territory: the Germans in 1888 and the
British in 1892. Treaties were arranged with both foreign powers.
In 1892 the British expedition force made its treaty with the Dagomba as 
well as with other northern states including the Gonja, Grunsi and Mossi, 
while in 189^ the Germans made their own treaties with the Dagomba.
The formal partition of Dagomba finally took place in November 1899 
under a convention signed with the Germans in which the British retained 
control over the greater part of Dagomba. Thus Dagomba was sliced into 
two parts: the Western part went to the British, while the Eastern part
(with the capital Yendi) went to the Germans. By 1901 Eastern Dagomba 
was incorporated into an administrative division with Sansanne-Mango 
(now Togo), while in the same year Western Dagomba became part of the 
newly-constituted Protectorate of the Northern Territories under a 
Chief Commissioner answerable to the Governor of the Gold Coast. It was 
not until after the First World War in 1919 that the reunification of the 
two sections of Dagomba took place.
The partition of the Dagomba state was bound to have a devastating
effect on the cohesion of the Kingdom. For fifteen years during the
partition the Ya Na (who resided in Yendi) was officially denied authority
over his chiefs in Western Dagomba which, as we have seen, constituted
the greater part of the Kingdom. He was confined to the Mango-Yendi
district of Togo in an area largely populated by Konkombas. Two of
the most important provinces in Dagbon, Savelugu and Karaga, came under
British control, as did some prominent divisions such as Tolon, Gulkpeogu,
Kumbungu, Nanton and the better part of Mion. The importance of this
apportionment of states lay in the fact that all three ’gates1 to Yendi
- Savelugu, Karaga and Mion - came under the control of the British.
It is also important to note that during this period the Ya Na was referred
to by the British as the ’chief* or king of Yendi, rather than of the 
37Dagombas. This was a highly unfortunate situation from the point of
view of the royal government, and one, according to Staniland, which was
rich in the "possibilities of intrigue11.
One consequence of this situation was the recognition by the British
of the Yo Na (Savelugu) and the Karaga Na as paramount chiefs. A
further result of this development was the arbitrary relegation of the
divisional chiefs of Tolon, Nanton and Kumbungu under the Savelugu
39 . . .chiefdom with which they were previously of equal rank. The humiliation
suffered by these chiefs can best be understood if we appreciate that both
the Tolon Na and the Kumbung Na were principal war chiefs of the Ya Na,
while the Tolon Na was also his principal elder.
The elevated chiefs did not fail to exploit their enhanced status.
The Yo Na, for example, brought several of the Gulkpe Na's villages under
his own jurisdiction and established a suzerainty over Kumbungu.
According to Blair, Nanton was given inferior status by the Yo Na and made
/
to pay allegiance to him despite its superior position in the court of 
JfOthe Ya Na. The Dakpema, who also laid claim to the pararaountcy,
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persuaded the British to move the administrative headquarters from 
Gambaga to Tamale because of the abundance of water there.
The most long-lasting effect of the partition was on dynastic 
politics: indeed, the present dispute between the two branches of the
royal family can be traced to this period. During the period of the 
partition, Dagbon was fairly stable as far as aristocratic politics was 
concerned. Between 1900 and 1917 the paracDuntcy was occupied by the 
Abudulai candidate, Alhassan, who had been installed by the Germans after 
having removed Ya Na Darimani. But as we have already seen, the Ya Na 
was virtually cut off from his subordinates as a result of the partition.
Nor was Na Alhassan in a position to advance the interests of his 
own gate. The British had imposed a ban preventing their chiefs in 
Western Dagomba from communicating with those in Eastern Dagomba, 
including the Ya Na himself. To enforce their command, they punished 
recalcitrant chiefs with heavy fines or imprisonment and, of course, the 
forfeiture of'their skins. Thus Yo Na Mahama who was a brother of 
Na Alhassan, was removed from the Savelugu skin and jailed by the British 
in 1910 because of his communication with Yendi.
The Andani gate on the other hand was powerful in Western Dagomba. 
Mahama was replaced by an Andani Candidate, Bukari, as Yo Na. By 19^5 
or so, other Andani candidates had been appointed to key skins in Western 
Dagomba such as Sanerigu, Tampion, Zanballon and Kpatinga. These were 
important royal chiefdoms which qualified for the way to Yendi.
Meanwhile the Karaga Na Bukari Narkaw , who was a cousin of Ya Na
Alhassan but who, technically, did not belong to either of the two 
If?
contending gates, was forced by the British to cease communication with 
Yendi. He turned out to be one of the most loyal supporters of the 
British administration which conferred upon him.the title of *paramount 
chief* of Western Dagomba. Under his assumed position he was made to
appoint an Andani candidate, Abudulai - Na Andani's third son - as
Mion-lana,i.e. 'British* Mion-lana, in 1911 or 1912. At the same time,
however, Na Alhassan appointed his eldest son, Abudulai, to the Mion Skin.
Thus there were two Mion-lanas, both by the name of Abudulai, but one
k3
belonging to the Andani and the other to the Abudulai gate. The 
'British' Mion-lana resided in Western Dagomba, while the Abudulai 
candidate resided in Togo and was supported by all of Na Alhassan's 
chiefs and elders.
However, it was not until the invasion of Northern Togo by the British 
in 191^ that the political reunification of Eastern and Western Dagomba 
took place and a 'settlement' of chieftaincy disputes was attempted.
The partition had polarised the Dagomba chiefdcms into two political 
camps: one loyal to the Ya Na based in Yendi, and the other manipulated
by the British Administration in V/estern Dagomba. The death of Na 
Alhassan in 1917 added to the confusion and, in a way, exacerbated the 
conflict over the two Dagombas within the British administration as 
represented by Armitage, the CCNT, on the one hand, and Poole, the 
District Political Officer (D.P.O.) on the other.
For several months after the death of Alhassan, Yendi was without 
a chief, while the two leading candidates, Abudulai the Mion-lana 
appointed by the British, and Abudulai the Mion-lana appointed by the 
deceased king, were bitterly engaged in competing to have their candidacy 
approved for selection. Armitage, who was in favour of promoting 
British interests, was in favour of the British 3ELon-lana; while Poole, 
who probably understood the significance of the iBagomba customs and 
constitution better, was for the Mion-lana appointed by the king.
Eventually a compromise was reached and the CCNT agreed (reluctantly) 
that the regent Abudulai (the Mion-lana appointed by the king) be selected 
as Ya Na on condition that the occasion was not attended with the 
’’ceremonies attached to the enstoolraent of a king of the Dagomba”, and
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that he (Abudulai) promised to limit his jurisdiction to the former Togo 
4-5
side of Dagomba. This arrangement was provisional pending the
election of a king after the War.
Such policies on the part of the administration induced a feeling 
of quiet resignation and tacit resistance among Dagomba chiefs. They 
refused to co-operate with the administration over the selection of chiefs 
as demonstrated for example by the case of the Tolon skin in 1917 when 
the chiefs refused to nominate or endorse a candidate; and even more 
impressively in 1918 when the selection of the Karaga Na took place.
The nomination was entrusted to Western Dagoasiba chiefs but, mainly 
because of the uncertain outcome of the peace negotiations, these chiefs 
were not prepared to commit themselves. The contest was mainly between 
Andani and Abudulai candidates, although there were two or three 
descendants of Na Yakubu who were also eligible. Eventually the CCNT 
was forced to select Ziblira (a son of the deceased Yo Na Bukari f&rkaw, 
and a grandson of Na Yakubu), not because he was the most eligible 
candidate, but because he had promised to follow the footsteps of his 
father, i.e. to support the British administration.
With the end of the War and the reunification of the former German 
side of Dagomba with the Western section, the way was now clear for the 
final settlement of the Dagomba paramountcy. The Abudulai candidate, 
who had been installed on a temporary basis as Chief of Yendi pending the 
final settlement of boundaries after the War, had very strong claims, 
not least his status as son of the deceased chief, as well as his good 
relationship with the Konkombas. But there were other candidates.
Three other chiefs had some claim: Karaga Na Ziblim, Yo Na Bukari who
was a son of Ya Na Andani, and the •British* Mion-lana Abudulai, also a 
son of Na Andani. Among these candidates, the Yo Na had the strongest 
claim, but he had become very old and blind, thus making it impossible
for him to conduct state affairs.
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The elders were not consulted on the selection of the Ya Na, however,
and traditional procedures were disregarded. The CCNT took it on
himself to assess the various candidates at a meeting with chiefs held
in Tamale in November 1920. The popular choice among the chiefs was
Yo Na Bukari, but the CCNT advised against this choice on grounds of the
V7chief*s old age and infirmity. He therefore recommended Abudulai
(the Yendi chief) as the best-suited candidate to re-unite and consolidate
2f8
Dagomba society. But the CCNT went further than merely appointing
a new king. He also attempted to solve the question of the Mion skin 
by making the appointment of the newly-installed king conditional upon 
handing over the skins of Mion to the British candidate. Naturally, 
this was not accepted. Thus the whole procedure was expertly •stage- 
managed* by the CCNT, who boasted that he could leave the Northern 
Territories satisfied that one of his last acts had been to re-unite 
British and Togoland Dagomba, while he !fbegged the Chiefs to dismiss the
ZfQ
past from their minds1'.
Staniland had noted that the Dagomba political structure was neither
destroyed nor systematically incorporated into the colonial bureaucracy.
According to him, the latter did not have the resources either in manpower
or money to allow it to exercise its authority except in the most general
50or superficial manner. As a result, chiefly authority survived.
There was also another important reason for the survival of the 
institution of chieftaincy: its spiritual and symbolic meaning to
Dagombas. . They saw their chiefs as an embodiment of ancestral values 
■which possessed a capacity for sustaining their community spiritually, 
socially, and in other ways. Dagombas felt obliged, therefore, to 
resist any attempts to destroy what they perceived to be an integral 
part of their way of life.
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The Origins of Gate Politics in Dagbon
Traditional politics in Dagbon revolves around two chieftaincy
factions: the Andanis and the Abudulais. This division was brought
about by the pattern of succession which followed the death of a former
paramount chief, Na Yakubu, who ruled Dagbon around the mid-nineteenth
century. After his death, Na Yakubu was succeeded by his eldest son,
Abudulai I, and later by another son, Andani II, who was born of a
different mother. The observed tradition in selecting the Ya Na
allowed only sons or grandsons of Ya Nas to succeed to the skins of 
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Yendi. The system of polygamy practised by the chiefs, however,
posed serious problems as far as selection was concerned, since both sides
were likely to have a wide range of eligible candidates for nomination
to Yendi. Furthermore, even when rules were established for the
selection of the Ya Na, these were not always consistent and were far
from rigidly followed as each side pressed hard, often through violent
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means, to have its candidate installed on the vacant skin.
Until 1953 the pattern of succession was based on a rotation system
according to which descendants of the two brothers, Abudulai and Andani,
were selected alternately. Under this system no gate had, in theory at
least, been able to establish the permanence its power and authority
in Dagbon, although, of course, the length of a successors rule could
enhance its position considerably. In the Batter respect the Abudulai
gate had the overwhelming advantage, for between 1900 and 19&9 their
three candidates sat on the Yendi skin for a jeriod of forty-nine years
5b . . .between them, compared with the Andanis* sixteen. The significance
of this pattern was that it enabled the AbuduHads to create a vast number 
of nobles or sub-chieftaincies, which provided them with an especially 
firm power base in Dagbon.
From the mid-fifties onwards, during the reign of Na Abudulai III,
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national-level politics had assumed an important role in the Dagomba
traditional political system, ■ The introduction of universal suffrage in
the Gold Coast in 195*N and the advent of political parties trying to
establish a foothold in the North, meant that the support of the paramount
chiefs was crucial if aspirant politicians were to be successful there.
The Convention People's Party (CPP) at first attempted to win.Na Abudulai's
support, but the chief was not prepared to commit his people to the
independence movement with which this party was associated, on the grounds
that the North was not sufficiently developed, either economically or
politically, for his people to benefit from self-rule - which would
effectively mean rule by Southerners. This was a view widely held by 
55Northerners, Furthermore, Na Abudulai identified (covertly) with the
Northern People's Party (NPP), a party which favoured a federal 
arrangement if and when self-government was to be granted.
The refusal of the paramount chief to allow himself to be enticed 
by the CPP set in motion a series of political manoeuvres by that party 
which saw parliamentary candidates, both commoners and royals, switch 
allegiances while the CPP also started a campaign to have the Ya Na 
deposed on the grounds that he was not constitutionally enskinned and 
that he was old and deformed. In the end, Na Abudulai was forced by 
political pressures to capitulate, and several of his former supporters, 
including the Tolon Na who "crossed the carpet" in December 1958 upon the 
advice of the Dagomba State Council, joined ranks with the CPP, From 
that moment onwards, the precedent was set for national politicians to 
intervene in, and manipulate, the Yendi skin nominations, and every 
government since Nkruraah's CPP has had an effective hand in installing 
the Ya Na of the Dagombas. In 197^» Acheampong himself played a minor 
role in removing Mahamadu Abudulai IV (who had been appointed at the 
behest of the NLC) from Yendi into exile in Accra while the Andani
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candidate, Yakubu, was being prepared for installation as Ya Na. This 
formed the basis of the Andani/Acheampong alliance in Dagbon which lasted 
until Acheampong's removal in 1978.
The intervention by national politicians gave an added dimension to 
the dispute, and the events of the sixties and seventies witnessed a 
level of activity hitherto unknown among supporters who desperately wanted 
to have their candidate appointed. As we shall see, supporters stood 
to gain immensely if a candidate representing their gate was actually 
installed into office.
The Nature and Origin of Prominent Andani Supporters
Although the Andanis had a large following in Dagbon - estimated at 
about fifty per cent - not all their supporters benefitted (at least 
directly) from the alliance with the Acheampong regime. The principal 
beneficiaries were the members of the Andani royal family (who were 
appointed to various chieftaincies throughout Dagbon) and prominent 
supporters, i.e. commoners. Of course, not all 'blood* members of the 
family held political office as chiefs; a number of their princes held 
positions as professionals, executives, or businessmen, while others held 
important military posts both locally and nationally. These together 
formed an important element in the network of Andani patron-client 
relationships•
As far as the prominent supporters were concerned, these included 
mainly members of the business and professional classes, although they 
might also include members of the 'intermediate' classes, such as clerks, 
artisans and small farmbrs. Commoners' support in preference for one 
gate over another was based on one or more of the following criteria': 
political orientation, religious affiliation, or family tradition.
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Supporters did not become such only after a gate had been installed in 
power; their support for the gate of their choice might go back several 
years - long before the candidates assumed important offices in Dagbon. 
Before the Andanis came to power their supporters provided various 
services to members of the family, including transport and farming inputs, 
and, in some cases, cash donations. Candidates who were eligible for 
senior chiefdoms like Savelugu, Mion, Karaga and Gushiegu - the first 
three being direct gates to Yendi - were especially lavished with expensive
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gifts. One of the earliest Andani supporters among the big Dagomba
rice-farraers was Alhaji Sumani Zakaria, who was a regular visitor to the 
palaces of the Kumbung-Na (who subsequently became Yo Na) and Mion-Lana 
Andani (who was installed as Ya Na during 1968-69) when he was a 
government driver, and long before he was engaged in serious rice farming. 
His support for this gate was based on the belief, according to him,
11 that the Andanis were better leaders for Dagbon, and whenever they came
57into power there was always peace and prosperity among the natives’*.
Because of the limited resources at the time, Zakaria's "gifts” to the
chiefs were moderate by comparison with those of the more affluent
supporters. As he explained: "I did not have the means to give them
big gifts like some of our wealthy supporters, but I carted their farm
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produce to Yendi and Tamale, and wherever they asked me to go”.
There were several other prominent rice farmers among the early and
active supporters of the Andanis. Alhaji Huseini ’’befriended” Dakpema
(Tamale fetish) in the early sixties, long before this chief was appointed
to office, and was also paying homage to Mion-Lana Andani "long before he
59became Na (Andani III) in 1968”. After each harvest he donated part 
of his yield to these chiefs as recognition of his respect for them, and 
which they used to maintain their "status and prestige” among Dagombas. 
According to Kuseini, such produce was generally sold by the chiefs and 
the proceeds used to purchase "small luxury items like radios, power
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generators, refrigerators, and so on, or to meet other expenses befitting
a royal dignitary".^ Chief Farmer Yakubu, who was Chairman of the RGA
during 1977/78, was also a "very close friend" of Dakpema since the 1950s,
and in 1966, they both played a very active role in recruiting members
for the Northern Youth Association (NYA) which was founded by Ibrahim 
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Mahama. Throughout the subsequent chieftaincy troubles in Dagbon,
Yakubu joined with others like Ibrahim Mahama, J.S. Kaleem (a former 
regional Education Officer who was later appointed Zobogu-Na, a Tamale 
sub-chieftaincy), J.H. Allassani (a former Minister in the Nkrumah regime), 
and Alhaji Suraani Zakaria, as the most vocal Andani supporters in the 
North.
The continuous dispute between the two gates as to the legitimacy 
or constitutionality of the sitting candidate, and its spread into
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national politics via political patrons, especially during 1967/68, 
resulted in each side being supported by highly placed officials in Accra. 
The disputes were often long and acrimonious, and had to be settled by 
officially appointed bodies, a process which took a heavy toll on each 
party’s financial resources. Cash contributions came from all prominent 
supporters, including those who were later to become very big rice-farmers.
It was conceivable, therefore, that after the Andani candidate had 
been appointed to the Yendi paramountcy their most active supporters would,
as a matter of consequence, be adequately compensated. Thus the
benefits and privileges bestowed upon the prominent Andani supporters among 
the very big Dagomba rice-farmers during the alliance with Acheampong were 
a direct result of their earlier and sustained support for that gate.
Motivation, political behaviour and identification
The split of the royal family into two rival camps did not diminish
the importance of chieftaincy to Dagombas to any significant extent. Its
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social, political and spiritual values remained intact.
The importance of chieftaincy to Dagombas cannot be truly understood
outside the context of these people*s own experiences. Its values and
real meaning to these people cannot be internalised by the •stranger*,
and only the most methodical and perceptive of observers can hope to
understand its impact upon the Dagombas and their motives for identifying
with one or another of the rival gates, Mallam Seidu Alhassan, an
Arabic teacher from Yendi, provided one account of the Dagombas*
perception of chieftaincy:
**If you are a true Dagomba you must show respect for your chiefs.
We see our chiefs as a link with our past. They represent all 
the mysteries of our wonderful past. They remind us of how 
dignified our leaders were, and of how they commanded the respect 
of their people. We look to them for guidance because through 
them the secrets and mysteries come to us ••• all the secrets 
of the past. And if you have a right (i.e. honest) chief in 
the village it will enjoy peace and prosperity for as long as he 
is there. Everyone has to show respect to his chief, even the 
big men and the politicians come to pay homage.
In this school I teach the children about the Koran, not about 
Dagomba customs. They already know about that from their 
parents, from their big brothers and sisters, and even from the 
drums. They learn about their past in their everyday lives.
All of us Dagombas know our history, and it is all about chiefs 
and respect for our elders. So if you take chieftaincy from 
us we are left with nothing.
Thus according to Mallam Alhassan, chieftaincy is an embodiment of the
Dagomba past, and chiefs are not only regarded as a symbol of spiritual
enlightenment, but also as an instrument through which this society
achieves cohesion and continuity.
The theme of continuity was also taken up by Zobogu Na Kaleem, one
of the most literate chiefs in the North. According to Zobogu Na, one
of the main characteristics of chieftaincy in Dagbon is its communal
orientation: i.e. the ability to organise comnnmities around individual
chiefs who have kept the community intact by providing spiritual guidance
6kand political leadership. Such qualities have been especially
important in view of the *turbulent* nature of USagoraba history.
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"The invasions of Dagbon by the Ashanti and others in the early 
days, and the disputes between Dagbon and the neighbouring 
states, or even between rival groups within Dagbon meant that 
there had to be strong leadership from the chiefs if our 
country (the Dagomba state) were to survive. Without such 
qualities from our chiefs Dagbon would certainly have vanished.
The way and manner that our people depend upon their chiefs for 
leadership, spiritual guidance and for moral upliftment, I would 
say is a legacy of the past."^
The Zobogu Na also believed that Dagbon came perilously close to 
collapse during the early colonial period, especially during its 
occupation by the British and Germans. As he points out, the Dagombas
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were deprived of their king during that period of political uncertainty,
and it was only because of the profound trust which the people had in
their chiefs, together with the chiefs* own respect for tradition and
accountability to their subjects, that further political crisis was
avoided and the possible dissolution of the state forestalled.
"Our chiefs and their people exercised patience, and in the end 
Dagbon became even stronger than before ... The present
trouble in Dagbon (a direct reference to the Andani/Abudulai 
conflict) is not about whether or not our people have respect 
for their chiefs; it is about the right of selection ...
Chieftaincy in Dagbon will always be, with or without conflict.
There will always be disputes about rights because there will be 
several candidates who are eligible for selection. But, my 
friend, that does not take the meaning away from chieftaincy, 
and for hundreds of years to come, the power and glory of
Dagomba chiefs will still be with us."^
The essence of traditional authority and its significance to Dagombas 
is hopefully elucidated by the above comments. These comments emphasise
the fact that spirituality was one of the most important criteria on which
support for chieftaincy was based.
But were Dagombas* motivation as regards support for, or identification 
with, their choice of gate based upon similar considerations as those for 
chieftaincy as a whole? As we have already explained, gate politics
had its origins in the pattern of succession involving two of Na Yakubu*s 
sons, Andani and Abudulai. Support for each line was hereditary as far
as members of the family were concerned. It was also based on family 
connections through intermarriage between royal and 'commoner* classes.
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As the practice became more widespread, each side built up a wider
constituency of support based on such connections.
Gate support was to a considerable extent also influenced by sympathy.
Dagombas supported a particular side because of benefits to their
community or to themselves as individuals which they derived from chiefs
belonging to either gate. The prevalent opinion among the subjects
that prosperity in Dagbon is correlated with gate (i.e. Dagbon experiences
prosperity only when their gate is in power) is an important factor
determining support. Thus according to the testimony of some Andani
supporters, the reign of their gate has always been marked by a period
of affluence caused by increased agricultural productivity, while
Abudulai reign is generally characterised by war and strife in Dagbon.
By the late 1970s, and perhaps earlier, political allegiance to one
side or the other seems to have become fairly "fixed” for most
supporters: sufficiently so as to prevent switches of support out of
short-term economic or "patronage” considerations. As an Abudulai
supporter explained:
”For a very long time the authorities have been trying to force 
us to bury our differences and support Andani. First it was 
Nkrumah, then Acheampong, and now Rawlings. But the 
politicians don’t understand the magnitude of the problems which 
they have created. They sacked Mahamadu from Yendi and installed 
their own man from the Andani side. As far as we are concerned 
Mahamadu Abudulai is our rightful leader, and all our supporters 
know that an injustice was done. We cannot switch our support 
just, like that ... We have to show respect to our leader.
Before Mahamadu there was Na Abudulai, and before that was 
Na Mahama. All these chiefs had the support and respect of their 
people. So we the present generation of supporters have to 
stand firm and get our leader reinstated as Ya Na, so that 
Abudulai can regain power here in Dagbon.'^g
Thus it is quite clear from such comments that the main concern among
Abudulai supporters was with the reinstatement of their gate to power.
This theme, together with the notion of irreconcilability, were central
to the political philosophy of Alhassan Ziblim,. the former Sang-larra and
secretary to Mahamadu Abudulai.
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’When you talk about a coalition you must also imply the 
question of power-sharing. The Andani people are not 
interested. Their wish is for the Abudulai family to 
remain weak so that in the end we (the Abudulais) will vanish 
altogether. That would leave only their candidates available 
for selection as Ya Na. Even if we accepted the proposals of 
the AFRC we are still left with no guarantee that the dispute 
would be finally solved ••• As far as we are concerned, 
our duty above all is to the Abudulai cause. We need to 
protect our own interest. Only when our chief is reinstated 
will we be in a position to negotiate. Until then I cannot 
see any realistic hope of the two sides forming a coalition.
The political considerations influencing gate support were not
restricted only to Abudulai supporters; the Andanis al60 stressed the
importance of power and authority, though from a somewhat different
perspective. While the Abudulai side based their arguments on the need
to regain power, the Andanis stressed the importance of its consolidation
in Dagbon. According to Alhaji Salifu Abdul-Rahamani, a large scale
rice farmer and very prominent Andani supporter, the control of political
power in Dagbon had "strengthened the foundations of the Andani family,
70and guaranteed prosperity for Dagbon". This supporter further argued
that, since 1973 under Andani, the Dagomba state had become stronger
politically, and that "there was greater cooperation between groups and
71government bodies". He continued:
"Under Andani, Dagbon has received recognition throughout the 
whole of Ghana, and Dagombas are now playing a more important 
role in the affairs of the country. Our people know that it 
is important to continue to give their support to Na Andani 
because that way the whole country (Dagomba state) will benefit. 
Andani has brought development ... and we cannot ignore the 
opportunity to bring more improvement to this region. That is 
why I personally get so involved preaching: to our people and 
the villagers about the merits of Andani rule."^
However, "as Mumuni Gariba, a nephew and secretary to the Kumbungu
chief suggests, gate support need not be influenced exclusively by
one single factor:
"People come to see my uncle for many reasons ... Some come 
because he will give them land to farm. - Some officials come 
on business. Others come to show their respect, while some 
come just to keep company. Some, like you (the author) come 
from far away to ask him questions ...
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nMy uncle is a very powerful (influential) man and he has helped 
several local rice farmers to obtain loans from banks to run 
their farms. He also has very many friends in high places in 
Accra. These officials always come to greet him when they 
visit the North. When the people hear that these big men have 
visited the chief they feel very happy because they know that he 
is keeping high company which will be turned to the advantage 
of the village. For that reason, most of the villagers 
support him.”^
Gate politics is unquestionably a very complex (and intricate) issue, 
and the wide-ranging reasons given by supporters for their allegiance 
to their gate merely underlines its complex nature. What has become 
clear, however, is that gate support is basically hereditary, and that all 
other intervening factors merely serve as a means of reinforcing such a 
position.
It is important that supporters maintain their gate into power, 
because through this they will receive patronage. By its association with 
the central government the ruling gate made it possible for its supporters 
to gain access to funds and resources. Thus as a result of the alliance 
between the Andani gate and the Acheampong regime, supporters of this 
gate were in receipt of huge economic benefits, especially during the 
period between 1976 and 1978, which represented a period of expansion in 
large scale rice farming in Dagbon especially. The Ya Na exercised 
considerable influence in the distribution of resources by nominating or 
endorsing officials at key establishments concerned with the development of 
rice farming in particular, and of regional development in general.
These included the Dagomba district councils, the State council, banks, 
farmers* associations, farming agencies, and several regional corporations.
The new importance or dimension acquired by gate politics in Dagbon 
was in a sense both the effect of the general economic development of the 
North in the post-independence period, and its incorporation during the 
mid 1970s into a wider political framework through ’annexation* of the 
Dagomba ruling gate with the central political regime. The
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commercialisation of agriculture merely emphasised the political 
significance of this gate as influential members of the regime who were 
engaged in large scale rice farming in Dagbon developed a close 
occupational relationship with members and leading supporters of the 
dynasty*
Later in this thesis we will hope to demonstrate the inter­
relationship between gate membership or support and successful rice farming 
in Dagbon, and also to show how political behaviour was determined by 
gate allegiance. But first we will consider economic development in the 
North more generally so as to place subsequent economic and political 
development in Dagbon in its proper context.
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CHAPTER 2
AN OUTLINE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PRIOR TO THE ACHEAMPONG PERIOD
In this chapter we propose to examine first, the strategies that were 
adopted by the colonial government for the development of the North from 
about the second half of the colonial period and their impact upon traditional 
political structures there, and secondly, the country*s economic performance 
during the period leading to the Acheampong regime. In this way the develop­
ment of agriculture, and more especially rice production, will be placed in 
its economic context.
SECTION Is COLONIAL STRATEGIES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTH
Early economic policies towards the North were dictated by two main
considerations. Firstly, the Northern Territories were regarded as a
source of cheap labour for the development of the more industrialised South.
A system of •forced* labour developed there during the 1920s by which the
Northerners were compelled to devote a minimum amount of free labour for
the construction of government projects. The bulk of the labourers,
however, were recruited for employment in the South on public works, such
as roads, railways and ports. A large number of Northern labourers were
also recruited by the mining companies in the South, while many others made
their way as migrant labourers on cocoa farms there. The competition for
Northern labour, especially between the government and the mining companies,
2
often resulted in bitter dispute and acrimony between the parties.
The- second consideration which influenced early economic policies 
in the North was its conceived role by the authorities as supplier of food 
to the South. Both these conceptions of the economic role of the North 
had long-term repercussions for its economic development, and even the 
decline of one of the Gold Coast*s major industries, namely palm oil, from 
about 1890, and the concern by the colonial administration by 1925/26 of a 
possible failure of the leading industry, cocoa, did not lead to a phange 
of strategy as regards the development of the North.^ Policies remained 
piecemeal and fragmentary.
\
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The administration of the Northern Territories as a protectorate 
also meant that it was further 'isolated* from the rest of the Gold Coast, 
and was never at any time incorporated within the framework of its general 
development* To make matters worse, the system of indirect rule 
practised in the North from about 1930 onwards, by which the local 
administration governed through chiefs, was not conducive to its economic 
or political development, as we shall see. This system was ideological 
in so far as it was set up to reduce the dependence of the protectorate 
on the more resourceful South, as well as being designed to produce a 
type of 'native* that was consistent with the perceptions of colonial 
rule. The policies adopted for the development of the North must 
therefore be seen in the broader context of the general politics of 
colonial development.
Early Economic Policies Towards the North
Initially the Gold Coast administration regarded shea butter as one 
of the most viable industries in the development of the North, but it also 
showed an increasing reluctance to finance it. Shea trees were found in 
large quantities throughout the North. Although demand tended to be 
mainly local there was in fact a southbound trade which declined steadily 
up to 1930, as indicated by Table 2*1*
TABLE 2.1: Shea Butter Southbound Trade, 1924-1930
Year Amount (tons)
1924 16,530
1925 13,632
1926 14,592
1927 9,275
1928 6,574
1929 6,424
1930 5*588
Total 72,615
Source: Adapted from the Dept, of Agriculture Annual Reports, 1924-1930.
(Note: Figures are for shea-butter kernels, and not the finished product.)
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The gradual drop in the southbound trade did not, however,
represent a decline in the production of shea butter as a whole, but
rather an increase in local demand; in fact, more shea butter was being
produced in the North. The Department of Agriculture estimated that in
1925 about 21,569 tons of the product was used internally, and a similar
amount exported, making a total of ^3,138 tons, with a production
Zf.
potential of *f20,311 tons of kernel.
Throughout the 1920s the Government was still largely preoccupied
with compiling reports on the ’possibilities' for agricultural development
in the North. Policies regarding its development were influenced mainly
by bureaucrats in Accra rather than the better-informed political
officers of the local administration who, generally,showed a clearer
insight into the problems and needs of the local people. Thus, despite
the excellent prospects of the shea butter industry,and the strong
recommendation by officers in the Northern administration, its development
on a commercial scale did not take place as the government decided against
it on economic grounds. The construction of factories in the North for
5
its production was not considered viable. The interest in shea butter 
was accordingly reduced to 'experimental' work*
The decision against the development of the shea butter industry 
exposed at the same time an important and fundamental difference of 
approach between rival factions in the administration. On the one hand 
was a 'conservative' faction headed by Auchinleck, the Deputy Director, 
which was opposed to the development of cash crops in the North, while 
on the other was a 'progressive' faction led by Knowles, the Director, 
which strongly advocated a policy of crop diversification for export.
This internal struggle between the two factions persisted throughout 
the 1920s, and was clearly dominated by the 'conservative' faction which 
had the overwhelming support of the Governor, Guggisberg, who did not
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only criticise the proposed development of the shea butter industry,
but also expressed doubts about the ’’ability” of the Director of
Agriculture for the attention he was giving "to the many new agricultural
products of export value which have been the subject of experiment during
the past few years ...”^
The policies of the central government as regards economic development
in the North remained unpopular outside government circles and were
widely criticised by nationalist politicians, local administrators, and
private interests. For example, the United Africa Company (UAC), a
private concern with growing commercial interests in Africa, challenged
the policy of excluding the North from economic participation in the
colony's development. The Company raised two important points:
firstly, the economic instability of the country arising from its
dependence on one main source of agricultural export; and secondly, the
Northern Territories which comprised nearly on©-half of the colony was
7
contributing practically nothing to its welfare as a whole. According 
to the UAC, investigations had shown that the Borth was capable of ’’rapid 
production of considerable quantities of groundnuts which, with shea nuts 
... would constitute valuable export if means could be devised to effect
g
cheap transport in the Gold Coast”.
Thus an important pre-requisite for the establishment of a profitable
export trade, and the development of the North more generally, would be the
availability of cheap transport to the South. As a result, the UAC called
for an extension of the Takoradi/Kumasi railway line to the Northern
Territories, but its construction there did not meet with the approval of
the Governor despite the sound economic arguments put forward in its favour.
As the company pointed out:
Everyone will appreciate your (the Governor's) desire to refrain 
from saddling the colony with heavier capital expenditure than
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it is able to carry, but 1 hope you will agree with me that in the 
case of a newly developing country such els the Gold Coast one may 
take an optimistic view of its future possibilities, and with the 
port facilities now available at Takoradi, it must be in the 
interests of the colony to feed it with all the produce that cam 
be economically brought to it.^
The government’s main objection against the extension of the railway
to the North was that the colony did not have the reserves to finance
such a capitsil intensive project. But this wsis hardly a convincing line
of argument since, under the Colonial Development Act of 1929* the
Tresisury had the power to make advances to governments of any colony for
the purpose of aiding agriculture and industry, including the
"improvement of internal transport suid communication”. As the UAC
rightly pointed out, the continuation of the railway to the North
appeared to be a case which could be brought within the provision of this 
10statute* But the government maintained its hardline policy and
declined subsequent proposals from the Colonial Office for the
11implementation of any such project.
Alternative Cropping Strategies
Shea butter was not the only potential export crop to be considered 
by the authorities for the development of the North; cotton and ground­
nuts were also regarded at one time or another as being potentially 
capable of generating economic development there, although initially 
doubts were expressed about the viability of cotton. Early interest 
was confined to experiments, suid these were carried out mainly in 
Togoland.
The early doubts about the prospects of cotton as an important 
export crop were based upon the uncertainty of the world trade and the 
instability of prices on the whole. Although prices were favourable 
during the early 1920s, the Colonial Office had serious reservations about 
the commercialisation of the industry, since it believed that the enhanced
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12cotton prices could hardly remain permanent* For this reason, early
interest in cotton was confined to experimentation*
By the late 1920s, however, interest in the industry was revived
mainly because of the advantages to the British (Lancashire) trade* In
view of the natives' experience with the crop, the North was regarded as
13being ideally suited for its cultivation* According to the Director 
of Agriculture, the main requirements for the establishment of the 
industry there were the distribution of a suitable seed and a guaranteed 
price for the product* The local administration was highly 
enthusiastic about the prospect of an export industry being established 
in the North, and despite financial constraints, a campaign was launched
15
to instruct the natives on the use of improved techniques of cultivation.
Achievement was, however, very limited due to the lack of funds from the
central authorities, and for the rest of the colonial period cotton
16
development in the North merely continued "under investigation11.
The development of new export crops in the North was bound to be 
affected by the relatively low level of expenditure on agriculture.
Between 1931/32 and 19AA5» total expenditure remained more or less 
constant, with slight fluctuations between years (Table 2 #2); and if we 
consider that cocoa, the main export crop, constituted by far the largest 
single item of expenditure, the amount made available to the development 
of commercial crop industries in generail, and in the North in particular, 
must have been negligible. In 1938/39» only £150 was voted for the 
shea butter and oilseed industries there, while £200 was allocated to 
mixed farming. Similarly, in 19^1/^2 only £Mf was made available to 
these industries, and £*f5 (estimate) for each of the subsequent years 
19^ 1 A 2 and 19^2A3. 17
Groundnut production on a commercial basis was not seriously 
considered until the late 19^ +0s when the Gonja Development Plan was
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TABLE 2.2: Gold Coast: Expenditure on Agriculture (1931/32 - 1945/46)
Year Amount (Actual)
1931/32 81,859
1932/33 74,412
1933/34 70,85'+
193V35 77,280
1935/36 77,998
1936/37 80,939
1937/38 93,166
1938/39 100,215
1939/40 95,154
1940/41 88,106
1941/42 92,625
1942/43 74,853
191+3 /44 88,287
1944/45 92,545
1945/46 134,599
Source: Adapted from Gold Coast Estimates (Various).
proposed as a result of a report by the West African Oilseeds Mission.
The project was to be set up in the Damongo area, and with the use of
mechanised farming techniques it was estimated that approximately 200,000
19tons of decorticated nuts would be produced annually for exports. It
would be organised along cooperative lines and would include three stages 
of development:- (1) the employment of paid male labourers; (2) the 
settlement on the land of the families of the labour force while it was
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still directly employed as paid labour; (3) the emergence of permanent
20peasant communities. The scheme, which would have started initially 
with 8,000 acres and eventually expand to over 22^,000 acres, would cost 
an estimate £ 12, 717* 800.^
Conceived by the Mission as one of the most ambitious schemes yet
proposed for the development of agriculture in the North, the Gonja
Development Plan (which was run by the Gonja Development Company) was
actually launched in 1950, but not on the scale originally intended.
The performance of the project was decidedly unsatisfactory with crops
yielding extremely poor results. By January 1953 only 3*800 acres had
been cleared, in contrast to the 100,000 acres anticipated by the
original plan (See Table 2. 3 for the estimated production target).
Furthermore, the project encountered several operational problems as
machines started to break down due to their general unsuitability for the
tasks undertaken. Man-power resources were also badly utilised. A
total of seventeen senior (European) and fifteen junior (African) staff
were engaged in addition to the several hundred labourers who were engaged
every year. As La Anyane has noted,the senior staff were not trained
agriculturists, and within a short time the failure of the project was so
complete that by 1956 the Company was liquidated having achieved nothing
22except ’’extravagant expense” for the Ghana Government.
The failure of the Gonja project reflected those of several other 
schemes introduced in the North at one time or another during the colonial 
period. Quite apart from the fact that these projects were not 
generally designed with the interests of the local people in mind, they 
also failed to take into consideration the cultural habits and •traditional' 
arrangements of the people. The Gonja project, for example, took very 
little note of the fact that the area parcelled out for the scheme was 
one on which the people of Damongo relied heavily to satisfy their day-to-
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day needs, and it required a letter of protest from the Yabumwura, the
Gonja paramount chief, to bring this fact to the attention of the 
23authorities.
TABLE 2 *3: Gonja Development Plan Production Target
Year
Acreage
Cleared
Progressive
Total
Area under 
Groundnuts 
Progressive 
Total
Tonnage of 
Shelled Nuts*
1948 8,000 8,000 - -
1949 4,000 12,000 4,000 1,000
1950 Nil 12,000 4,000 1,000
1951 Nil 12,000 4,000 1,000
1952 40,000 52,000 4,000 1,000
1953 100,000 152,000 24,000 6,000
195** 120,000 272,000 64,000 16,000
1955 120,000 392,000 104,000 26,000
1956 120,000 512,000 144,000 36,000
1957 120,000 632,000 184,000 46,000
1958 40,000 672,000 224,000 56,000
1959 Et Seq. 56,000
Total Output 
Gold Coast
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
12,000
32,000
52,000
72,000
92,000
112,000
112,000
* 4 Acres per ton
Source: Abstract of West African Oilseeds Mission (NAG, Tamale, TNA
12/8*0
The most unfortunate aspect of the governnent*s approach to the 
development of agriculture in the North was that for over thirty years 
during colonial rule it concentrated entirely mpon trivial experiments 
at the expense of educating the people in better methods of agriculture, 
selection of soil, introduction of new crops, and so forth. The
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Northern farmers received no.significant benefit from the 'experiments* 
conducted at the stations. As the Acting CCNT summed it up, as far as 
the commitment to economic development was concerned, the situation in
2kthe North represented a "deplorable result". One of the main
criticisms of the government's policy was its continued tendency to ignore
the fact that transport and communication were important to the development
of the area. The communication system was so poor, that, according to
some local administrators, it appeared to have grown on no special plan
25
"dictated by economic considerations". Policies were also criticised
on the grounds that they took a "national park" approach view of 
development, which consisted of segregating the North from the "evil 
influence" of the South in order to let them work out a gradual, natural 
development
The Post-1930 Approach
From the mid-1930s onwards, there was a change in strategy as far as
agricultural policy in the North was concerned. The Government adopted
a policy aimed at improving the 'quality' of farming. Thus, the use of
intensive farming techniques was advocated for the first time, and a
campaign for the adoption of mixed farming was actively pursued. The
27Stockdale Report was one of the first to recoraoend this approach. This 
Report served to reinforce earlier views that there was no hope of the 
Northern Territories producing a crop which canid be exported outside 
the Gold Coast, and suggested that agricultural policy be directed instead
28
towards the supply of the needs of the Ashanti and the Colony. The
earlier conception of the North as a supplier saf food to the rest of the 
country was therefore revived.
Mixed farming had limited success in the Sforth as a whole. With 
the exception of the Mamprusi district where the number of mixed farms 
increased from 335 in 19^9 to 1,932 by 1956, the scheme was slow to take
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off as suggested by Table 2*4. In Via, for example, the growth of such 
farms remained more or less even from year to year, while in the Dagomba 
district (by far the most important farming area within the Northern 
Territories) growth was so restricted that by 1956 only 3 per cent of the 
total number of mixed farms in the North were actually established there.
TABLE 2.4: Adoption of Mixed Farms in the Northern Territories 1949-1956
District 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
Mamprusi 335 612 810 1171 1245 1485 1629 1932
Wa 19 19 12 12 19 20 16 20
Dagomba 12 18 16 21 30 40 60 60
Total 366 649 838 1204 1294 1545 1705 2012
Source: Department of Agriculture, Annual Reports, 1949/50 - 1956/57
According to the Department of Agriculture in Accra, the success of
the policy in the Mamprusi area was due partly to the transport and
marketing facilities which were more advanced there than in the North-West,
and partly to the more efficient operation of credit schemes by which
29
farmers obtained bullocks and ploughs. On the other hand, the credit
scheme was not administered as efficiently in the Dagomba district (which 
had a better system of road communication than other parts of the North), 
and must be regarded as one of the main reasons for the comparative 
failure of mixed farming there. r
The Dagomba Agricultural Loans Scheme was instituted in 1951 with a 
view to supplying cash to farmers for the purpose of buying bullocks and
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agricultural equipment. A cash loan of about £30 was made to each
30farmer who was deemed qualified to receive it. The scheme ran into 
difficulties very early on, the main problem being that farmers could not 
be trusted to buy stock with their loans as they tended to spend the 
money for other purposes. It was soon to be discontinued in its 
original form after several court cases for recovering loans, and in 
1952/53 loans were given in the form of a pair of trained bullocks.
Such mistrust in the Dagomba farmers (not necessarily an unfounded one) 
most certainly contributed to the failure of the policy of mixed farming 
in the district.
So fair in this section the analysis has focussed on the general 
policies adopted by the colonial government as regards economic development 
in the North. But what impact did these policies make upon traditional 
political structures? In order to answer this question we will need to 
examine the relationship between colonial rule and chieftaincy. We will 
begin our analysis by looking at the role of chiefs during the colonial 
period.
Colonial Rule, Chieftaincy and Economic Hevelopment
Colonial rule was divided into two distinct phases of political
administration: direct and indirect rule. The role of the chief was
prescribed under each system. •Direct* rule came into effect in 1902
when the Northern Territories were formally integrated into the British
Empire, and continued until 1932 (when it was substituted by •indirect*
rule), by which time the administration had started to change its
31political outlook towards the North. Direct rule was basically a
system of rule through chiefs who were regarded as instruments for 
implementing government orders. Bening has pointed out that the 
influence and political importance of the chiefs in respect of their 
communities were quickly realised by the early administrators, and by
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1898, Northcott, the first Commissioner for the Northern Territories,
stressed the need to make use of them during every phase of the
administration while supporting them widely, except in their relationship
32
with neighbouring chiefs and of offences of a capital nature.
The policy of direct rule was ruthlessly pursued by the administration
without either regard or respect for the existing traditional order, and
the authorities could appoint or remove chiefs at will, or even create
new chiefdoms to suit their particular needs. Such a system of rule did
not appear initially to come up against overt opposition from the natives
themselves who were forced* into accepting itf and which caused the
authorities to claim, mistakenly, that ’’the creation of chiefs by
government over the tribes who originally recognised no chief, or where
33no chief could be found, has met with considerable success". The 
practice by local representatives of the Government of creating chiefdoms 
of convenience was based upon a serious misunderstanding of the organis­
ation of traditional society, rather than upon the alleged non-existence 
of such chiefs or chiefdoms. This misunderstanding led to a strange and
often dangerous 'grouping* of tribes for purposes of administration and
. . 3*fpolitical expediency.
Consequently, under such a system of administration chiefs lacked
real authority over their subjects, and their ability to introduce social
change - a capacity which they possessed in the pre-colonial days - was
therefore severely restricted. One of the chiefs' most important
functions during the pre-colonial period was the collection of taxes.
Ferguson and Wilks have suggested that during the pre-colonial period
the Dagomba had possessed a "quite complicated tax structure" which
35unfortunately was allowed to atrophy. Under that system, which was
pyramidal in structure, dues were paid by the people to the local chief, 
from local chief to divisional chief, and from divisional chief to the
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paramount. In addition, there was a regular tax, or tribute, paid by
36
each farmer at each of the five yearly festivals,
Staniland has pointed to another important source of revenue in the
North - caravan tolls - which was abolished in 1907 because of the
government*s desire to encourage trade in foodstuffs with the South,
According to Staniland, "the immediate consequence of the abolition of
caravan tolls was an enormous drop in the revenue of the protectorate
37which took twenty years to regain its level in 1907M« But these 
policies were deliberately pursued in the interests of the South, as
38
remarked by one of the Governors of the Gold Coast, Sir Hugh Clifford,
The effect of these policies was to erode the influence of chiefs over 
their people, as indeed to weaken further the economic structure of the 
North.
Traditional Authority and Education
Education'was regarded by the government simply as a means of
providing staff for the local administration. With such a defined role*
the scope for expansion was extremely limited, and education made no
significant impact upon the North. By 1930, the year marking the
•official* end of direct rule there, only seven schools had been
established throughout the whole of the protectorate - five government
primary schools and two technical schools - and the number of children
39attending was still under six hundred. As far as Dagomba was
concerned, there were only two institutions during that period: the
Tamale Primary School, which opened in 1909* and the Trade School which 
opened in Yendi in 1922, but subsequently moved to Tamale in 1927•
Unlike the South during the early colonial period when education was
/
for the greater part provided by the Missions, the North remained 
practically excluded from their influence. These Missions, especially
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the White Fathers of Ouagadougou, were regarded with utter suspicion -
a suspicion which, according to Bening, led to a restrictive educational
41
policy up to 1957# Objections were also raised against the Wesleyan 
Mission Society which, after first setting up a centre in Tamale in 1912, 
was compelled by government policy to withdraw, after only four years in 
the North.
The main objections to the Mission schools were both doctrinaire and
political. The local administration argued that the time had not yet
come for the protectorate to be opened to further missionary enterprise,
and furthermore,it deprecated the introduction in the North of "numerous
denominations" which tended to confuse the natives and which, it claimed,
eventually played off one against the other to the "detriment" of the
42spread of Christianity among them. The administration also expressed 
"grave concern" about what it considered to be "subversive activities" 
of the French-influenced White Fathers and the disruptive effects this 
might have had among the Northerners. It was not until about 1921 that 
the Missions were finally permitted to establish in Tamale, and even then, 
they were severely restricted by the requirements of the local admini­
stration as to their location and sphere of activities.
Education in the North only took on some significance in the mid- 
1920s after the Governor, Guggisberg, expressed an •interest* in the area. 
Although there would be an enhancement of traditional institutions while 
maintaining a *high standard* of education, there would be no great 
expansion of the school system. The number of schools would be limited
both by the teachers available and the Governor*s desire to concentrate
43resources on the building of Achimota College in the South. Requests 
to open several schools throughout the protectorate were turned down for 
these very reasons. The first senior school in the North was not 
opened until 1927 in Tamale. Average attendance for all schools
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remained very low (about 900 in 1932 compared with over -^1,000 in the 
Colony of Ashanti), and expenditure on education amounted to £6,955 
(compared with £168,150 in the Colony .arid Ashanti)
The policy of limited educational expansion in the North was designed 
to prevent the growth there of an educated elite or •scholars* as they 
were euphemistically known in the South, who became the champions of 
nationalism in the Gold Coast* It was carefully planned instead to 
produce a class of administrative •auxiliaries* required by the government 
for the effective running of the local administration: teachers, clerks,
works foremen, treasurers, policemen, and so on* Northerners were 
virtually excluded from secondary and higher education, and although a 
handful filtered through the system and attended Achimota and other 
secondary schools in the South, it was not until the early 1950s that the 
North had its first university graduate. The disparity between the 
North and South, not only in education, but as regards broad policies in 
general, has led some scholars to interpret the policies of the colonial 
administration as !,deliberately isolationist”• They certainly 
contributed, both directly and indirectly, to the relative under­
development of the North at the time.
We have seen that during the period of direct rule chiefs did not 
play any important role in the administration of the Northern Territories. 
The failure to consult the traditional rulers of the people and to allow 
them a more prominent and responsible role in the running of their 
communities had serious consequences both for the relations between the 
chiefs themselves on the one hand, and between chiefs and their subjects 
on the other, as indeed for the effective runniing of the protectorate as 
a whole. Such belated realisation by the colonial government led first 
to the recommendation, and later the adoption m£', the system of ’indirect* 
rule. Unfortunately, as we shall see, this system was restrictive,
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since it narrowly defined and limited the role of the chiefs.
The Chiefs Under Indirect Rule
•Indirect* rule was introduced in the Northern Territories during
46the early 1930s, and continued until 1945* This system was based on
the conception that African institutions were culturally distinct from
European ones, and that the institutions of government most suited to the
needs of the Africans were those devised by himself. For the first
time, therefore, the colonial government acknowledged the authority and
strategic importance of traditional rulers to the successful running of
the protectorate. The new system did not, however, give power to the
chiefs; their roles were strictly defined by law, and *interpreted*
where necessary by local political officials. Indirect rule was not a
47form of local self-government as suggested by some, nor did it mean, 
as Crowder points out, the "government of African peoples through their
48chiefs"• Traditional rulers were given neither autonomy nor freedom
to formulate or choose between alternative policies. Again, according
to Crowder, what indirect rule did precisely was to lay heavy emphasis
49
on the role of the chief in the government of African peoples.
The Ordinances of 1932 set up Native Authorities under the paramount 
chiefs of the various districts throughout the North: Dagomba, Gonja,
Mamprusi,’ Nanumba, Builsa, Tumu, Lawra, Wa, and Kassena-Nankanni. Each 
Native Authority was given jurisdiction over its own court (its power of 
jurisdiction was limited to certain types of offences) and treasury, as 
well as over a wide range of local matters including markets, lorry parks, 
and sanitation. By 1935 these responsibilities were extended to include 
primary schools, but were limited in scope. For instance, while the 
Native Authorities were required to erect buildings and provide school 
furnishings, meals, and clothing for the pupils, the government continued 
to provide teachers* salaries and school materials. Ladouceur has argued
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nevertheless that the transfer of schools to the Native Authorities held
a decidedly beneficial effect on education in the North, since five schools
were opened there between 1934 and 1936, bringing the total number to
50
tv/elve, while enrolment reached 1,430 by 19z*0«
If the administration of education under indirect rule was considered
successful, then that of tax collection must have been even more
spectacular. During the early years of indirect rule the administration
was indeed reluctant to introduce direct taxation, on grounds of general
poverty in the North. Such a decision, however, must have restricted
further the already limited opportunities for its development. By 1933*
for example, the Yendi Treasury had a revenue of just £593, while the
total receipts of the four divisional treasuries in the Dagomba district
51(Tamale, Savelugu, and Kumbungu being the others) came to only £1,672.
Their major item of expenditure involved the payment of salaries to
chiefs and elders serving on judicial tribunals. When eventually the
authorities were allowed to introduce a system of taxation in 1936, it
proved so effective as to surpass the expectations of the local
administration. The amount collected by the end of the first year of the
experiment was £19,114 - nearly double the estimated amount - so that,
according to Ladouceur, it led indirectly to the establishment of similar
52taxes in the South.
The introduction of the tax did not remain a one-year wonder.
Between 1937 and 1941, the government gave grants-in-aid in the region 
of £13,634, and the Dagomba Native Authority raised between £8,419 and 
£9,140 annually.
Staniland concludes that in terms of the objectives of indirect rule, 
direct taxation was an undoubted success, flproviding a substantial
y
injection of money for Native Authorities and replenishing the strength 
of Dagomba chieftaincy, with all the implications this bore for politics 
later on".5^
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The introduction of indirect rule in the North was considered highly
successful by the administration itself. The authorities were so impressed
by the success of Native Authority councils that they even anticipated the
establishment of a Regional Council of Chiefs in which they would meet 
55yearly. In fact the first such meeting, although largely an informal
affair, took place in Tamale in 1938, and brought all the paramount chiefs 
of the Northern Territories together. Although the war interfered with 
the regular conduct of this meeting, the 1938 meeting was, however, the 
prelude to the Northern Territories Territorial Council which opened in
19*6 .
Despite claims by the authorities about the success of indirect rule 
in the North - and there is no doubt that some important gains were 
achieved in certain areas of administration - the system must be put into 
its proper perspective. The institutions set up by the government were 
not capable of transforming the socio-economic structure of the North.
In the first instance, Native Authorities were not autonomous. Their 
powers were strictly defined and limited to keeping law and order, 
collection of taxes, supervision of markets, and the construction of 
schools. They were not allowed to formulate specific policies for the 
development of their districts \ the chiefs were merely agents or, as
56Ladouceur has put it, ’’useful auxiliaries” to the district administration. 
Secondly (and this point is not totally unrelated to the first), Native 
Authorities were operating within the framework of a broader political 
system which was not designed to let traditional leaders assume the role 
of political leadership within their communities, but rather to make them 
•efficient* in their administrative functions. Colonial administrators
observed very early on that indigenous political institutions were not
/
conducive to their concept of rule, and therefore modifications were 
needed. Crowder has suggested that these modifications fell into two 
categories: first, those of traditional government that were repugnant
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to European ideas of what constituted good government, and secondly,
those that were designed to ensure the achievement of the main purpose
57of colonial rule which was the exploitation of the colonised society.
The most serious obstacle to the development of social change in the North 
was the absence there of an educated elite in general, and within the 
chieftaincy class in particular. Consequently, those very people who 
were entrusted with the task of running the business of Native Authorities 
and giving leadership to the Northern people, were seriously lacking both 
in intellectual and professional capacity. Unlike the South where the 
educated members of the community agitated and fought for social change, 
the uneducated masses in the North were by comparison both timid and 
conservative, and incapable of instituting social, economic, or political 
reform locally.
The policy of neglect and isolationism which characterised the North
throughout the colonial period was conceived very early on. It was
foreshadowed by Sir Frederic Hodgson, the Governor, who stated in 1899
that he would not spend upon the Northern Territories - the •hinterland*
of the Gold Coast - a single penny more than was absolutely necessary "for
58their suitable administration and encouragement of the transit trade’1.
The region was considered to be an economic liability for the rest of the
Colony, and this attitude prevailed throughout the colonial period.
Only Guggisberg, who was Governor of the Gold Coast from 1919 to 1927*
showed any •interest1 in the North, but his achievement was extremely
limited, and his administration failed to establish even the basic
foundations for the future development of the area. The policies
pursued in practice, whether deliberate or as a result of inertia, were
not conducive to the eventual transition to self-rule, with the result
that the North found itself unprepared for the rapid, economic and
59political changes that took place after the Second World War.
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Agriculture continued to be the basis for the development of the 
North in the post-colonial period* But it was not until the 1960s that 
any serious attempt was made to incorporate Northern agriculture within 
the national development framework. Before we go on to examine the 
implementation of such policies, especially as regards the Acheampong era, 
we will first consider the development of the national economy during the 
twenty years or so since independence.
SECTION IlffHE PERFORMANCE OF THE ECONOMY FRQH THE LATE 1930s TO THE 
ACHEAMPONG PERIOD
In Part I of this chapter we attempted an examination of the policies 
adopted by the government in its attempt to bring about economic 
development in the North, and the impact of such policies on the 
traditional political system. In Part II we will consider the general 
economic performance in the pre-Acheampong period with a view to placing 
agricultural development (and commercial rice production in particular) 
in the general context of the national economy. During the period under
consideration economic performance was influenced by two ideologically
opposite development strategies: the socialism of Nkrumah on the one
hand, and the liberalism of the National Liberation Council (NLC) and 
Busia*s Progress Party (PP) on the other. The analysis in this part of 
the chapter draws heavily from Killick.^
Development Strategies in the pre-Acheampong period
Nkrumah attempted to transform Ghana into an industrial state bo­
using socialist strategies which were laid down in the Seven Year 
Development Plan 1963/6^ to 1969/70. The planners stated that Ghana
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was undertaking a period of economic reconstruction and development aimed
at creating a socialist society !tin which the individual Ghanaian will be
able to enjoy a modern standard of living in his home supplemented by an
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advanced level of public services outside"•
Under Nkrumah the state itself would play the major entrepreneurial 
role* Private capitalism (i.e. large-scale enterprises) was discouraged, 
whether Ghanaian or foreign, although Ghanaian enterprises were limited 
mainly to small-scale concerns. The direct participation of the state 
in the productive system was to be achieved by setting up new enterprises 
rather than nationalising private concerns. According to the planners, 
socialism should not be achieved by hindering the growth of the private 
sector, but by maximising the growth of the public sector. Nkrumah*s 
instruments for effecting socialism included legislative controls on a 
number of selected areas such as imports, capital transfers, the licensing 
industry, maximum wages, prices, rents, and the power of the trade unions.
The governments attitude towards private capital was nevertheless 
contradictory, and Nkrumah did not only fail to transform Ghana into a 
socialist state, but under him the economy declined rapidly.
The NLC which came into power in a military take-over in 1966, 
attempted to restore some •order* or •efficiency* in what they perceived 
to be a chaotic situation. Their main policies have been summarised as 
follows
1. reduce pressure on demand on available resources, thus improving the 
balance of payments and easing inflationary pressures. Major cuts 
were also made in public sector investments.
2. a policy of •cautious liberalisation* through which they tried 
(unsuccessfully) to abolish import, price, and exchange controls.
3* emphasis was placed on private enterprise, especially Ghanaian*
Special measures were introduced to assist Ghanaian businessmen, 
policy of obtaining external aid and debt relief from Western countries.
5. attempt to develop through measures like (a) stabilising the economy 
and improving the balance of payments, (b) creating an atmosphere of 
confidence conducive to private investment, (c) giving more 
assistance to peasant farmers, (d) strengthening the economic planning 
capabilities of the public service.
The regime, however, did not achieve its major objectives, and its 
policies were carefully formulated to undermine those of its predecessor.
When the NLC handed over in October 1979 to the newly-elected Progress 
Party (PP) headed by Dr. Kofi Busia, it claimed that Ghana had achieved a 
sufficient measure of economic stability and a fresh basis for new growth, 
but as Killick points out, it still conceded that "major problems" awaited 
solution.^
The Progress Party government was generally in favour of private
enterprise, though its overall strategy was ambiguous. For example, side
by side with its attitude towards freer market forces, the party envisaged
a large role for the state - an ambiguity which Killick notes was neatly
illustrated by the statement pledging to move away from trade controls and
6k
those purporting to improve the enforcement of price controls.
Busia*s chief economic adviser and policy-maker was J.H. Mensah, 
whose major preoccupation was with issues of growth, employment and equality. 
It was Mensah*s firm belief that after nearly a decade of stagnation Ghana 
needed more rapid growth and improved economic performance. The 
strategies adopted for dealing with these problems were however never
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clearly estimated, but four main imperatives are identified as follows 
•1. to raise domestic investment and saving rates;
2. to expand export earnings and attract more external assistance;
to accelerate the *Ghanaianisation* of economic activities; 
k0 to place special emphasis on rural development• ✓
These objectives were taken to entail greater public investment, 
especially in agriculture and other rural programmes. While, however,
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the state was supposed to play a greater role in the development drive, 
certain measures were adopted which partially dismantled the command 
economy. These included the rapid liberalisation of imports and an 
increase in the interest rates, a restraint on wages, and a substantial 
reduction of the real incomes of public servants in 1971* Besides, 
various small-scale business activities were reserved for Ghanaians while 
aliens were expelled from the country.
Busia*s achievements as regards regulating the economy were no more 
successful than those of its immediate predecessors. A high level of 
public expenditure and a large import boom brmight the economy to crisis 
point, and the government was forced to devalue the currency by a massive 
90 per cent in December 1971* This resulted in sharp increases in the 
price of several food items (by approximately 50 per cent) as well as 
those of imported raw materials, machinery and equipment. These 
measures were also directly responsible for the overthrow of this regime 
by the military early in 1972.
So far in Part II we have provided an outline of the development 
strategies pursued by the different regimes since independence. We will 
proceed to examine briefly the general performance of the economy within 
the framework of such strategies.
Domestic Economic Performance
During the latter part of the 1950s the Ghanaian economy appeared to
66grow fairly rapidly - at well over 5 per cent between 1955 and 1960.
The country was well endowed with a healthy economic infrastructure while 
industrialisation was gathering pace. Investment was about 20 per cent 
of GDP in i960, and domestic saving was sufficient to pay for most of it. 
Ghana at the time did not suffer from the serious foreign exchange s.
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constraints of later years. Furthermore, prices were fairly stable, and
the cost of living was rising only very slowly.
By the mid-1960s all that had changed; the economy failed to grow,
67and according to Killick, it might have even retrogressed. It is
estimated that the GNP per head fell from about 0 1*tO in i960 to under
125 in 1969* During the first half of the decade, i.e. during the
Nkrumah period, the GNP was estimated to be expanding at about 2,6 per
cent annually, at approximately the same rate as the population growth.
In the post-Nkrumah period, however, the position deteriorated rapidly,
resulting in very little growth in total GNP, and a decline in GNP per
head. Stagnation of growth occurred despite a massive development
effort during the first half of the decade whsn the investment ratio was
raised from 16 per cent in 1958/59 to 23 per cent in 196^/65 - considered
to be an extraordinarily large figure by the standards of low-incorae 
68countries. It was of course Ghana's 'big push* period when it
accumulated massive increases in capital stock. By 1966 gross capital
69stock stood at / 3*232 million compared with 0 1,68*+ million in 1960,
Despite such effort *Nkrumah still failed to produce economic growth 
either in the short-term or on a long-run basis, A simultaneous 
decline in saving ratios - for example net national saving dropped from 
1,8 per cent growth in 1958/6*+ to 0.3 per cent in 196*+/68 - had serious 
repercussions for economic growth, since it resulted in a growing gap 
between investment and domestic saving. The effect of such movement in 
savings was that by the mid-1960s about a third of gross investment had 
to be financed by capital borrowed from abroad, and which resulted in 
large balance of payments deficits, Busia's attempts to achieve higher 
rates of investment and growth in 1970 and 1971 were not matched by 
adequate measures to increase domestic savings, and led to further 
balance of payments crisis and inflation at home.
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Agricultural Production
Agriculture was one of the main sectors which was earmarked to 
benefit from Nkruraah’s industrialisation strategy. Mechanisation would 
be introduced to revolutionise the structure of rural agriculture and 
improve farmers* living standards. Of course neither of these objectives 
was realised; on the contrary, the mechanisation of agriculture had the 
adverse effect of reducing agricultural output, and it is very doubtful 
(in view of increases in prices as a result of food shortages) whether 
farmers* living standards improved even marginally.
Under Nkrumah the state increased its participation in the productive 
system, including agriculture. The United Ghana Farmers* Council (UGFC)
- the political wing of the CPP - was made responsible for organising 
farmers* cooperatives and providing agricultural extension services, 
while the State Farms Corporation was created to undertake food 
production. The Workers* Brigade and the Young Farmers* League also 
organised farms, while the Food Marketing Board was set up to fix 
minimum prices and improve the distribution of foodstuffs. Each of 
these organisations was run by party officials who were accountable to 
the CPP rather than to the farmers. Their policies therefore reflected 
the broad economic strategy of the government.
Another notable failure in the government*s agricultural policy was 
to be found in the distributive system. Quite apart from a sharp fall 
in the standard of road maintenance, there was also a curtailment in 
feeder road construction as well as large reductions in the number of 
vehicles brought into the country as a result of the shortage of foreign 
exchange. Killick suggests that the declining distributive system gave 
a ”very partial” explanation of the inflation of food prices. According 
to him, the periods when food prices rose more rapidly relative to other 
prices were 1963/66 and 1969/71 when the distributive system was under
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70greatest stress. Falling output, however, contributed largely to 
rising prices.
The poor performance of the agricultural sector was due, in the main,
to the inefficiency of the UGFC which lacked the necessary expertise,
whilst its officials used their position to cheat the farmers who in turn
became increasingly hostile to this organisation. Furthermore, the
UGFC*s task was made more difficult by the shortages of inputs such as
fertilizers, seed and cutlasses, so that by the mid-1960s its services
had deteriorated drastically.
It was Nkrumah*s firm conviction that the provision of extension
services and the use of mechanisation would radically transform
traditional agriculture. According to him, the break with primitive
methods could only be achieved through large-scale importation of
foreign technology - tractors, combine harvesters, and so forth. But
the successful adoption of mechanised farming techniques would depend
upon several factors, especially the regular supply of spares and new
machinery to replace the depreciating stock. In compliance with his
new strategy, Nkrumah pursued his policy of mechanisation in agriculture
and the task of implementing it was left solely in the hands of such
organisations as the state-controlled UGFC which, as we have already seen,
was entrusted with the running of mechanised cooperative farms, the
Young Farmers* League which organised some settlement farms, the
Workers* Brigade with 10 mechanised farms, and finally, the State Farms
71Corporation with 105 such farms.
According to Miracle and Seidman,the UGFC*s failure to establish 
successful mechanised cooperative farms was due largely to its failure in
turn to deliver the tractor-ploughing services and other technical
• 72 yassistance which the farmers needed. Socialised agriculture was also
a failure from the point of view of its drain on national resources as
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well as its general level of physical output. As Killick shows, although
they were supposed to operate on a commercial basis, the state farms
73absorbed 0 19*8 million in subventions during 1963/65* Their failure
in physical output was even more striking. In a comparison of the
performance between peasant farmers and the state farms, Killick concludes
that the state farms achieved lower yields and smaller outputs per man
than peasant farms. The yield per acre for peasant farms was 0.9^ tons
as compared with 0,13 tons for state farms. As regards specific food
crops, peasant farms realised superior yields in all main crops, such as
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maize, rice, yams and groundnuts.
The failure of the state farms were not uniform; some of these, such
as rubber and oil palm became viable, and did better than others, but
even then, Killick argues, their failures were more evident than their 
75successes. The policy of post-Nkrumah governments - the NLC and the
PP - was to keep those farms which showed some promise, and to close
others. As a result, the number of state faros operating between 1966
and 1971 was drastically cut from 105 to 33* and even these did not
perform well. By 1971 only a quarter of the available acreage was under
cultivation, and the State Farms Corporation was making large financial
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losses - an average of 0 1,4 million in 1969 and 1970,
Briefly, then, the domestic performance of the economy was thus 
characterised by an overall lack of growth, and a sharp decline in 
agricultural productivity, especially in state-managed enterprises.
The low productivity in agriculture meant that Ghana was forced to use a 
substantial amount of its dwindling foreign reserves to purchase foodstuffs 
from abroad, thus restricting further the industrialisation programme.
External Economic Performance
By independence, when the structure of the Ghanaian economy was in
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the process of change - and becoming more capital intensive and taking
in more government services - vast suras were required to finance the
development programme. As Szereszewski has pointed out, resources needed
to increase such capital investment did not come from a progressive
77reduction of rival internal uses11 but mainly from abroad. . As a result, 
the government incurred a growing deficit on the country*s balance of 
payments from about 1959 in contrast to the previous years during which 
overall balance was maintained. The extent to which the external 
payments situation deteriorated from 1960 onwards is illustrated by 
Table 2 .5 below.
TABLE 2.5s Summary of Statistics of Ghana*s Balance of Payments,
1960-71 (Millions of Cedis)
Year Balance Overall Current Implicit
of Trade Balance Account Liquidity
1960 -10 -129  ^ -70 544
1961 -72 -203 -219 325
1962 +13 -109 -12 313
1965 -41 -177 -102 211
1964 0 -130 -41 170
1965 -163 -310 -111. 59
1966 -55 -173 -37 22
1967 +26 -117 -44 -22
1968 • +59 -69 -6 -28
1969 +81 -70 -13 -41
1970 +143 -21 +74 33
1971 -36 -191 -94 -6.1
Source: Adapted from Killick, op.cit. p. 102 (Table 6 .1)
Note (i) These figures were calculated on the basis of the exchange 
rate established in February 1972, i.e. # 1.28 = # 1.00.
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According to this Table, between i960 and 19&5 Ghana*s estimated 
international liquidity balance had been reduced from 0 544 million to 
0 59 million. At the same time, very large foreign debts had been 
incurred in order to meet the country's import bills, and by the time of 
the 1966 coup this had amounted to about 0 640 million, Killick argues 
that if all the debt and liquidity positions are taken together, the 
overall deterioration in Ghana's net asset situation was around 0 1,100 
million, with the result that the country financed about two-fifths of
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her imports by running down her reserves and obtaining foreign credits.
During the early 1960s when imports were still increasing, exports
on the other hand were continuously declining as a result of a sharp fall
79in prices from about 195°. While the decline of world cocoa prices led 
to a steady decline of the industry in the later 19&0S, there were other 
dominant influences: the pricing policy of the Cocoa Marketing Board and,
later, the overvaluation of the currency. At the same time other producer 
countries were still expanding their output, so that Ghana began to lose 
its former position as the world's leading cocoa producer. By 1970/71» 
it had contributed only 26 per cent of the world ouput, as compared with
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about 37 per cent ten years earlier. The decline in the sixties of
the cocoa trade, by far the country's largest earner of foreign exchange, 
together with the government's massive expenditure on foreign goods, had 
the effect of seriously weakening the balance of payments situation and 
plunging the country into serious financial crisis.
The NLC had considerable success in improving the foreign payments 
situation. They moved the trading account out of the red, and current 
account deficits were greatly reduced (See Table 2,5)• These improvements
were achieved while export earnings declined. Very large reductions 
were achieved in imports mainly through a combination of disinflationary 
policies at home such as a devaluation in 19&7* tighter control over 
licences. These measures had the important effect of reducing domestic
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investment. But as Killick says, holding down imports was only a 
’’palliative", and improved export performance was essential to any long-run
81solution of the payments problem.
Despite the drastic measures adopted, the NLC still depended on 
large-scale external assistance, and obtained more aid and credit from 
the IMF. By the time Bu^ia came into office in 19&9» the balance of 
payments position appeared to have at least been stabilised, if not 
improved altogether. Cocoa exports began to rise both in value and 
quantity, in response to more favourable world prices. in spite of this 
situation, within two years the government was confronted with a severe
82payments crisis. While cocoa prices (and hence export earnings) were
returning to "historically more normal levels” - between 19&7 ^ d  1968 
the average world price of cocoa rose by 58 per cent to its highest level 
for fifteen years - increased imports had absorbed most of the 'windfall* 
foreign exchange earned in 19^9 and 1970; however, when exports declined 
in 19711 imports were not substantially reduced. After four years of 
surpluses the country experienced its third largest deficit ever on 
current account. Killick sums it up as follows: "reserves slumped,
unpaid import bills piled up, and the IMF was sent for again. A 
desperately large devaluation in December 1971 was followed almost at 
once by another coup and Ghana's second 'democratic experiment' was
• 83
at an end."
It is against this precarious economic background that Acheampong 
seized power, and by which his programme of national reconstruction, 
most especially agricultural development, must be assessed.
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CHAPTER 5
THE SMC, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND PATRONAGE IN NORTHERN GHANA
Chapter Two provided a brief historical analysis of colonial 
agricultural policies regarding the North, followed by a discussion of 
the economic performance of Ghana from the mid-t950s up till the 
Acheampong period. In this Chapter we are concerned with the broad 
strategies employed by this regime for the general development of 
agriculture, and of rice farming especially in the north of Ghana.
Acheampong^ Policy of Self-Reliance
In January 1972 Acheampong overthrew the Busia Government and 
established the National Redemption Council (NRC). According to the 
soldiers, the Government had failed to improve the welfare of ordinary 
Ghanaian citizens and were found guilty of economic mismanagement.
Whatever their'real motives, the NRC leaders attempted to justify their 
seizure of power by condemning the 1971 devaluation of the cedi as 
productive of excessive economic hardships and as a surrender to 
foreign pressure. Shortly after coming to power, it therefore 
announced an alternative "package" of economic measures. These included 
a revaluation of the cedi which reduced the extent of devaluation to 
26 per cent against the United States dollar. Restrictions were 
imposed on certain categories of imports which had previously been put 
on Open General Licence, while price controls were widely extended and 
included most motor vehicle components. Rents were frozen and 
restrictions placed upon increases in wages. The Government also 
announced its intention to reactivate various state enterprises left 
uncompleted or abandoned after the overthrow of Nkrumah. Regional''■ 
Development Corporations were established in every region with the
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stated view of promoting economic development there.
However, it was in its policies regarding agriculture that the
new regime made its greatest impact. The basis of its agricultural
programme was the joint policy of Operation Feed Yourself (OFY) and
Operation Feed Your Own Industries (OFYOI). The stated objectives of
1
the government's policy of self-reliance were three fold :-
1) to produce more food to feed the people;
2) to produce locally more of the raw materials to supply factories;
3) to diversify and increase exports.
The government's approach to the development of agriculture more
generally and rice farming in particular, was based on a policy of input
subsidy. Rather than supplying the various inputs - fertilizers,
improved seeds, tractor services, loans, etc* - at real cost and hoping
that the high world market price would encourage Northern farmers to
%
produce the crop, the government aimed to increase the supply of rice to 
urban markets at artificially low (official) prices, but nevertheless 
to make its production profitable through subsidised inputs.
All farmers were expected to participate in the new agricultural 
programme, including rice farming, but as we shall see, small farmers 
were not encouraged to participate in commercial rice production - the 
bedrock of the government's agricultural policy as regards the North 
- through the unavailability to them of vital subsidised inputs, 
including bank loans. They were expected to concentrate instead upon 
•traditional* foodcrops, such as yams, maize, millet and groundnuts 
with a relatively low subsidy input,but which was considered to be less 
lucrative than rice.
Commercial rice farming, on the other hand, was reserved for large- 
scale producers who were recruited from an assortment of social ^ 
categories: businessmen, professionals, high-level civil servants,
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police and military officers, politicians, and so on. The emerging 
rural elite constituted also a large number of Northerners who were 
already engaged in food production. These local farmers did not 
start small, but had initial capital as well as important local business 
connections. As we shall demonstrate later, the most successful among 
the local (Dagomba) farmers were supporters of the ruling chieftaincy 
faction (which was also supported by the regime),and which gave them 
a decidedly overwhelming advantage.
Thus, although the OFY programme was intended to increase
agricultural output through the involvement of the entire rural sector,
it turned out in effect to be a policy which nurtured a new class of
large-scale commercial farmers that thrived on vast state subsidies at
the expense of small farmers. One consequence of this policy,
according to Bates, has been ’’disparities of wealth, social status, and
2
political power" within the region. Later,when we consider the
relationship between the big farmers and local institutions,we will hope 
to show how precisely this worked.
The SMC*s expenditure on agriculture was indeed an indication of 
its commitment to develop this sector. According to the Five Year 
Development Plan 1975/76 - 1979/80, a total of 0 9991065,876 was 
allocated to agriculture, representing 25.5 per cent of total national 
expenditure.^ Out of this amount, 0 32,868,300 was allocated to the 
Northern. Region where no less than twenty-one development projects were 
earmarked, while 0 67*902,500 was allocated to the Upper Region to 
finance nineteen such projects (See Appendix I and II). A sum of over 
0 100.5 million was therefore allocated to development projects in 
these two regions during the Plan period, representing 10 per cent
A
of the amount spent on agriculture in the country as a whole. This
amount represented by far the highest expenditure allocated to 
agricultural development in the North at any time.
99
This level of expenditure was not unrelated to the ’interest* 
which the regime had in the North, Several commissioners and high-level 
officials of Acheampong*s regime were actually from the North, and had , 
important social and political connections there. In fact the very 
nature of the schemes for increasing rice production - the distribution 
of subsidised inputs, mechanical equipment, etc. - was such that a great 
deal of 'discretion* was given to those officials who administered them 
and therefore tended to favour the politically well-connected. Of 
course it was not only Northerners who constituted the elite and 
privileged group of rice farmers there, but several others from the 
South, including Acheampong himself, and who between them had farms 
scattered throughout the North consisting of several thousands of acres. 
While these absentee farmers were in Accra or on duty their farms were 
being run by farm managers or appointed 'friends'.
Agricultural production was expected to increase rapidly in 
response to government policies. As well as boosting productivity, 
the OFY policy was also expected to conserve important foreign reserves 
through savings on food imports. The government even anticipated a 
surplus production of rice which could be exported to earn valuable 
foreign exchange. In fact in 1973* according to government planners, 
the country achieved a balance of payments surplus of 14-3 million 
which they considered to be a reflection of the "sound economic policies"
Zf
pursued by the government. This assertion was however couched m  
propaganda, since the policies introduced in 1972 and in particular the 
OFY programme, could not have taken effect by then.
No doubt the successful implementation of the OFY policy, with its 
heavy emphasis on intensive farming techniques, rested on the availability
y
of modern farm technology - agricultural machinery, fertilizers, etc.
- which had to be imported. Thus the launching of this programme was
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bound to make heavy demands on the country's foreign exchange reserves. 
In 1972, soon after the OFY campaign was launched, the government had 
the resources available from which to implement its policy, mainly 
because cocoa production, official sales and the world market price were 
all fairly high. This was also, of course, before the 'hiking* of 
oil prices by OPEC countries in 1974 which affected the country very 
seriously and substantially eroded its export earnings. In 1974, 
Ghana's imported crude oil was valued at 0 140 million, and the 
government's financial position was far from being healthy. It was 
also directly responsible for forcing the government to remove subsidies 
on certain essential commodities which had hitherto amounted to 
0 28 million per year."*
The precarious economic situation had damaging effects on the 
implementation of the agricultural programme in the North. Far from 
staging a recovery from the slumps of the early years of the NRC, the 
economy continued to decline rapidly throughout the 1970s. As early 
as 1974/75 it had become clear that the government was in no position to 
implement its agricultural programme unless it received substantial 
assistance from foreign aid-giving authorities. The country's current 
account in 1974 recorded a deficit of 0 212.4 million, and its net 
reserves fell from 0 235*1 million at the end of 1973 to 0 26.1 million 
at the end of 1974 despite heavy short-term borrowings from abroad.^
The immediate effect on the agricultural development programme as a 
result of declining economic performance was an increasing shortage of 
imported farm machinery and spares, and virtually all other forms of 
agricultural inputs. By 1977/78 agricultural production in the country 
had declined considerably, and rice farming in the North had ceased to 
be a viable economic proposition to all but the biggest farmers with 
important 'connections'.
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Growth of Rice Cultivation in Northern Ghana
Ghana had long been an importer of rice. As we cam see from 
Table 2.1*the quantity of rice imported between i960 and 197^ fluctuated 
from one year to the next, but showed sharp rises in intermittent years, 
such as in 1962 when 70,697 metric tons were imported, representing an 
increase of nearly 50 per cent on the previous year; or in 1970 when an 
import of 53*122 metric tons represented another rise of nearly 50 per 
cent. The average yearly import between 1970 and 197^ amounted to Jf1,056.6 
metric tons, with a CIF value of over 12 million cedis. This was a 
substantial increase on the previous five years (1965/69-) imports
amounted to just over 55* 000 metric tons per year on average with a CIF 
value of 5.8 million cedis. In view of the government's newly adopted 
agricultural policy of achieving self-sufficiency in food, such an 
increase in rice imports represented a severe setback and embarrassment.
It was therefore important for the government to take a more serious 
look at its agricultural programme. From the early 1970s onwards,a 
number of agricultural projects were being set up throughout the country, 
especially in the Northern and Upper Regions. Most of these were 
officially designed to help the small-scale farmer improve his 
productivity. One of them, the Upper Regional Agricultural Development 
Programme (URADEP), by far the largest and most ambitious agricultural 
project undertaken in the country, will be discussed later in this 
chapter. Food crop production, and rice production in particular, was 
central to the development of these new projects that were mushrooming 
throughout the North.
Rice had been produced in the country for many years, but it was
not until the mid-sixties, when mechanised farming techniques were
introduced, that the crop was produced on a commercial scale. By i960
7only 1,950 acres came under mechanised production in Northern Ghana.
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TABLE 3.1: Ghana Imports of Rice:Quantity Value and Unit Value
I
Year Quantity CIF Value (1000) Unit Value (C/M.T.)
1960 28,780 (a) 3259.6 113.3
1961 **6,337 5028.7 108.5
1962 70,697 7523.1 106.4
1963 26,357 2960.6 112.3
196** 38,329 3771.9 98.6
1965 29,599 3622.9 122.4
1966 48,200 6440.4 153.6
1967 39,400 6151.0 156.1
1968 30,100 6785.3 225.4
1969 28,064.8 (b) 6002.2 217.5
1970 53,122.0 10109.7 193.3
1971 35,109.5 . 5977.2 172.7
1972 24,268.8 6140.0 253.0
1973 53,573.8 17383.4 271.6
1974 39,104.0 20912.2 580 .9
Sources:-(a) Rice Statistics Year Book, WARDA, First Edition 1975, 
Table 11.
(b) The 1970 Ghana Agricultural Conference on Rice 
Production.
(0) External Trade Statistics 1969-1974, Central Bureau 
of Statistics, Accra.
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As far as Ghana as a whole was concerned, the total acreage increased
8only gradually between 1940 and 1968 (see Table 3 .2).
TABLE 3 *2: Rice Production in Ghana, 1940-1968
Year Acreage Product ion (tons)
1940 27,000 13,000
1950 49,000 22,000
1966 82,000 40,000
1968 113,000 5^,000
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Accra, Proposal for a Rice
Development Project in Northern Ghana, 1971•
Northern Ghana had been the main producer since the early 1960s,
During that time most of the rice grown there was upland rice, and it
was grown in mixed stands with other crops such as maize, yams, or 
9
millet. Within a short period swamp rice replaced upland rice, and
now rice is normally grown in pure stands. By 1970 there was a total 
of 78,000 acres of rice under cultivation (pure and mixed) in the two 
northern regions (See Table 3 .3). Tamale, with 24,000 acres, had 
the biggest acreage under rice production throughout the entire North.
As far as the number of land-holders was concerned, out of a total 
of 60,800 in Ghana as a whole, 5,600 were located in the Northern 
Region (9 per cent) with an average of 6.4 acres of rice per holder; 
in the Upper Region, on the other hand, there were 37,000 holders (or 
62 per cent) who cultivated rice, at an average of 1.1 acres per holder. 
Thus, even if there were a larger number of holders in the Upper Region, 
the average holding there was significantly lower than in the Northern
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TABLE 3.3 i Area Under Rice Production - Northern and Upper Regions 
(Acres), 1970
District Pure Mixed Total
Yendi 7,000 - 7,000
Tamale 24,000 - 24,000
Other Areas 5,000 5,000
Northern Region 36,000 - 36,000
Navrongo, Bolgatanga 18,000 1,000 19,000
Bawku 10,000 3,000 13,000
Other Areas 4,000 6,000 10,000
Upper Region 32,000 10,000 42,000
Total Northern Ghana 68,000 20,000 78,000
Total Ghana 96,000 40,000 136,000
Source: Adapted from Report on Ghana Sample Census of Agriculture 1970
(Table XI.7, p. 86).
Region. . Given the necessary facilities ani inputs, commercial rice
production was likely to be more amenable to expansion in the Northern
Region with its overall larger holdings. The total area under rice
production in the North continued to increase rapidly, especially after
the bumper crop of 1974. According to the Ministry of Agriculture,
the total area under rice cultivation in the North increased from
79,000 acres in 1973/74 to 107,000 in 1975/$, and reached 130,000  
11acres in 1977/78. There were several reasons for this impressive
increase in rice production in the North:
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1) the introduction of subsidised mechanical equipment such as tractors, 
ploughs, combine harvesters, and land-clearing equipment which gave 
access to unutilised lands;
2) the availability of subsidised inputs such as chemical fertilizers 
and improved seeds;
3) the availability of cheap bank loans to large-scale producers;
*f) the financial returns resulting from high input subsidies;
5) the social prestige and new status associated with large-scale 
farming;
6) the availability of large tracts of very cheap land due to a liberal 
system of land tenure.
Mechanisms for Implementing Agricultural Development in the North
Initial capital was one of the most crucial inputs for successful 
farming, especially rice farming, in the Norths. Commercial banks were 
advised to make cheap loans available to farmers, usually at 5 or 6 per 
cent below the market rate of interest. Fanners were also assisted 
by the Agricultural Loans Bank and the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) 
which were set up specifically to provide subsidised loans to farmers. 
While the commercial banks - National Investment Bank, Barclays, Ghana 
Commercial Bank, Standard Bank - provided mainly for the big (and well- 
connected) farmers, the state banks on the otter handy were supposed to 
assist the smaller ones, but as we shall see, small farmers, and small 
rice farmers in particular, were not given the level of assistance which 
they expected of these institutions.
Between 1970 and 1976 the assistance given by banks to rice farmers 
in the Northern Region increased substantially, both in terms of the 
number of farmers sponsored and the amount advanced in cash. According 
to Shepherd, 53 rice farmers in the Northern tegion were in receipt of
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loans from the Banks in 1970, By 1976 this figure had increased to about
12753 involving some 0" 9.5 million. The ADB was the largest single
lender, supporting in 1976 a total of 360 fanners with a total credit
13advance of 0 5*^ million. Although the ADB had cut the amount of
credit advanced to farmers to 0 2.8 million in 1977* it had in fact
1^fincreased the number of farmers receiving loans to 1,080. The number
of loan recipients, however, dropped sharply to 500 in 1978 with a total 
£ 15
credit advance of 1.6 million. This cut-back in cash available to
farmers reflected the policy of the banks in general to reduce credit
in an attempt to check the rate of default among farmers.
Most of the loan recipients, however, were large-scale rice farmers.
According to a sample survey of rice farmers conducted by Shepherd in
the Northern Region, the majority of these - 78 per cent - were large-
scale producers, i.e. with 50 acres or more in size. Shepherd also
found that kk per cent of these loan recipients came from the
16professional, business and senior military classes. My own findings
suggest that by 1977/78 the majority of farmers receiving assistance 
from the banks were those with important social and political •connections', 
as we shall see later. Small rice farmers were virtually excluded 
from the aid-giving process, even by the ADB. Only 11.8 per cent of the 
small rice farmers in our sample claimed to have received any financial 
help in 1977/78. 17
Chemical fertilizers were distributed locally by the Fertilizer 
Depot of the Ministry of Agriculture in Tamale. Such fertilizers were 
utilised in Northern Ghana only moderately prior to 1970, when the 
Ghanaian-German Agricultural Development Project (GGADP) started to 
instruct farmers in their use through demonstration farms. As a^  
result of the GGADP*s successful campaign, their application throughout 
the North became widespread and demand for this input increased rapidly.
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Two types of chemical fertilizers are used by rice farmers in the
North. The first type, N.P.K. (15-15-15), is applied immediately
before planting at the rate of two bags (cwt) per acre. The other,
sulphate of ammonia, is used as a 'top dressing* about six weeks after
plainting, and for this one bag per acre is recommended. As a rule,
fertilizer is applied by 'broadcasting' - spreading by hand - except
in the case of a few very large farms where seed drills are used.
The demaind for fertilizers increased with the expansion of rice
farming in the region. The Ministry of Economic Planning estimated
that rice farmers in the Northern and Upper Regions would require
10,950 tons of this input in 1974/75 at a cost of 0 1.5 million, and
18
increasing to 17,840 tons in 1978/79 at 0 2«5 million. The Table 
below gives the estimated fertilizer requirements of rice farmers in 
the North.
TABLE 3*4: Estimated Fertilizer Requirements for Rice Farming in
Northern and Upper Regions (in Tans)
1978/79
11,890  
5,950
17,840
Fertilizer was heavily subsidised by the State, to the extent of 
76 per cent in the case of N.P.K. which cost the government $ 12.00 a 
bag on the world market in 1977 but which was sold to the farmers at
Variety Year
197V75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78
(15*15.-15)' 7,300 8,590 9,900 10,950
of" Ammonia 3*65° ^  ^ 95° 5,«0
Total 10,950 12,890 14,850 16,450
Source: Ministry of Economic Planning, Tamale.
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0 2.80. This important and highly subsidised input was hardly
available to the small rice farmers. In his study of rice farmers
in the North, Winch advanced the following as the most probable reasons
19for low fertilizer use among the farmers there:-
1) lack of funds;
2) inadequate appreciation among non-users of increasing yields if 
applied as recommended;
3) among the average farmer a belief that some fertilizer is better 
than no fertilizer;
k) a lack of appreciation that improved seed varieties require relatively 
high dosages of fertilizer in order to obtain good results; and 
5) an inadequate input system.
While all of the above constitute plausible criteria for the low 
application of fertilizer among some farmers, especially the smaller ones, 
there was, however, another more fundamental one: the growing shortage
of supplies from about 1976 caused by the declining economic situation. 
Government purchases were cut drastically and in 1977 and 1978 the 
shortages reached such crisis level that most rice farmers in the North, 
including some big ones, did not use any fertilizer whatsoever. Only 
those privileged and well-connected farmers were able to obtain 
sufficient amounts via •contacts* in other regions. Any excess amounts 
that were obtained by these prominent rice farmers were sold to others 
at exceedingly high prices, usually four or five times the subsidised 
rate.
The use of mechanical farm equipment was one of the most important 
mechanisms for implementing a programme of large-scale agricultural 
production. These included land-clearing equipment such as 
caterpillars, combine harvesters, tractors and associated equipment - 
harrows, ploughs, seed drills. These services were provided by a
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number of local agencies, including the Ministry of Agriculture, which 
was the largest individual stockist in the region. A number of private 
contractors were also engaged in providing mechanical services to 
farmers. All mechanised farm services were subsidised by the 
government. The Ministry of Agriculture subsidised tractor services, 
for example, by up to 30 per cent of actual costs.
Initially, land-clearing was undertaken by the Ministry of
Agriculture and was carried out by small tractors with conventional
blades. By 197^ the GGADP provided the Ministry with a grant for a
new land-clearing unit which included two caterpillar tractors, chain
and ball-clearing equipment, land-clearing blades, two trucks to
transport the tractors and other equipment, as well as associated equip- 
20
ment. During 197** and 1975 when most of the land-clearing in the North 
was done by the Ministry, farmers were charged £ 20 per acre. From about 
1976 land-clearing was increasingly being undertaken by private 
contractors, and during the 1977/78 season they charged 0 900 par day.
By that time about 70 per cent of all rice fields in the North was 
being cleared by mechanical equipment.
Tractor services were provided both by the Ministry of Agriculture 
and private companies, but most of the tractors in the North were 
privately owned. It was estimated that by 1978 there were about 600 
private tractor owners in the Northern Region alone, although about 20
21
per cent of these were inoperative because of the lack of spare parts.
The majority of farmers, however, depended upon the Ministry or the 
private companies to prepare their land.
The biggest of these private agencies was the Development 
Mechanisation Company (DEMCO) which was based in Tamale with a fleet of 
15 tractors and 10 combine harvesters. The company was established in 
1976 as a result of a joint venture by two banks - the ADB and the
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National Investment Bank - and a private company, John Holt. It was
exempted from paying taxes for the first five years of business as a 
part of the governments policy of subsidising agriculture. Other 
agencies benefitted from the governments liberal farming policies.
One of these, the Nasia Rice Company, formed in 197^ and owned jointly 
by Barclays, the ADB, the National Investment Bank and the National 
Credit Savings Bank, was also exempted from taxes for the first five 
years of business. The Nasia Rice Company owned all types of farming 
equipment, and although strictly speaking the CompanyS facilities were 
reserved only for its own ’pool* of farmers, consisting of fifty-six 
in 1978, it did, however, hire out equipment to the very influential 
farmers, especially those whose farms were situated close to its own.
Tractor services were provided to a more limited extent by some 
of the commercial banks,or by state agencies such as the Northern 
Regional Development Corporation (NRDC), the National Reconstruction 
Corps (NRC) and, as we have already pointed out, the Ministry of 
Agriculture. Private owners also hired out their tractors to other 
farmers. By 1978 about 90 per cent of the land prepared in the North 
was carried out by mechanical tractors. Charges varied considerably 
from one supplier to the next. In 1978 the Ministry of Agriculture 
charged 0 30 an acre for ploughing and harrowing, while private 
contractors charged between 0 60 and 0 70 per acre. Private owners 
were the most costly, charging about 0 100 per acre on average for 
ploughing.
Land Tenure in the North
Large-scale agricultural production, including rice production, did 
not depend entirely upon the availability of subsidised inputs; it 
depended to an even greater extent upon the availability of cheap land,
Ill
and fanning on such a scale would most certainly not have taken place 
in Northern Ghana without the liberal system of land tenure that was to 
be found there. Prior to the colonial period land was not sold, but 
was regarded by the people as inheritable property. There was an 
attempt, however, which dates back to colonial times, to alter the 
structure of land tenure in the North, and which will be examined here 
in brief, because of its implications for the general development of 
agriculture there.
The need to control land use in the North led to the superimposition 
of modern land law on the traditional land tenure system when land there 
was vested in the government. The main reason for the colonial 
governments decision to control land in the North lay in its vision in 
the 1920s of the need to control certain lands for public use, such as 
railways, without adequate compensation. Although the construction of 
the railway to the North never materialised, the established colonial 
land law was never abrogated.
In 1927 a Lands and Native Rights Ordinance was proposed without
consultation with Northern chiefs and people, and declared all lands in
22the North public lands; but the government was subsequently forced to
reverse its decision because of protests from Southern intellectuals and
politicians, and the Land and Native Rights Ordinance of 1931 recognised
Northern lands as 'native lands'. But as Agbosu has pointed out,
the management and control of native lands was vested in the Governor
23in trust for Northerners. Under the 1931 Ordinance the Governor
was empowered to grant rights of occupancy to both natives and non­
natives alike, and to charge rent in respect of such occupancy.
The 1931 Ordinance had important and far-reaching effects. In 
the first place it removed the management of land from the jurisdiction 
of chiefs. Secondly, the Lands Department (which manages land in
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Northern Ghana) could claim land anywhere in the area for development 
purposes without payment. According to the Five Year Development Plan 
1975/76 - 1979/60, this Department could lease to individuals and
2
institutions interested in undertaking large-scale farming in the North.
The 1931 Ordinance was repealed by the State Property and Controls 
Act of i960 which preserved the control of Northern lands in the 
President. The position of the President as the •trustee* of Northern 
lands was further enhanced by the Administration of Lands Act, 1962, 
by which he could declare any stool lands in Ghana as vested in himself 
to hold in trust by Executive Instrument. Rirther laws were enacted in 
1963 - Executive Instruments Nos. 107 and 108 relating to the Upper 
Region and Northern Region respectively - which reinforced the powers 
of the President in regard to land rights.
The interest taken in Northern lands since independence was caused 
by the commercial importance of the area as a food producer. The State, 
especially under Nkrumah, needed to acquire vast tracts of land cheaply 
for the purpose of large-scale mechanised agriculture. Growing 
protests from politicians, intellectuals and Northern chiefs to have 
the earlier laws repealed and revert the land back to the traditional 
owners led in 1977 to the Commissioner for Lands and Mineral Resources 
setting up the R.L. Alhassan Committee to determine the ownership of 
land in the Northern and Upper Regions. The Alhassan Report,which
recommended strongly the return of all Northern Lands to the traditional 
rulers ,was however never published, and its findings were never seriously 
considered by the SMC.
The reasons of course were obvious. At that time most of the
big rice farmers in the N^ orth were sponsored by the Acheampong regime. 
Many of these were •alien* or ’stranger* farmers who found it difficult 
to persuade Northern chiefs - who for practical purposes were still 
responsible for the administration and management of the lands - to
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release large tracts to them. It was commonplace knowledge that
•stranger* farmers objected to the tight control which some of the chiefs
exercised over land in the area, and these formed part of a ‘silent
campaign* to have land in the North sold outright for purposes of
farming. There was an equally strong lobby, however, which was
opposed to "parcelling out land v/hich would leave the natives eventually
25
without adequate means of feeding themselves". The 1979
Constitution, however, recognised the importance of Northern lands to
26
the people and re-vested all lands to the traditional owners.
Agricultural Development Agencies in the North
The GGADP, which was based in Tamale, was for many years the
largest agricultural development project established in the North.
This project started in 1970, and its main objective was to increase
agricultural production through the distribution and application of
fertilizer. Until the involvement of the GGADP, fertilizer use in
Ghana was not common. Most of the GGADP*s earlier activities were
centred around the supply of fertilizers to fully mechanised rice farms.
About 70 per cent of all fertilizers delivered into the Project went to 
27
these farms. The GGADP later extended its scope to cover a variety 
of activities, as a result of which it came into contact with several
28thousands of small farmers.
The GGADP,which by 1978 had become fully integrated within the 
Ministry of Agriculture, had by then handed over most of its activities 
to this Ministry, but continued to provide important services to the 
rural farmers, such as the supply of fertilizer, training in animal 
traction, the building of multi-purpose stores, silo building, and
/
staff training. The Project was financed jointly by the government of 
Ghana and the West German government. The Ministry of Agriculture
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allocated # 150,000 annually for the purchase of fuel and lubricants 
and for the payment of Ghanaian personnel employed by the Project,
The Ministry was also responsible for the transportation of
fertilizers and chemicals from Teraa to the project areas. By 1976,
over 30,000 tons of fertilizers had been transported at a cost of
# 1,200,000.^ Between 1970 and 1978 it was estimated that about
DM 30 million was provided as technical aid for the running of the
GGADP. These funds were used for the importation of fertilizers and
chemicals, provision of vehicles and animal drawn equipment, machinery
and spare parts and, of course, payment of the German staff. Under
the loan agreement between the Ghanaian and the West German governments a
30provision of DM 19 million was made for the importation of fertilizers. 
While the Germans provided nearly all the money, its allocation was 
largely in Ghanaian hands, with the result that most of it was 
distributed among bureaucrats and their clients, instead of to the small 
farmers for whom it was intended.
If the GGADP pioneered a new phase in the rural development of 
Northern Ghana, the Upper Regional Agricultural Development Programme 
(URADEP), sponsored by the World Bank and the governments of Canada, 
Britain and Ghana, represented by far the most ambitious integrated 
agricultural development project to be established throughout the entire 
North. This project, which was fully incorporated into the Ministry 
of Agriculture in the Upper Region, became operational in July 1977 
and had two principal objectives: (1) to increase agricultural
production and consequently farm incomes; (2) to establish permanent 
farmer-support services. According to the planners, the project would 
achieve its objectives in two ways: first, by "redefining'1 the role of
agricultural services and intensifying extension for crop and animal 
production and human nutrition; and secondly, by developing associated
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31physical infrastructure requirements of the region’s farmers,
URADEP was designed to be carried out over a five year period,
and it involved a very complex farm development programme. Some of its
. . 32mam provisions were listed as follows:
(1) establishing 90 service centres at the rate of about 30 
per year to provide extension services to small farmers 
throughout the Upper Region.
(2) providing farm inputs, insecticides, improved seeds, 
fertilizers, spare parts, farm equipment, oxen, etc., 
through deferred cash payments or loans to increase 
production to 108,000 hectares. Crops will include 
millet, maize, sorghum, groundnuts, cotton, rice, 
cowpeas and tomatoes.
(3) providing better animal health services and improved 
animal husbandry and establishing small ranches for local 
livestock owners.
(k) developing several (seven) applied research and
demonstration units along with a seed multiplication 
programme•
(5) providing in-service training for project staff at the 
Navrongo Agricultural Institute.
The Programme also provided for the development of physical 
infrastructure such as the construction of small dams, village wells, 
project offices, houses for staff, strengthening the regional branch of 
the ADB, and establishing a Farmers* Services Company (FASCOM).
The cost of financing URADEP was estimated at 0 6 4 . million to 
be spread over a period of five years. Subscribers consisted of: 
the World Bank (0 21 million), the U.K. government (0 11 million),
Ghana government (0 16 million over and above existing budget normally 
available for the Upper Region), and Financial Institutions of Ghana 
(0 10 million). In addition, technical assistance personnel, were 
provided as direct aid by the British Overseas Development Mission, while 
the Dutch bilateral aid project, Training in Extension for National 
Development (TREND), provided about 0 2 million spread over four years 
for the development of the Institute for Field Communication and
116
Agricultural Training (IFCAT) at Navrongo.
URADEP was both innovatory and revolutionary. There had never been
such an all-encompassing scheme designed for rural development anywhere
in Ghana. The significance of URADEP as a regional development agency
cannot therefore be ignored. According to its chief executives,
URADEP was regarded as a pilot project "designed to serve as a model
for replication in other regions of Ghana".^ .
The Northern Regional Rural Integrated Programme (NORRIP) was
originally based on the URADEP model, and was designed to be implemented
35over a period of twenty years in four stages as follows:-
1. Establishing the principles of development strategy to 
be used in the region.
2. Planning of development programme for the region.
3« Detailed project planning.
4. Project implementation.
The areas covered by NORRIP included agriculture (crops, livestock,
fisheries, and forestry), infrastructure (water, transport, public health),
36training and education, and extension and community development.
However, as soon as the Northern Regional planners realised the
magnitude of the problems encountered by the URADEP, they recommended a
37less integrated programme than the one originally planned.
URADEP did not make any serious impact upon the small farmers in 
the region. As far as these farmers were concerned, this project was 
a meaningless exercise, totally removed from their everyday experience. 
They remained uncommitted because URADEP did not appear to contribute 
anything to the improvement of their well-being. As one Bolgatanga
38
small farmer explained, officials were more involved in "kalabule"
39 'than in attending to the needs of small farmers.
It is difficult to estimate what proportion of the 125*000 farm 
families in the region actually came into contact with URADEP, since
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there was no reliable statistical information to go by, but the farmers 
maintained that officials' participation was minimal. As one Navrongo 
farmer put it,
I have never seen even one official of the World Bank on our 
farms. What I have seen is a film show about how to improve 
our farming. They are . trying to educate us by showing us 
films, and a few months later they come back to ask about 
results ... How?^q
These views were reinforced by a senior official at the Project's
headquarters who admitted that URADEP had taken on more responsibilities
than it could possibly handle. He indicated further that officials
were not fully committed to the cause of the small farmers:
Many of them do not seem to understand what is expected of them, 
so they take a very casual attitude towards the work ... 
personally I would say that about seventy per cent of this 
project is being conducted in the comfort of the office and in 
officials' homes rather than on the farms.^
During the very few occasions when farms were visited by extension
staff, the farmers were reluctant to accept adlvice from personnel who
they considered to be ill-trained and inexperienced in the field. As
the Regional Chief Farmer pointed out,
Which right-thinking farmer will abandon proven methods of 
agriculture for experimental methods? Our farmers want to 
improve themselves, but quite often the authorities believe 
those farmers have no ideas of their own.^
As far as the Chief Farmer was concerned, the whole project was conceived
in an ’’atmosphere of unreality”. As he argued, when in a few years
time, the authorities would have taken stock ®f the ’’monstrosity” they
labelled a development project in the Upper Itegion, ’’they will come to
realise that the saddest mistake about URADEP was that it was devised
4 3
and planned in Washington, and not in Bolgataiga” .
Although by the end of 1978 the planners in Bolgatanga had not 
conceded failure, they at least acknowledged "problems' confronting the 
Project. They admitted that it had not proihced the desired effect 
upon the farmers in the region as a whole. $he major setback, they
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claimed, was the difficulty experienced in supplying inputs to farmers* 
The administrators also confessed to the obvious ,flack of interest11 
on the part of the small farmers* According to Colonel Zanlerigu, 
the Chief Administrative Officer, the Project was still in its infant
stages and it was "probably too soon to draw conclusions ••• it could
kbcatch up later”• This is a significantly typical •kleptocratic*
remark. The failure of URADEP to make any serious impact upon the 
small farmers in the Upper Region illustrates the elitist nature of the 
scheme, but more specifically the failure of the planners to recognise 
the inevitable realities of implementation by Ghanaian officials. All 
the field officials for the project (and most of the top executives) 
were recruited from Ghanaian nationals who were either university 
graduates or members of the *middle, class* with solid 'connections*•
As we suggested earlier, the amount of money coming in for this scheme 
was huge, and was used really as a *kleptocratic bonanza*. The 
scheme was misconceived primarily in the sense that it underestimated 
the degree to which local officials would simply direct the funds and 
subsidised inputs to themselves and their big-farmer allies. It is in 
the context of this reality that the lack of meaningful contact with the 
farmers, and the latter*s lack of adaptability, must be explained.
The GGADP and URADEP were potentially the two most constructive 
rural development projects to be established in the whole of Ghana at 
the time. They were both intended to boost agricultural production
and were regarded as the back-bone of the OFY policy in the North.
While URADEP was generally considered to be a failure because of its 
lack of involvement with the farmers, the GGA33P was considered to be 
far more successful. Of course the two projects were different in 
scope. While URADEP was a more comprehensive scheme incorporating 
the entire Ministry of Agriculture in the region (and consequently taking
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on the function of that Ministry in addition to the new ones it created), 
the GGADP was more limited in outlook (if only by its gradual handing 
over of most of its original activities to the Ministry) and more 
specialised in its functions. Besides, and this is significant, the 
GGADP was manned largely by German personnel (who were not influenced 
by big-farmer allies) and assisted mainly by junior Ghanaian staff.
It was therefore able to identify far more easily with the needs of the 
local farmers. The application of fertilizer use by small farmers 
was one of the GGADP's most successful activities in the North.
There were a number of other projects set up in the North for the 
specific purpose of improving agricultural production, and rural 
development more generally. Bullock ploughing was introduced to small 
farmers by the Christian Services Committee and the GGADP as a highly 
recommended form of "intermediate technology". This "technology" was 
in fact more adaptable to the Upper Region where it was more readily 
adopted. On the other hand, it was not considered to be either 
practical or effective by small farmers in the Northern Region. The 
purchase of animals and implements presented the farmers with 
considerable problems which the establishment of training stations in 
Nyankpala and Savelugu in the Northern Region did nothing to improve.
The Banks were also unwilling to assist these farmers with the adoption 
of such technology.
The boring of wells in villages and the construction of dug-outs 
throughout the area were also considered an integral part of the rural 
development programme, and was undertaken by the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA). Unfortunately, however, these schemes were 
not always co-ordinated within the framework of a regional policy, and 
in some cases appeared to exist in isolation. This point was emphasised 
by an official at the Ministry of Economic Planning who argued thus:
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At the moment so many projects are being set up in the North 
that it is quite easy to lose track of what each one is doing.
As far as the individual projects are concerned, they seem fine 
in the short-term, but we have to look at the development of 
the region on a long-term basis. It is for that reason that 
I believe so many of these schemes are a waste of human and 
government resources ... they just do not co-ordinate.^
Attempts made by the Ministry of Economic Planning to co-ordinate
the work of the various agencies involved in agriculture locally did
not receive the support of these agencies concerned. An OFY Committee
set up for this purpose consisted only of organisations involved with
rice cultivation, and furthermore very little success was achieved in 
if7
its work. The lack of co-ordination between agricultural officers
or agencies was harshly, but deservedly criticised by an agricultural 
Monitoring Mission during its fact-finding tonr in 1977* One of the 
main projects criticised was the Vegetable Oil Mills in Bawku, which 
led the Mission to view with deep “pessimism’* the "condition of the
kSgreater part of the industrial backbone in the North". The factory 
at Bawku was found to be completely dismantled and used as a store and 
groundnut purchasing centre. Its purchase of groundnuts in 1975/76 
was 13,6^7 bags, but in 1976/77 only 279 bags were purchased despite 
the Ministry's target for the area of 63,000 acres of groundnuts in that 
yearI One of the main reasons for this sensational drop in official
purchases was that the Oil Mills were paying considerably less than
50other purchasing agents. This suggests, however, not just a lack of 
co-ordination, but rather a high degree of collaboration in smuggling 
and black market operations.
One of the most crucial observations made by the Monitoring Mission 
was that most of the projects established in the North were not subject 
to either regional or district control, and sometimes they gave the
A
impression of being what the Mission called "the backyard gardens of a
51few officers concerned". Such projects had little effect on the
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situation of the small-holders, Mthe ones who really possess the key to
52the agricultural take-off”•
Out of a total of 50 projects visited by the Mission, an analysis 
was made of 58 of them. Of these, 2k were delayed (65 per cent), while 
just were either completed or in progress. The Mission's analysis 
was further illustrated by the following observations:-
(1) by 'in progress' we understand only the spending of money 
without any attempt at qualification.
(2) the project shown as completed refer to the construction 
phase only.
(5 ) of the 2k delayed projects, there are 15 of which almost
nothing has been done (less than 50 per cent achievement).
Most of the projects are nearer the zero mark. This means
that on ko per cent of the projects visited, project
implementation has been zero.,-,
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Again this suggests that funds which had been allocated to the 
implementation of rural development projects for the benefit of small 
farmers had been diverted for other purposes.
The point to be made about the implementation of projects and the 
agricultural development programme more generally is that while the 
authorities continued to stress the importance of these projects, there 
was no effective machinery established for their co-ordination and 
enforcement. Bureaucrats operating within a system of administration 
that was noted for its degree of corruption, or 'kalabule', were 
therefore free to handle public funds and other resources to serve their 
particular needs and those of their allies. lia a sense the inward- 
looking, elite-oriented economic policies of the regime were responsible 
for the poor contribution made by the small farmers as far as 
agricultural production in the North was concerned. Their real 
purpose was to provide the means by which its supporters became 'big' 
farmers.
In discussing the strategies adopted by th= SMC to implement
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agricultural development in Northern Ghana during the 1970s (especially 
with reference to rice production), we have suggested that its policies 
benefitted a privileged group of farmers and bureaucrats, even though 
the development strategy was formulated (officially) to incorporate the 
small farmers* How precisely did the system work to favour these 
privileged groups? Furthermore, how did small farmers without formal 
contacts manage to conduct their commercial farming activities within a 
system that was institutionally so biased against them? In order to 
answer these questions we will need to understand the concept of patron- 
clientelism and its specific applicability to Dagomba society. It has 
to be pointed out that in this thesis we are not concerned with a 
consideration of patronage as a basis of power* We are concerned 
rather with the need to maintain one's gate into power, because through 
this one will receive patronage* The system of patron-clientelist 
relations prevailing in Dagbon was a rather complex one, and made even 
more so by the inter-relationship between chieftaincy factionalism, 
national politics and regional economic development*
Patron-clientelism and its relevance to Dagbon
Definitions of patron-client relations are varied, but all of these
emphasise three important elements: inequality, reciprocity and
5k
proximity. Patron-client relations are unequal since they develop
between two parties which are unequal in status, wealth and influence. 
•They are reciprocal since the relationship between patron and client 
depends upon the exchange of goods and services. Proximity suggests 
that these are based on personal, face-to-face relationships which produce 
a feeling of trust between the parties involved'. Thus Lemarchand defines 
patron-clientelism as "a more or less personalised relationship between 
actors (patrons and clients), or set of actors, commanding unequal status
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or influence, based on conditional loyalties and involving mutually
55beneficial transactions". The same characteristics are pointed out
by Scott, who defines patron-client relationship as "a special case of 
dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in 
which an individual of higher socio-economic status (patron) used his own 
influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for 
a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by
offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to
56 * . . .the patron." Finally, Lande construes a patron-client relationship
as "a vertical dyadic alliance, i.e. an alliance between two persons of
unequal status, power or resources each of whom finds it useful to have
as an ally someone superior to himself. The superior member of such an
alliance is called the patron. The inferior member is called his
client. " 57
The study of patron client relationships falls into two broad
theoretical classifications: the anthropological approach is used to
emphasise a particular type of relationship, such as kinship behaviour.
In other words, the study of patronage as conducted by anthropologists
focuses on how people of unequal authority, but linked through ties of
interest and friendship, manipulate their relationships in order to attain 
58their ends. The political science approach on the other hand,
conceives of patronage in terms of the ways in which party politicians 
distribute public jobs or other favours in exchange for electoral support. 
The political party is generally considered as the major unit in the use 
of this term. Thus according to Weingrod, patronage from this perspective
is therefore largely "the study of how party political leaders seek to
turn public institutions and public resources to their own ends, and how
59favours of various kinds are exchanged for votes." But the two'
approaches are best considered as being complementary, as Bailey, a 
political anthropologist, has demonstrated. The study of patronage
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from a political science perspective is the main subject of his work,
Politics and Social Change, in which he examines how Indian villages
relate to state bureaucratic institutions, and how state-level political
'machines* operate in the village context.^
The advantage of the above definitions is that they are broad-based,
and include a wide variety of phenomena, while at the same time they
distinguish patron-client ties from a number of similar-influence
relationships. On the one hand they encompass traditional forms of
clientelism in which the patron’s superiority is based on some sort of
traditional influence, generally stemming from landownership or
religious status. They include, on the other hand, such modern-type
phenomena as party-directed patronage commonly referred to as "raachine-
politics", i.e. organisations or systems of communication set up by a
61party through which it could distribute patronage. Scott has
suggested that the role of the patron should theoretically be distinguished
from that of a party broker or boss. He nevertheless admits that it is
quite possible for a single individual to act both as a broker and a
patron, just as a boss may often function as a patron. As he has noted,
"such a role combination is not only possible, but empirically quite 
62common". Indeed the experience of large rice farmers in Dagbon
suggested that their easy access to the political leadership in Accra 
meant that they were generally able to accumulate sufficient personal 
resources to act as patrons to smaller colleagues, while at the same time 
acting as political agents or local brokers for the regime. These 
farmers were uniquely placed to function effectively in this dual capacity. 
Although they were not party workers - political parties having been 
proscribed under the military regime - their relationship with the regime 
was such that they were required to promote its image locally, recruit 
support, and help implement its policies.
The point however is this: whether of a traditional or modern
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variety, a relationship can be designated as a patron-client relationship
as long as it displays the elements of inequality, reciprocity and
proximity. But the criteria of instrumentality and traditionality are
also crucially important to patron-client relationships. According to
Ozbudun, these attributes distinguish patron-client ties from certain
types of relationships which, like clientelism, may also result in the
political mobilisation of large numbers of pe o ple.Kinship  ties are
among such mechanisms for mobilised political participation. But, as
Ozbudun argues, they do not qualify as patron-client ties since, first,
they are based on affective rather than instrumental bonds, and secondly
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do not typically bring together parties of unequal wealth and status.
The above definitions make it necessary to qualify our use of the 
concept of patron-clientelism in regard to the relationship between 
leading members and ordinary supporters of the two chieftaincy gates.
A patron-client relationship defined in such terms implies that the 
majority of ordinary people professed only conditional allegiance to one 
gate or the other, and were likely to switch their allegiance (eventually) 
if they failed to gain instrumental benefits. This, however, was not 
the experience of the greater majority of the Dagomba people, including 
the rice farmers. The relationship between leading gate supporters who 
were prominent rice farmers and ordinary farmers were conditional and 
instrumental only when they concerned supporters of the same gate.
Although it has been known for some small farmers to "cross over11 to a 
rival candidate who can promise help, this is nevertheless a rare 
occurrence and would involve only those people with a lesser commitment 
to their gate. As a general rule, Dagomba farmers did not switch 
allegiance to a rival candidate, since this would constitute a betrayal 
of their own gate and of their political beliefs.
The big rice farmers found it necessary to have a personal
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following, not only for social prestige but also for political reasons: 
as a bargaining weapon against politicians in Accra* Thus the bigger 
their following, the more support they could promise, and consequently 
the greater the reward they could extract from the regime. Their 
"catchment” area or "constituency" was usually the village, especially 
those situated around their farms, but they might also sponsor smaller 
farmers from any locality within Dagbon.
As we have already suggested, patron-client relations do not always 
fall into neat categories, but often take a variety of forms, and there 
might even be some degree of overlap between one type and another.
Dagbon provides a rich example of the variety of patron-client relationships 
that are possible within a developing society still strongly influenced 
by traditional values.
The dyadic-type relationship was- by far the most common among the 
Dagomba rice farmers. These were generally relationships of a semi­
permanent, i.e. long-standing nature, and consisted of what has been
/ 69described by Lande as "horizontal" and "vertical" webs. One example
of the first type of network might consist of a straightforward exchange
of one type of resource for another, such as the exchange of mechanical
services (tractors and combine harvesters) for fertilizer or seed rice.
Reciprocity was not necessarily restricted to a straightforward exchange
of farming inputs. In fact many parties exchanged farm services for
commercial products such as fuel and lubricants. Furthermore,
transactions of this nature did not take place exclusively between farmers,
but involved a wide range of participants, including bank managers,
bureaucrats, senior military officers, executive heads of corporations,
professionals and businessmen. It was a question of one*s needs and
what one had to offer in return. Thus a bank manager might allocate
funds in the form of loans and overdrafts to a large farmer in return for
which this farmer would cultivate and manage his farm while he attended
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to routine business* Such an arrangement was particularly convenient 
especially as bank managers were not permitted by law to engage in 
commercial rice farming on grounds of professional ethics* They 
surmounted this problem by entrusting the running of their farms to 
appointed "managers”.
The vertical-type network, on the other hand, involved a relation­
ship between a rich and prominent rice farmer and those smaller farmers 
who depended upon him for crucial farming inputs such as tractor services, 
fertilizer and transport, and in return for which he received their 
political support. In this way the big Dagomba rice farmers, acting as 
brokers for the regime, were able to recruit and deliver a considerable 
amount of political support to their patrons in Accra.
While the dyadic-type clientelist network represented the predominant 
form to be found in Dagbon, there were several other patterns of patron-
client relations involving rice farmers. One such type, commonly
70attributed to tropical Africa, is "mercantile clientelisra". Very
little work has been done on the clientelistic relationships between
town merchants and their peasant customers in Africa, and even less so
71as regards Northern Ghana. Clientelism of this type involves a kind
of personalised relationship between buyer and seller, or between merchant
and farmer. The merchant does not only provide the farmer with his
necessary supplies, but also buys his goods. Such relationships might
extend even to the entire trading community. As Lemarchand points out,
these reciprocities involve, besides material benefits, a sense of mutual
.trust between parties with the "landlord" or trader enjoying a certain
amount of "credit rating" from his reputation of trustworthiness and 
72
reliability. Such mutual trust as existed between traders and Dagomba
rice farmers was of crucial importance to both -parties since rice was 
traded ’illegally* between them at prices several times above the 
•official* government price. But as far as those farmers who engaged
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in the ’illegal' trade in rice were concerned, not only did such trade 
represent a profitable outlet for their produce; it was also a means of 
obtaining from traders cash advances which were used to finance their 
farming activities,
A further type of patronage associated generally with 'modern' 
society and which, under Acheampong developed to an unprecedented scale 
in Northern Ghana, was the system of 'brokerage'. The political broker 
or "boss” must be clearly distinguished from patron as used in the 
everyday sense. According to Boissevain, who makes the important 
distinction between patron and broker, patrons are those persons who 
dispense with first-order resources, i.e. resources which are controlled 
directly, such as land, jobs, funds, etc. Brokers on the other hand 
are those persons who dispense with second-order resources, such as
73strategic contacts with other people who control such resources directly.
In other words, the broker operates through his 'connections'. As
Boissevain sums up, his role is that of "bridging the gap in communications
7kbetween persons, groups, structures and even cultures".
The concept of broker arises out of the raQLe of the political or 
party leader in the socio-political structure. Such a leader does not 
deal directly with the masses but rather through agents or brokers. The 
crucial pay-off is not made to the party rank-and-file, but to the broker. 
The regime provides such brokers who may be a local boss, a labour leader, 
or some other functionary with personal benefits ranging from personal 
opportunities for wealth to access to more prestigious jobs. Brokers 
must be provided with resources so that they in turn can win the support 
of their followers. Most of the benefits which a party distributes to 
its brokers ultimately depend on favours secured from the government.
Thus as Chalmers has indicated, the party's mosi.important resource,
therefore, is often its contacts with people who are closer to the centres
75of decision-making.
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It is, however, quite possible for a single individual to act both 
as broker and patron. As Scott rightly argues, the diffuse claims of 
the patron-client tie make it normal for the patron to act as a broker
r?C
for his clients when they must deal with powerful third parties. On
the other hand, if the political party simply gives the local patron
direct control over its programmes and grants in the area, it thereby
enhances his resources for becoming a patron on a larger scale, and
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eliminates altogether the need for brokerage.
Although the regime is central to the concept of brokerage, this 
type of patronage could be dispensed via powerful individuals nominated 
by officials of the party or the central administration. One of the 
import suit chsiract eristics of the Acheampong regime was its ability to 
operate via selected individuals representing the SMC,s interests at the 
local level. Such individuals included leaders of regional organisations 
such as the Ghana National Reconstruction Corps (GNRC), the Special 
Marketing Unit (SMU), trade unions, and businessmen (and women) who had 
special access to Acheampong. In Dagbon the SMC*s local interests were 
represented by the prominent farmers whose positions were enhanced by 
their membership of, or identification with, tHte ruling chieftaincy gate. 
These farmers were also leaders of the Rice Growers* Association (RGA) 
which also functioned as a political arm of the SMC. Furthermore, 
these farmers* leaders were given special access to other regional bodies 
and organisations, especially those connected with agriculture. Their 
proximity to local bureaucrats and bank managers meant that they were in 
an exceedingly strong position to negotiate aid both for themselves and 
on behalf of their clients. Most of the direct assistance given to 
Dagomba farmers was distributed via the RGA. Since such aid was 
monopolised by supporters of the leading members, i.e. those farmers with 
Andani links, its distribution became the central bone of contention 
between member supporters of the two sides in the chieftaincy dispute.
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The sura effect of this strategy of aid distribution was to win
political support for the regime among the substantial followers of the
EGA leaders. For example, by 1977/73 when the Acheampong regime
embarked on its campaign for the newly-proposed formula on Union 
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Government and was probably at the height of its unpopularity with a 
large and crucial section of the Ghanaian public, namely, the professional 
classes, it was important that it could fall back on support from other 
groups. It depended to a very large extent upon the rural populace for 
such support, and its strategy of appealing to this section via local 
agents or brokers was particularly effective in Dagbon,
Clientelisra in Dagbon was influenced by both •traditional* and 
•modern* value systems. The pattern of interrelationship between the 
several types found there is in itself a measure of the theoretical 
complexities involved in an analysis of this concept. It is mainly for 
this reason that I have in future references chosen to refer simply to 
broad terms like "patronage" or "patron-client relations" rather than to 
more specific types.
In the following two chapters of this dissertation we will go on to 
illustrate the difference between small farmers* and big farmers* 
experiences in greater detail, and to explain the sources of the 
difference more fully. This will later lead to a consideration of the 
ways in which big farmers tried to exert pressure on the regime to 
protect and further their interests.
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CHAPTER 4
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SMALL-SCALE RICE FARMING
In this Chapter we will attempt to demonstrate that the incentives 
provided by the agricultural policies of the Acheampong regime in the 
form of subsidies on agricultural inputs such as mechanical equipment, 
fertilizer, improved seeds, and bank credit, did not benefit the 
small rice farmers. We will also attempt to show the relative failure 
of people starting off as small farmers without political connections 
to make a profit out of rice farming.
According to the 1970 agricultural census there were 5>600 rice 
growers in the Northern Region of Ghana, with an average holding of 
6.4- acres. This figure had probably increased to around 6,500 by 1978, 
of which 25 per cent of the growers were producing at subsistence level,
60 per cent at the small-scale commercial level (under 50 acres), and 
15 per cent at the large-scale commercial level (over 50 acres). The 
differentiation between the various levels of production is really one 
of gradation, as will be seen in the course of the analysis. It should 
be noted from the beginning that 'subsistence* or 'non-commercial* 
farmers did not, as a rule, utilize subsidised inputs, since these 
were not available to them, or they did not have the resources to purchase 
them. On the other hand, the small-scale commercial rice farmers 
utilized most of these inputs, together with some paid labour, though 
the combination in which these factors were used depended upon their 
availability or the resources of the individual farmer.
Subsistence Farmers and Rice Production
( / #
We begin our analysis of small farmers' experiences by classifying 
these into 'subsistence* and 'small-scale commercial*. The concept of
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the Ghanaian ’peasantry• embraces in reality different scales and, to 
some degree, different modes of production which it is analytically useful 
to distinguish for the purpose of this thesis#
This discussion of subsistence farmers is based on a series of 
visits to farms situated in the surrounding villages of Tamale, and on 
informal interviews with such farmers in the Tamale and Yendi districts# 
Forty-six such farmers were interviewed altogether. Among the villages 
visited were Nyankpala, Vitin, Kanville, Jimle, Tampion, Nanton and 
Kalaraga in the Tamale district, and Sambu, better known as Mion, in 
the Yendi district. Visits to the villages (with the exception of 
Sambu) were always accompanied by visits to the farms during which 
informal discussions were held with the farmers. They often spoke at 
great length about their farming history and activities, but questions 
were usually directed at them with a view to clarifying specific issues, 
such as the use of inputs, type of technology employed, sources of 
agricultural finance, and markets for their produce.
The average size of a subsistence farmer’s holding was very small, 
about four or five acres, of which about half was put under rice 
cultivation. There were of course several factors influencing the 
size of these holdings, but the most common m s  the lack of initial 
capital. In other words, they would produce for the market if they 
could. Farming on a large-scale would inevitably require the investment 
of capital which was not readily available to these farmers from banks 
or other financial institutions. The reluctance of banks to give credit 
to such farmers was based on their belief (which was not totally 
unfounded) that these farmers could not provide sufficient security to 
guarantee loan repayment.
v
The importance of bank credit was recognised by every farmer in the 
area. Although it was part of official government policy to encourage
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financial institutions to assist all farmers, irrespective of size, yet 
small-holders were the least assisted. On the other hand, banks would 
always refuse to extend credit to those farmers who seemed intent upon 
being, or likely to remain, subsistence farmers. Not a single one 
of the subsistence farmers interviewed claimed to have received any form 
of financial assistance from any of the commercial banks.
Prior to the importance given to rice farming from about 1972 or
so, the subsistence farmers’ chief concern was with providing food for
their families. The introduction of commercial rice farming, however,
changed their outlook. Like every other farmer in the region these
wanted to capitalise on the opportunities introduced by the agricultural
•expansion’ in the region. As one of them put it, their aim was not
to remain ’’poor” and produce at a "petty11 level, while others were
"cashing in" on the new opportunities provided by the State.
Unfortunately, they had been unable to achieve their ambition because of
the various "forces" working against thera.^  The most important farming
resource, land, was of course no problem since, according to these
farmers, there was always a village chief somewhere who would provide them
with enough to meet their needs. Indeed a subsistence farmer from
Kalaraga testified to having obtained "more than fifty acres" for purposes
of rice farming, and as soon as he could secure a loan from friends or
relatives (my emphasis) he would clear that land and cultivate only
"sinkafaa and simli" (rice and groundnuts). Like many other colleagues
from the village, he had applied several times for a loan from the ADB
if
in Tamale, but was turned down each time.
Why did these small farmers find it difficult to build up initial 
capital? The answer lies in the fact that they depended entirely upon 
farming for their income, and the incidence of low farm yields caused 
by bad weather conditions and the lack of application of crucial farm
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inputs such as fertilizer, meant that small farmers in the North could 
not accumulate sufficient capital to engage in farming on a commercial 
scale.
While most subsistence farmers would have genuinely liked to expand,
a few others expressed a preference for traditional practice. Our
investigation showed that 19 per cent of the subsistence farmers in our
sample did not wish to expand. Their main reason was the element of
risk involved. For example, a Nyankpala farmer who claimed that he had
been engaged in farming, including rice cultivation, for nearly thirty
years and was contented with his small four acre farm, did not accept
that the advantages of commercial rice farming outweighed the risks
involved. He rationalised as follows:
Every year I farm enough to feed my family. Whenever the rains 
are favourable ray yield is plenty, and sometimes I share some of 
my produce among my brothers. Let us say that I wanted to 
expand my farm. I would need to borrow money from the bank to 
buy a tractor and implements. And that is looking for trouble, 
because .if the rains were poor and I had a poor yield how would 
I repay my loams? ... If I wanted more land, for example, I 
could get it just like that, but I am happy the way things 
are.r-
Several others out of a group of eight small farmers interviewed
near the Nyankpalana's palace expressed similar views. Baba Salifu,
for example, was able to draw from personal experience. He borrowed
500 cedis from a trader in 1976 so as to increase the size of his farm
from four to ten acres in order to cultivate some rice. Unfortunately,
it was a bad year for the rains and he lost his entire rice crop. It
took him two years to repay the loan, and according to him, he no longer
wished ,!to hang my (his) hat above my (his) head11.^  Thus, while some
subsistence farmers aspired to engage in commercial rice production but
were prevented from doing so because of various economic or financial
/
constraints, others were more perceptive of the risks involved.
For various reasons, therefore, these small farmers were kept not
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only on the 'periphery* of commercial rice production, but were also 
excluded from participating in the agrarian 'drive' of the 1970s, They 
did not produce for the market in spite of their willingness to do so. 
Subsidised inputs, such as tractor services and fertilizers, were not 
utilised by these farmers since they were not available at prices which 
they could afford. The most important difference between these and the 
commercial farmers was in the use by the latter of hired labour. The 
subsistence farmer depended exclusively upon the use of 'free' (family) 
labour for all farming activities. Even then, the difference between 
the two 'systems' was again one of gradationi since 'free* labour was 
utilised at all levels of farming in the North, including the really 
large-scale farms.
The group of farmers that we have been describing so far, though 
numerically very large, contributed only marginally to the amount of 
rice produced in the North, We will proceed to examine in greater 
detail the class of small commercial rice farmers whose contribution was 
crucial, or was expected to be, for the success of the government's 
agricultural programme.
Small-Scale Commercial Rice Farmers
For the purpose of this study small-scale commercial farms will be 
considered to be those which do not exceed fifty acres in size. This 
limit is of course arbitrary, but generally it was the range within 
which farmers displayed the usual characteristics of this type of 
enterprise, including the non-ownership of machinery. Ownership was 
a very important factor in determining size, but not necessarily the 
crucial determinant. Membership of the class of large-scale rice 
farmers depended upon a combination of factors of which the most 
important was political connections.
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We should point out very early on that the small commercial rice 
farmer did not necessarily devote all his land to rice production, but 
only a proportion of it. In fact no farmer used his land exclusively 
for the purpose of rice cultivation. The rice farmers in the North 
(big and small alike) often cultivated other food crops. While the 
large commercial farmers cultivated such other crops as maize and guinea 
com, the small ones tended to cultivate the traditional food crops, 
such as yams, millet, and groundnuts. As far as the large commercial 
rice farmers were concerned, the proportion of their land devoted to 
other crops besides rice was, naturally, much smaller, generally 
exceeding no more than about one-tenth of their total land holding.
On the other hand, the small commercial rice farmers tended to allocate 
a greater proportion of their land to food cropping. Thus, although 
rice was regarded by the fanners as potentially the most profitable of 
all the crops cultivated locally, the tendency was for the small farmer 
to increase his total area under all crops whenever he increased the area 
tinder rice cultivation.
As far as the farmer was concerned, the policy of crop diversification 
had two important functions:- first, to maintain a farming tradition, 
and secondly, to serve as. a premium against a possible loss of the major 
crop: rice. The small farmer, like his big counterpart, was aware
that rice cultivation required a higher resource input than the 
traditional crops, and consequently incurred a relatively higher 
production cost. He therefore attempted to •cover* himself by 
cultivating a balanced cropping system. As one small farmer explained, 
he did not underestimate the value of rice, but he also knew that rice 
cultivation involved a certain amount of risk; he therefore; allocated 
half of his twenty-two acre farm to staple food crops, so that he was
7
’’guaranteed a return, no matter how small, at the end of the harvest".
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This, however, was the opinion of one of the very few small rice farmers 
who took a ’rational* view of rice farming. The prevailing opinion among 
these farmers was that rice was potentially a profitable crop and should be 
cultivated regardless. As we shall later see, there was no sound basis for 
such an assumption unless, of course, farming inputs could be purchased at 
subsidised rates, or rice was sold at black market prices rather than at 
•controlled* prices.
Rice, however, was of special importance to the farmer. The price paid 
by the government rice mills increased over the years - from 2 cedis per bag 
in 1970 to 70 cedis in 1977 - due of course to pressure on the government by 
growers. Its appeal became even greater after the launching of OFY in 
1972 when the government encouraged its production by providing greater 
subsidies on inputs as well as credit for fanners.
According to our sample survey of small rice farmers in the Northern 
Region, most of these took up rice farming on a commercial scale during 
the late 1960s or the early 1970s during the OFY propaganda campaign.
Table 4.1 below shows, for example, that 41 per cent of these farmers took 
up commercial rice farming between 4 and 6 years prior to 1978, while 
another 26 per cent started to cultivate it between 7 and 10 years prior 
to that date. On the other hand, very few farmers took to rice farming 
in the last three years prior to 1978. This was the period, of course, 
when subsidised inputs were most difficult to obtain, and which served 
as a deterrent to prospective farmers.
We have observed that the farmers tried to strike a balance between 
traditional food crops and rice. Generally, the small farmers 
allocated about half of their total holding to rice production. Out of 
a total of 2,295 acres cultivated by the small farmers in our sample
survey, 1,134 acres (49.4 per cent) came under rice cultivation. As 
far as the distribution of farm size was concerned, 42 per cent of the 
small-scale farms were between 6 and 10 acres, 21 per cent between 
11 and 15 acres, and 15 per cent between 16 and 20 acres (Table 4.2).
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TABLE 4.1: Small-Scale Commercial Rice Farmers: Experience in
Commercial Rice Production Prior to 1978 (a)
Years Prior to 1978 No. of Farmers Percentage
1 - 3 6 7.9
4 - 6  31 40.8
7 - 1 0  20 26.3
10 - 15 10 13.2
Over 15 9 11.8
Total Sample 76 100.0
(a) Based on the question ,fWhen did you first start cultivating rice 
to sell?"
Source: Survey of Small-Scale Commercial Rice Farmers, N/R 1978.
TABLE 4.2: Small-Scale Rice Farmers: Distribution of Farms
(By Acreage)
Size in Acres No. of Farms Percentage
3 - 5  5 6.6
6 - 1 0  32 42.1
11 - 15 16 21.1
16 - 20 12 15.8
2 1 - 3 0  3 3.9
31 - 50 8 10.5
76 100.0
Source: Survey of Small-Scale Rice Farmers, N/R, 1978.
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Only a very small number of small rice farmers were engaged in 
cultivating larger acreages. According to our survey, only 3»9 per 
cent of these farms were between 21 and 30 acres, while 10.5 per cent 
were within the 31 - 50 acre rauige. This was a reflection of the 
operational problems which small farmers experienced in cultivating 
bigger plots, but also an indication of the difficulties of moving from 
/small-scale to large-scale production. This point alludes to a very 
interesting question. Were the big farmers those who started off 
with the right connections, or was it possible to become a big farmer 
through effort and/or luck, and then gain the right connections? Very 
few of the big rice farmers started small, i.e. with farms of under 
fifty acres in size. Research among these farmers suggested that 
small farmers remained small, due to constraints regarding inputs, 
especially capital. Most big rice farmers on the other hand started 
farming with very large acreages, usually between two and three hundred 
acres, and expanded even further. Such enterprises were possible 
because of these farmers* already established connections either locally 
or nationally, or both.
As we have already seen (Chapter 3), within a few years rice had 
become the single most important cash crop in the North in terms of its 
rate of expansion. Unfortunately, rice farming did not fulfil the 
farmers* expectations of making them rich. What it did in fact was 
to create an illusion of future prosperity among these farmers, with 
the exception, of course, of the rich and well-connected.
We set out below an estimated budget for a 10 acre rice farm, which 
represents the average size for a small-scale farming enterprise. This 
estimate is based upon data collected from our survey of small rice
/
farmers in the Northern Region in 1978, and on prevailing ’market' 
prices for farm inputs.
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Summary of Revenue and Costs
Revenue
(a) Total Production (@ 6 bags per acre) = 60 bags
0
(b) Total Value @ 0 70 per bag 4,200
Costs
0
(a) Total Non-Labour Costs 2,705
(b) Total Labour Costs 800
(c) Transport and other Incidentals 350
(d) Total Costs 3,855
Net Profit 345
Notes
(1) Calculated on the basis of 0 3 per 3 hour day.
(2) Based on the combination of both labour and mechanical equipment, 
and spread over a period of five years. These figures 
represent the average yearly cost.
(3) Manual harvesting is labour-intensive and consists of cutting, 
heaping, threshing, winnowing and bagging*
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The above estimate suggests that small scale rice production was 
not a very profitable enterprise if 'costs* were based on prevailing 
market rates. The small producer's net income for a season's work 
(approximately 6 months) was / 3^5 » or 57*5 cedis per month, that is, 
nearly three times lower than the average earnings of a labourer 
employed, for example, by the Ministry of Agriculture. In other words, 
small-scale commercial rice farming based on prevailing 'market' prices 
and the low government (official) prices paid to producers, was not a 
profitable economic activity vis-^ i-vis even the lowest paid work in the 
region. It could have been profitable wit& government subsidies and/or 
with prices which would certainly need to have been higher than the 
prevailing official prices. For example, in our estimate above, if 
the small farmer had been able to obtain some in-puts such as 
fertilizer and mechanical tractor services at government subsidised 
rates, he would have saved at least 0" 715 in costs alone1 Moreover,
if the estimated output for the above farm was sold to local traders 
at 0 210 a bag (which reflected a truer market price than the 'official' 
government price), the farmer would realise total sales of 0 12,600, or 
a net income of 0 8,7^5 (less costs). The fact remained, however, 
that the great majority of small rice farmers did not use inputs at 
subsidised prices, whilst at the same time tihey were compelled to sell 
their produce to the Government Rice Mills at 'official' prices, as we 
shall see.
Overall profitability was also affected by high labour costs.
The average labour utilisation per acre in all field activities was about 
1^0 man hours for a small farm, of which about 80 per cent was used for 
harvesting and 20 per cent for pre-harvesting activities. According
g
to our survey , between 70 and 80 per cent of all labour used was hired
9
labour. The average cost of hired labour vas 5 cedis per day , and 
if the labourers were conveyed (generally by trailer or truck) the cost
148
to the farmer could be as high as 8 cedis per day per labourer on 
average. This of course is not the complete picture: some
activities such as harvesting utilise more labour than others. If 
we assume that the farmer utilised 112 man hours (paid) to harvest one 
acre at 1978 prices, the cost to him would be # 1*f5«60 (including 
transport costs). On the other hand, the cost of hiring a combine 
harvester was 0 60 per acre (subsidised rate), or a net saving of 
85.60 per acre. It would therefore cost the farmer substantially 
less to harvest by combine harvester. The point, however, is that 
combine harvesters were not available to these farmers either because 
of the general shortage of such machinery, or because of their lack of 
important •connections*.
As we indicated earlier in this analysis, it was possible for small- 
scale rice farmers to make a fairly reasonable profit jLf inputs were 
purchased at subsidised prices and/or if their rice was sold at •market* 
prices. A few of these farmers did manage to sell some of their 
produce at such prices. Hoarding (unlike smuggling which was conducted 
only by the big farmers with important contacts) was not confined to 
big farmers; some small farmers engaged in it because this was their 
only realistic means of making a ’reasonable* profit under the 
circumstances. While hoarding encouraged higher prices and enhanced 
these farmers* incomes, it did not of course make them ’rich*, for, 
despite their 'inflated* income, production costs were very high.
Since these did not own mechanical farming equipment they had to depend 
upon the big farmers mainly for such services, and for which they paid 
very high prices. It was the big farmers, therefore, who gained from 
the *kalabule* trade in rice.
The number of small rice farmers engaged in hoarding was in fact 
very small (about 5 per cent altogether). Hoarding (and thus
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profiteering) was not a ’safe* activity, especially for small rice 
fanners who were operating under the illiberal political atmosphere 
existing in Ghana at that time and which saw the ruthless pursuit of 
offenders. Thus it was a risk not worth taking except by the most 
enterprising.
Small Rice Farmers and the Sale of Paddy to the Rice Mills
In order to make farmers comply with government policy of selling
paddy to the official Rice Mills, specially •trained1 groups of soldiers
and police were deployed throughout the countryside and in farmers*
homes to search for hoarded crops. During a visit to Damongo in
June 1978, the author witnessed an anti-hoarding operation in that area
which involved the confiscation of about two thousand bags of rice
mainly from small farmers. During June and July 1978 there were
reports of similar raids throughout the region, and two of the most
affected districts, Yendi and Savelugu, were said to have •lost* several
10thousand bags of rice during the ’exercise•. According to the
military officer in charge of operations in the Northern Region at the 
time, and who was himself a large-scale rice farmer, these measures 
were necessary in order to avoid food shortages in the region and to
11stop farmers making *exhorbitant profits* from subsidised agriculture.
On the other hand, according to some of the victims, these raids
were meant to intimidate the smaller farmers «ho were not represented
by any organisation in the region, and more especially those who were
opposed to the regime. As expressed by one of these farmers:
These people (the soldiers) did not distaarb the big men (the 
big rice farmers) in the town; they picked on all the small 
farmers ... mainly those who did not support Acheampong.
Rather than seizing their rice the officers were helping the 
big farmers to smuggle it across the boriers. I witnessed 
myself how two trucks carrying rice from Yendi were given 
permission by Border Guards to cross at the border near 
Chereponi. They were going to Togo.^
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As we shall later demonstrate, the very big and well-connected farmers 
did not have the need to hoard rice in anticipation of high prices 
during the lean season. They smuggled most of it immediately after 
harvesting. Thus the anti-hoarding operations in the North during 
June and July 1978 were directed mainly at those smaller rice farmers 
who took advantage of the high ’market' prices. Occasionally lorries 
carrying rice belonging to the big farmers might be intercepted near 
border points by 'enthusiastic' rank and file soldiers, but as a rule 
such activities on the part of the big farmers went unchecked.
It is conceivable that the brutal physical punishment handed out
to offenders (in addition of course to the confiscation of their produce)
did have some effect in increasing official sales. About 70 per cent
of the small farmers in our sample survey claimed to have sold all their
rice to the Government Rice Mills in 1977/78. Although no official
statistics were produced to show the number of small farmers selling
officially during 1978/79* officials expressed the opinion that there
was "a substantial increase in the number of small farmers who sold
13their produce to the Mills". While the number of farmers selling
to the government might have increased, it still remained difficult to 
ascertain how much of their produce was actually sold to the Mills, 
since there was no means of knowing this other than from the farmers 
themselves.
There was another important reason why small farmers were persuaded 
to sell to the government at official prices: to enable them to purchase
fertilizer at subsidised rates. Purchases from the Depot were 
conditional upon selling paddy to the Rice Mills, and farmers were 
required to show proof of this before buying. This had been a policy 
of the government for several years, but was rarely enforced. During 
th 1978 and 1979 seasons, however, it was strictly implemented,
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especially as fertilizer was in such great demand. Only a few 
fanners were in fact able to obtain their full fertilizer requirements 
from the Depot. Others were forced to buy at •market* prices from 
those big farmers with surplus quantities. Nevertheless, the majority 
of the small farmers sold their rice (or rather some of it) to the 
government in the hope that the distribution and allocation of 
fertilizer would improve.
Thus the anti-hoarding campaign, combined with the (official) 
requirement to sell paddy to the Rice Mills as a precondition for 
purchasing subsidised fertilizer, had some effect at least in increasing 
sales by the small rice producers. The point, however, is this: 
how significant was an increase in the level of •official* sales by 
small rice farmers to official government purchases? Since between 
80 and 90 per cent of the rice produced in the Northern Region was by 
the large farmers, it follows, therefore, that if purchases were to 
increase to any significant level these, rather than the small-scale 
producers, would have had to boost their level of sales to the Government 
Rice Mills. But as we have already suggested, and will hope later 
to demonstrate, the big rice farmers smuggled most of their rice or sold 
it privately at ’market1 prices.
Small Farmers, Input Utilisation and Rice Production
We have already suggested that small rice farmers experienced 
exceedingly great difficulties in obtaining subsidised inputs as a 
result of which they could not hope to meaningfully engage in their 
farming enterprise. We will now attempt to relate these farmers* 
experiences with regard to the use of various inputs.
'(a) Initial Capital
Although it was part of the government’s policy to encourage banks
152
to assist fanners - the ADB was established in 1968 specifically with 
this objective in view - small rice farmers were the least assisted 
relative to large rice farmers. Only 19*1 per cent of the small rice 
farmers in our sample survey received loans or credit from the Banks 
in Tamale in 1977/78 (Table 4.4). Most of those who did not
receive financial assistance (56 .7 per cent) claimed to have applied but 
had their applications turned down, while 45.3 per cent had never 
applied. It is worth noting that 62 .6 per cent of all the farmers 
who did not receive loans were thinking of applying at some future date 
- an indication of course of the importance of initial capital to these 
small rice farmers.
TABLE 4.4: Loan/Credit Distribution Among Small-Scale Rice Farmers
During 1977/78
Those Receiving 
Those Not Receiving
Total Sample
Source: Survey of Small Scale Rice Farmers N/R, 1978.
The reluctance of the commercial banks to grant credit to small 
rice farmers stemmed from a genuine concern about the ability of these 
farmers to utilize those facilities profitably as well as to repay their 
loans. Discussions with ADB officials in Tamale suggested that the 
Bank would more likely (and in fact did) support small producers of 
traditional food crops (yams, maize, millet, guinea corn) rather than 
small rice farmers. In the view of the Loans Officers, the small rice
No. Percentage
9 1 9.T
38 80.9
47 100.0
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farmers represented a high element of risk. According to one such
official, the small rice farmer lacked the technical expertise to
’’yield maximum benefit from his farming activities and to make it
profitable”, so that he was likely to depend more and more upon the Bank
for assistance, ’’until eventually he would be driven into financial
15
ruins and unable to pay back his loans”. Before credit was
considered, therefore, the Bank had to be satisfied first, of the farmer’s 
ability to put his land to ’good* use, and secondly, of his ability to
16make repayment in the event of crop failure. The problem of course
was what constituted ’’maximum benefit” and ’’profitability”. According
to these officials, a farmer was expected to demonstrate his ability
to make a profit from his enterprise (based presumably on his farm
17
income) before he could be considered as being ’safe’ for a loan.
As we suggested earlier (Table 4.3)» profitability depended upon the
•right* combination of factors as well as prevailing prices. The use
of loans per se was not a guarantee for profit, but their use would most
certainly have allowed small producers scope to combine various factors
in such a way as to enhance profitability. A more liberal policy of
bank credit together with a true market price for their paddy would have
enabled small rice farmers to make a profit and repay their loans.
These farmers were therefore ’trapped’ because of the misconceptions of
bank officials and the unrealistic policy of the government as regards
sales and prices. Besides, small farmers did not have the all-
important ’connections* that were so crucial'to successful farming in
the North. Bates has suggested how such ’connections’ played an
important role in structuring the allocation of loans to the commercial
food crop producers in Northern Ghana, with applicants ’’going over the
heads of the professionally-minded lower staff” who would in turn be
18directed to release the funds to specified individuals. The small-
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scale rice producers did not have access to these high-level officials.
Our interviews with the small-scale rice farmers in the Northern Region
suggested that very few of the unsuccessful applicants were given an
audience with bank managers or senior officials and, even if granted,
the outcome was still unfavourable to these farmers, as demonstrated
by the example of Alhassan Yakubu. After Yakubu * s original
application to the ADB had been turned down on the grounds that he was
not a ’’serious” farmer, he turned up at the Bank’s office in Tamale
with receipts showing purchases of ’’nearly 800 cedis” of inputs, and
insisted upon seeing the Manager. After some initial resistance he
met a senior Loans Officer who still maintained that he had not ’’proved”
himself to be an efficient rice farmer - it was his second year as a
commercial rice producer having produced 75 bags from 20 acres in his
first season - and that he should try the following year. When Yakubu
produced his documents to prove that he was indeed a ’’serious” farmer,
the official promptly ’’dismissed” him with a warning that in future he
19should not be ’’disturbed”.
The attitude of the Banks towards the small farmers was further
emphasised by the nature of the loans given to these farmers. Out of
the nine farmers in our survey who were in receipt of loans from the
ADB, only two were given limited credit with the backing of guarantors
20
for the specific purpose of rice farming.
(b) Mechanised Farm Services
The reluctance of banks to provide small rice farmers with financial 
assistance meant that they were seriously handicapped as far as obtaining 
the Use of mechanical tractor services were concerned. They were not 
only unable to purchase machinery - it is doubtful whether the purchase 
of farm machinery by individual small farmers would have paid off 
anyway, in view of the overall low level of productivity of these farmers
155
and the unrealistic official prices paid - but to a very large extent 
their flexibility was restricted since they could not choose between 
alternative sources of mechanised services. Support by the banks 
would have meant that farmers could pay for such services by direct 
credit. The farming agencies did not accept payment by •instalments* 
which was a common method of payment among farmers who were not in 
receipt of bank credit. On the other hand, private owners tended to 
accept such arrangements especially if the farmer concerned shared a 
common political (chieftaincy) identification.
Table 4.5 supports the assertion that nost of the small rice farmers 
obtained tractor services from private owners. Some of these services 
were in fact provided by tractor operators -who grabbed an opportunity 
to earn extra income by ploughing land for small farmers at prices 
much higher than subsidised rates. V/hile in 1978 the subsidised rate 
for ploughing and harrowing was 70 an acre, small farmers paid between 
120 and 0 140 to private owners or their operators. The co-operation 
of tractor operators was indeed crucial for supplying scarce tractor 
services to the small rice farmers, but it is doubtful whether they
21constituted a kind of rural ’'aristocracy11 as postulated by Shepherd.
Although the Ministry of Agriculture was a useful source of tractor
services it did not supply these on the scale originally expected. One
reason for this was due partly to its depleted stock caused by frequent
breakdown and lack of spare parts, and partly to the Ministry's
preference for allocating machinery to its senior staff, civil servants
and other public officials, but more especially military personnel who
regarded themselves as having exclusive right to such machinery
22belonging to the Ministry.
A
As far as other available sources were concerned, small farmers did 
not have any success in utilising services provided by these. DEMCO, 
the biggest of the private agencies, supplied tractor services mainly
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TABLE '4*5! Source of Mechanised Services by Small Rice Farmers During 
1977
Source Tractor Combine Harvester
Private Owners 59 6
Ministry of Agriculture 10 2
DEMCO 2 1
NRDC 0 0
Nasia Rice Company 1 0
Banks 1 1
Self Owner 1 0
Total Utilising Services 7*f 10
Non-Users _2 66
Total Sample 76 76
Source: Survey of Small-Scale Rice Farmers, N/R, 1978*
to big farmers who were assisted with bank credit, while the others were 
exclusive to those farmers with 'connections*• Combine harvesters were 
even more difficult to obtain, with private owners providing the main 
services to small farmers* Most of these farmers, however, were 
forced to adopt manual methods of harvesting* Our Table shows that 
only 13 per cent of the small farmers in our sample utilised combine 
harvesters, with private owners again providing the main source of supply*
(c) Fertilizer Use by Small Rice Farmers
The application of chemical fertilizers by Northern farmers 
increased, as we have already noted, with the establishment of the 
Fertilizer Project by the GGADP in 1970* The introduction of 
commercial rice farming witnessed an unprecedented increase in the demand
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for such fertilizers by local farmers. Chemical fertilizers were 
important to these rice farmers since no other form of manure was used 
(or available for use) on land whose organic properties were being 
rapidly destroyed through inadequate preparation and poor farming 
techniques generally.
Between 1970 and 1975*when fertilizers were distributed in the
North by the GGADP,small farmers did not experience serious difficulties
in obtaining their supplies. From 1975/76 however, after its
management and distribution was taken over by the Ghanaian government,
supplies fell increasingly short of demand mainly because of the
governments insolvency. The government was unable to import
sufficient quantities and this had severe repercussions on both the
allocation and the system of distribution. Great difficulties were
experienced in carrying fertilizer from Tema to the regional depots
23because of the shortage of transport facilities. Even after
supplies had actually reached the Tamale Depot,further difficulties
were encountered by the lack of storage and packing facilities there.
As a report in the Weekly Spectator pointed out, 80,000 bags of
fertilizer were left to rot at the Tamale Fertilizer Depot because the
Ministry in Accra had failed to respond to a local request for a fresh
2*fsupply of bags to re-pack the damaged ones.
The total effect of this attitude towards farming was to create a 
shortage of this important input and to raise its price beyond the 
means of most small farmers. During the 1978 and 1979 seasons, 
farmers were particularly hard hit by the fertilizer shortage. Part 
of the problem in 1978 was the 'timing' of its distribution; by the 
time it became available at the Depot most farmers had long finished 
planting, thus making it too late to apply nitrogen, or first 'dressing' 
as it is commonly known. In the following year it was simply not
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available from official agencies and farmers were forced to resort to 
private sources, i.e. the black market traders, for their supplies.
Less than half (4-2.1 per cent) the small farmers in our survey
claimed to have obtained their fertilizer requirements directly from
the Depot in 1978, while 4-8.7 per cent obtained theirs from private
sources which consisted of large farmers or traders (Table 4.6)
At the same time only 22.4 per cent of all small farmers in the survey
claimed to have obtained an adequate supply of fertilizer during the
1978 season. Most of those who received their stock from the Ministry
of Agriculture claimed that their allocation was not sufficient for their
needs, and many of these had to make up the deficiency by buying on
the black market. During the 1978 farming season N.P.K. was sold
between & 12 and 0 16 a bag on the ’market1, and sulphate of ammonia
between 0 10 and $ 14-, while subsidised prices stood at 0 7*50 and
# 5*50 respectively for the same period. A small minority of the
farmers in our sample (9*2 per cent) did not use fertilizer during the
1978 season. The most common reasons given were the high prices charged
by ’traders’ or the enormous bribes demanded by senior officials at the
25Depot before fertilizers were released.
There were a few farmers, however, who did not have the need to 
apply fertilizers because of the fertility of their land. For 
example, Araadu Abudulai,who for four years prior to 1978 had a twenty 
acre farm near Daboya, had never applied any form of fertilizer and, 
according to his testimony, his output was generally as good as, and
26in some years even better than, those who used fertilizer.
Abudulai’s experience was an exception since M s  farm was situated 
along a tributary of the White Volta where the land was extremely fertile. 
The use of fertilizer was crucial for successful rice cultivation in the 
North.
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TABLE 4.6: Fertilizer Use by Small-Scale Rice Farmers During 1977-1978
Source Sufficient Insufficient Total
No. % No. % No. %
Ministry of 
Agriculture
11 14.5 21 27.6 32 42.1
Private 6 7.9 31 40.8 37 48.7
None - - 7 9.2
Total 17 22.4 52 68.4 76 100.0
Note: By •sufficient* is meant the amount officially recommended for
use by the farmer. Thus, the recommended application rate for 
N.P.K. is between two and three bags per acre, while for sulphate 
of ammonia the rate is one bag per acre.
Source: Survey of Small-Scale Commercial Rice Farmers, N/R, 1978.
(d) Recruitment of Labour
Competition for casual labour was very energetic and enterprising 
between all types of farmers. While the small rice farmers utilised 
a greater proportion of hired labour for harvesting relative to other 
operations, the large farmers used most of it during the weeding process. 
Casual labour on the whole was not in short supply, but there were those 
labourers who were considered as *specialists* either through efficiency 
or experience, and who were in greater demand as a result. It was 
mainly from among the rest, or ’fringe* supply, that the smaller farmers 
recruited their workforce.
The better skilled labourers were also ’creamed off* by the ✓ 
higher wages paid by the more prosperous large-scale farmers. During 
the 1978 season some of these farmers paid betv/een 0 5 and 0 6 a  day for
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the •specialist* labourers recruited from the urban centres, while the
less skilled ones were paid 0 3 a day on average. Casual labour
recruited from the rural areas, i.e. from villages situated around the
farms, received much less in compensation. During the 1978 weeding
season, village recruits from near Gushiegu were paid between 0 2 and
0 3 a day, according to their skill, by fanners from Tamale. Such pay
differential led at times to conflict between labour and capital, and
which in some cases gave an impression of the manifestation of class
conflict such as in 1977 when a group of 60 casual workers recruited
from local villages downed their tools and threatened to "chop down11
Alhaji Abdul-Rahamani's farm in Daboya, if they were not given an
27increase in pay from 0 3 to 0 h a day.
The existence of a dual system of pay structure for casual labour 
posed very serious problems to the small rice farmer. The fact that 
they were left with a •residue* of labour did not necessarily mean that 
small farmers paid * cheap* rates for such services. These were not 
•surplus* labour in the true sense, i.e. as far as the market was 
concerned. They were 'surplus* relative only to the needs of the big 
farmers. But as far as their bargaining power with the small farmers 
was concerned, these casual labourers negotiated over wages or 
conditions of work, and generally won some concessions. Usually the 
farmer, would agree to provide meals comparable to those offered by the 
big farmers to their workers. Furthermore, small farmers did not have 
their own means of transport, and labourers recruited from the urban 
centres had to be conveyed at extra costs. Thus the small rice farmers 
did not only compete against the large-scale rice farmers for labour, 
but also the average 'cost* of labour to them was probably much higher 
than to their big counterparts.
Some small farmers could minimise or avoid altogether the high cost
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of transporting workers to farms by recruiting, whenever possible, from
nearby villages* According to our survey, nearly 58 per cent of the
small rice farmers recruited labour in this way (Table 4.7). Besides
28saving on transport, they also paid cheaper rates to village recruits*
Of course it was not always possible for the farmer to recruit only from 
the villages; he simply had to supplement his workforce by recruiting 
from the urban centres. Thus according to our survey, 14.5 per cent 
of the small farmers recruited casual labourers from Tamale only, while 
27*6 per cent recruited both from Tamale and the villages. Those 
farmers who recruited casual labour only from Tamale either had a 
•regular* and reliable supply from there, or did not have the necessary 
•contacts* to recruit •cheap* labour from the villages near their farms.
TABLE 4.7: Source of Recruitment of Casual Labour by Small-Scale
Rice Farmers (1977)
Source No. of Farmers % of Sample
Tamale only 11 1^.5
Surrounding villages only (a) kk- 57-9
Both 21 27.6
Total sample 76 100.0
(a) Villages situated near the farm.
Source: Survey of Small-Scale Rice Farmers, 1^ /R, 1978.
Nearly all small rice farmers in the North utilised hired labour.
It should be noted that small farmers did not make exclusive use of 
either type of labour, but used degrees of each. Generally, the amount
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of hired labour employed by the small farmer varied between 70 and 80 
per cent of his total workforce. The final proportion of hired to 
•free* labour depended upon various factors: the size of holdings,
capital, the type of farm activity (weeding or harvesting), the amount 
of 'free* labour available to the farmer and, of course, the cost of 
hired labour.
Output Level and Motivation Among Small Rice Farmers >
How did the problems experienced by the small rice farmers, in the 
light of the above analysis, affect their overall performance in terms 
of general output? Let us examine briefly the level of output of these 
farmers.
TABLE 4.8: Crop Yield for Small-Scale Rice Farmers (1977)
Crop Total Acreage Total Yield (Bags) Average Yield
Rice 581 1,235
per Acre 
2.1
Millet 307 348 1.1
Maize 412 542 1.3
Groundnuts 259 373 3.4
Guinea Corn 56 64 1.1
Notes: (1) The Table includes commercial crops, i.e. crops that sire
cultivated mainly for the market. Yams were widely grown 
by rice farmers but were used mainly for domestic 
consumption.
(2) In the sample of 76 small rice farmers, 61.4 per cent 
cultivated millet, 70 per cent maize, 4l per cent yams, 
56 .8 per cent groundnuts, and 12.9 per cent guinea corn.
(3) Intercropping was still a common practice among the 
farmers of Northern Ghana and was adopted by 5Qf/o of the 
farmers in our sample. However, only 5.3 per cent 
intercropped rice. s.
Source: Survey of Small-Scale Rice Farmers, N/R, 1978.
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One of the most important results indicated by the above Table (4 .8)
is the extremely poor yield realised by these farmers, not only for rice,
but for all crops. Millet, maize, and guinea corn yielded just over
one bag per acre on average, while groundnuts yielded slightly over
three bags (unshelled). The average yield for rice was 2.1 bags of
paddy per acre. As far as rice was concerned, the Ministry of
Agriculture estimated that the expected yield was between fifteen and
tv/enty bags per acre, so that on average productivity was drastically
low. The productivity for all other crops was several times below the
•officially* expected yield. For example, millet was expected to
yield between 9 and “10 bags per acre, while maize, groundnuts, and corn
were expected to yield about 15, 10 and 12 bags respectively on 
29average. But as we have already seen, the farmers in the North were
constrained by a number of factors which contributed to the overall low
level of productivity. Included among these constraints were the
shortage of mechanised farm services, fertilizers, and a general lack of
capital. Furthermore, there were the familiar weather hazards such
as drought or erratic rainfall which could seriously affect output.
The 1979 farming season, for instance, was seriously disrupted by floods
caused by the heavy and persistent rains that fell during the early
months and which caused only a relatively small proportion of agricultural
land in the North to be cultivated. Officials at the Ministry of
Agriculture in Tamale estimated that less than one-tenth of the total
acreage of land under rice production in the Northern Region was
actually cultivated during that year.^ Similar views were expressed
by the Chief Farmer for the Upper Region who claimed that the unforeseen
early rains had caused so much flooding to paddy fields that farmers
31m  the region would not be able to grow any nCe whatsoever.
Production may have been especially low in 1979 because of bad weather
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conditions, but the generally low level of production by comparison with 
the expected yield was due, on the whole, to the lack of application 
of farm inputs.
For the small-scale grower who did not own or have access to inputs
the problems were both serious and varied. Yet the farmers persevered,
and during the period under consideration the acreage under rice farming
in the North increased at an impressive rate. While the overall size
of small farms might not have increased significantly, the number of
small farmers who were engaged in rice production increased sharply
between 1970 and 1976. V/e are therefore forced to ask the question:
What motivated the farmers to pursue such an apparently risky and
32non-profitable enterprise? There is no one single answer to this
question, but, paradoxically, the most common reason given by the 
farmers themselves was the profit motive.
Table 4.9 refers to the stated motives of small rice farmers for 
pursuing this enterprise.
TABLE 4.9s Small Farmers* Main Motives for Cultivating Rice
Stated Motives 
Financial Gain 
Interest in Rice Cultivation 
Tradition from Family 
Introduction of Tractor 
Other Farmers* Success 
Supplement Income 
Government Policy
Total No. in Sample
No. of Farmers 
68 
35 
22 
41 
8 
28 
19 
76
°L
89.4
46.0
28.9
53.9
10.5 
36.8
25.0
Source: Survey of Small-Scale Rice Farmers, N/k, 1978,
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According to Table 4*9»the great majority of small rice farmers in our 
survey took to rice farming because of the potential profit involved. 
More than 89 per cent of these farmers claimed that they were motivated 
by this reason, while 25 per cent stated that they were attracted to 
rice farming because of government policy as regards rice farmers, i,e, 
the supply of various inputs at subsidised rates to farmers. It is 
interesting that more than 53 per cent of these farmers were motivated 
by the introduction of the tractor whose services they obtained only 
with the greatest difficulty, A few, however (10,5 per cent),claimed 
that they were 'encouraged* by the success of other rice farmers.
The prevailing opinion among the small farmers that rice production 
was a profitable enterprise is not supported by the evidence. It was 
profitable only to the big and well-connected farmers who, as we have 
noted, either sold their rice at 'market' prices or smuggled it to 
neighbouring countries. The small producers, on the other hand, were 
obliged to sell at 'official' prices to the government. In order to 
realise a profit at prevailing 'official' prices the small farmer would 
have had to obtain all inputs at 'subsidised' rates, as well as improve 
drastically on his level of output. Neither of these conditions 
existed.
The claim by some of the farmers that they were motivated by 
government policy towards rice farmers has to be examined closely. 
Officially, it was the policy of the government to assist all farmers, 
including small rice producers, by providing them with inputs and 
encouraging banks to provide loans wherever possible for farming in the 
region. But it was the big farmers who benefitted mostly from these 
policies. From time to time the small farmers were promised assistance 
via various regional establishments, but these never materialised.
Having been 'trapped' in this situation,they continued to pursue their 
farming activities under great difficulty, hoping that conditions would
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later improve. They were also ’encouraged* by the over-optimistic view 
that one good harvest in the future could make up for previous losses.
We will illustrate this attitude on the part of small farmers with 
the example of Issa Mohammed who started to cultivate rice in 1975 on 
a ten acre farm near Savelugu.^ In three consecutive harvests he 
produced eleven, twenty-eight, and twenty-four bags of paddy 
respectively. His main problems were the usual ones associated with 
rice farming in the North: shortage of farm inputs and machinery, lack
of initial capital and poor rainfall, which, in varying degrees, were 
responsible for his poor yields. In 1977* Mohammed sold 16 bags of 
rice - 10 to the Government Rice Mills at 0 70 each, and 6 to market 
women at 0 190 each - bringing him a total revenue of 0 1,840. He 
claimed that he spent 0 90 an acre for ploughing, and a further 0 200 
on fertilizer (obtained mainly from private sources). His labour costs 
were estimated at 0 500, while other expenditure (bags, transport, 
bribes, etc.) amounted to about 0 100. Total expenditure was estimated 
at 0 1,700, thus leaving him with a net profit of only 0 1**0. Mohammed 
was not discouraged by such a low profit margin. On the contrary, 
he expressed a desire to increase his acreage in subsequent years if he 
could obtain tractor services ”in reasonable time and for a reasonable
34
price”. Mohammed justified his enterprise in this way:
If I am lucky with the weather, even on my ten acres, I could 
harvest not only thirty or forty bags of rice, but more than 
one hundred ... and I would be able to make up for all my losses 
over the past year and maybe the year before. With rice farming 
here in the North you cannot predict your output ... so you have 
to keep trying...c
The opinion that their luck would change sooner or later was prevalent 
among the small rice farmers. The point is, however, how long could 
such optimism last? s.
A programme which was intended officially to boost agricultural 
production mainly through small-farmer participation, succeeded therefore
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in excluding these same farmers by systematically denying them necessary 
inputs in favour of a new rural class of large-scale rice farmers whose 
members depended upon political or other *connections' and the patronage 
of local chieftaincy for their predominantly successful rice 
farming enterprise. We will proceed in the next chapter to examine 
the experiences of these large-scale rice fanners.
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25* My interviewee claimed that he was asked for 0 100 in bribes by
a senior official at the Depot before he could purchase *f0 bags
of fertilizer. Since he could not afford to pay such enormous 
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32. In our estimated cost analysis at the beginning of the chapter 
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CHAPTER .5
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LARGE-SCALE RICE FARMING
The object of this Chapter is to examine the general characteristics 
of that group of rice farmers which we described earlier as "large-scale 
commercial". The Chapter sets out also to examine certain types of 
relationship created by these farmers in order to promote their economic 
interests. What is emphasised here, and has not been discussed in 
adequate detail in the literature generally, is the effect of government 
sponsorship upon large-scale rice farming in the North, especially in 
Dagbon, and the way this was responsible for the development of different 
socio-economic groups or ‘classes' in the process. Our main concern 
in this Chapter, and in subsequent chapters, is about rice farmers in 
Dagbon (which is the central focus of this thesis), although we will 
illustrate certain points where necessary by making general references to 
the North in general.
We have already stated that the government's approach to encouraging 
rice production was based on a system of input-subsidy. Rather than 
supplying the necessary inputs (mechanised services, fertilizers, improved 
seeds, etc.) at their real cost and hoping that the high world market 
price for rice would induce Northern farmers to produce it, the government 
attempted to increase its supply to urban markets at an artificially low 
(official) price but nevertheless to make its production profitable 
through subsidised inputs.
By 'large-scale* farmers we mean those farmers with a total holding 
of over fifty acres of land, the point at which they were likely to adopt 
modern farm technology. According to the conmercial banks, it was at 
this point that they preferred to start considering farmers for loans and 
other credit facilities. Officials at the Ministry of Agriculture also 
considered this the minimum size at which farmers could begin to produce
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rice on a ’’significant commercial basis”. It also represented an 
optimal farm size (or at least an adequately profitable farm size relative 
to very small farms). The extensive use of certain types of inputs 
such as hired labour or mechanical equipment is not considered to be the 
main criterion determining large-scale production since, as we have seen, 
small-scale commercial farmers also made some, if limited use, of such 
inputs. The important point is that it was from amongst those with 
holdings of fifty acres or more that farmers started to own farm machinery 
as well as seeking membership of the EGA, and securing benefits associated 
with membership of which the ability to gain bank loans might be a part,
Large-Scale Rice Farmers, Connections, and Bank Credit
One very important advantage of being a member of the class of 
large-scale rice farmers was the access which one had to those in 
positions of influence both at the local and national level, and through 
which one's rice farming capabilities were greatly enhanced. We should 
state from the beginning that not all large-scale rice farmers benefitted 
equally from membership of this class. Some were in a better position 
relative to others as far as access to 'aid* administrators were concerned. 
Among those big farmers who were not so well-placed, assistance was 
obtained from the more privileged and prominent amongst them via patron- 
client relationships. As we shall see when we consider social mobility 
in Dagbon, the need to belong to, or support the ruling chieftaincy gate 
was crucial. The prominent Dagomba rice farmers were generally all 
members or leading supporters of this gate. Of course there were a 
considerable number of large-scale rice farmers who were non-Dagombas, 
and who had no important allegiance to the ruling dynasty. The most 
successful among these farmers, however, had in common with the ruling 
gate their unqualified support for the Acheampong regime, and which was 
instrumental for receiving help for a profitable rice farming enterprise
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in the North.
The big rice fanners used their position to obtain generous supplies
of all subsidised inputs, especially subsidised credit. Rothchild has,
pointed to the relative success which large-scale Ghanaian farmers have
experienced in securing funds from the banks. According to him,
53*3 per cent of the total funds loaned by the ADB in 197^ were
distributed among 3«5 per cent of the applicants who were each authorised
to borrow 0 20,000 and above.^ Bates has argued that such loans were
generally allocated not according to commercial criteria but rather to
k
patterns of friendship and influence.
The extent to which rice farmers in the TSorthern Region were
5
supported by the banks has been clearly demonstrated by Shepherd. 
According to his summary, by 1976 most of the loan recipients were 
large-scale rice farmers, i.e., those with fifty acres or more (See 
Table 5 .1). These received 85 per cent of the loans given by the banks 
in Tamale. As far as the really big rice farmers were concerned (those 
with 200 acres or more), they accounted for 32 per cent of all such 
loans. Moreover, senior employees (civil servants and other public 
officials) and senior military and police personnel were given 
considerable priority over their junior counterparts, not only for those 
cultivating very big acreages (200 acres or more), but also for all size 
farms, including small-scale production. This tends to support our 
claim that status was an important factor determining the allocation of 
subsidised agricultural inputs to farmers•
By 1978, status and ’connections* had become even more important 
as a means of receiving credit from banks. At that time, banks had 
adopted the policy of cutting back drastically on available credit to 
farmers due to the low level of repayment among these farmers, and 
concentrated instead upon recovering outstanding loans. They were
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accordingly very selective in their choice of customers, especially as 
regards new rice farmer customers. New farmers were not normally 
accepted without the •backing* ofthose already established, i•e. prominent 
customers who might be rice farmers. Thus by 1978, personal contacts 
or •connections* became an even more important factor in determining a 
farmer’s ability to gain subsidised agricultural inputs.
Loan advances to big rice farmers varied according to size of farm, 
status, and to an extent the needs of the farmer. The minimum credit 
given to rice farmers in overdraft by Barclays Bank in 1978, for example, 
was 1^,000, while some of the very big ones received up to 0 60,000.
As far as long-term loans for the purchase of farm machinery and equipment 
were concerned, these amounted in some cases to several hundred thousand 
Cedis outstanding by June 1978.^
Prior to 1978, some very big farmers received loans simultaneously
from different banks for different purposes, Alhaji Sumani Zakaria,
one of the biggest and most successful rice farmers in the North, and a
chief supporter of the Achearapong regime, took out several •huge* loans
which were not always utilised for *agric - business*• After a *bumper*
harvest in 1977 in which he claimed to have sold 12,000 bags of paddy to
the Government Rice Mills (and one presumes several thousand more at
•market* prices), he obtained a "very big" loan from Barclays Bank for
7"other business purposes", i.e. besides rice farming. It was
widely believed that this particular loan was used to finance the 
construction of his office block in the centre of Tamale, a claim which 
he strongly repudiated during the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council*s 
(AFRC) investigations in 1979« Early in 1977 Alhaji Zakaria was also 
granted an import licence on the personal recommendation of Acheampong,
g
and this was used to purchase eight tractors and implements. Nearly 
sill members of the RGA executive were in receipt of generous loans from
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the banks. The Chairman received a loan from the ADB for farming
purposes in 1977, while at the same time securing another big one from
9 . .Barclays Bank to promote his transport business* The Organising
Secretary was another beneficiary, he was granted an import licence
early in 1978 for the purpose of buying farm machinery, in addition to
several large loans which he had already secured both for himself and 
10his brothers* These were only a few of the several well-connected 
big farmers who used their influence to obtain funds for various 
purposes other than rice farming.
By 1978 some of the big rice farmers in the North had been 
utilising subsidised bank loans for a period of up to five or six years. 
In many cases payment was deferred under the pretext of *poor* harvests, 
while in others loans were not repaid in full as these farmers used 
their political influence to stop the banks enforcing repayment. Thus 
the extent to which the large and well-connected farmers benefitted from 
the structure of loan allocation in the North cannot be underestimated.
We have seen how several big farmers obtained huge loans for 
the purpose of rice cultivation. But how profitable was rice farming 
to these farmers? We will examine this question before proceeding to 
discuss more fully the specific types of relationship which developed 
between members of this class for the consolidation of their group 
interests.
Profitability of Large-Scale Rice Farming
Several farmers experienced good crop yields from time to time, 
such as during the •bumper* crop of 197 -^, or the 1978/79 harvest when 
most farmers realised above average yields. In between these years, 
however, crops were affected by drought and hush fires when some farmers 
experienced total loss of their crops. Because of the unpredictable
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Summary of Estimated Costs and Revenue
1 Non-Labour
0
67,725.00 1 Average Yield: 8 bags per Acre
2 Labour 950.00 2 Total Production: 300 x 8
= 2,*f00 bags
3 Incidentals
(Transport, Fuel, 5,000.00 3 Price 0 70 per bag
Bags, etc.)
Total 77,675.00 Total Revenue = 0 168,000.00
Net Profit 90,325.00
Assumptions
1 Large-scale rice farmers use all farm inputs at official subsidised 
rates.
2 The superior yield for large-scale rice farmers was due to more 
efficient land preparation, a greater utilisation of subsidised inputs, 
and a more economical method of harvesting by mechanical equipment.
3 Large-scale rice farmers sell their produce to the Government Rice Mills 
at •official* prices.
nature of output due to natural or other causes, it becomes problematic 
to try to. estimate the profitability of rice farming in the region.
Of course any reliable estimate as to the profitability of rice 
production must take into account the question of •time*. What is 
attempted here is an analysis of its profitability based upon 1978 costs, 
and an average output for the more successful farmers. This estimate 
is also based on a 300 acre farm, which could be regarded as a fairly 
typical large-scale farming enterprise in Dagbon.
Large-scale rice farming (as suggested by the above estimate) was 
characterised by mechanised techniques for all major operations:
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landclearing, ploughing and harvesting* Planting, or seed •broadcasting* 
as it is popularly known, fertilizer application and weeding were carried 
out by manual labour. It should be noted that a few (very few) large 
farmers did not utilise manual labour for weeding; they practised weed 
control either by double-harrowing (which was more effective when water 
was abundant during the early growth of the crop) or by the application 
of chemical weed killers (herbicides).
As we will see from the above estimate, the average labour input 
per acre was lower for large-scale rice farms than for small rice farms. 
Labour utilisation for our (estimated) large farm was 16.5 man hours per 
acre compared with 65 man hours per acre for small rice farms (Table 4.1, 
Chapter 4) • The main reason for this difference was the greater use of 
labour made by small farmers for harvesting and land-clearing. As far 
as the large-scale enterprise was concerned, **8.5 per cent of the total 
man hours were allocated to weeding, while 2k per cent was used for 
planting, and 27 per cent for fertilizer application.
The total estimated expenditure for a 300 acre farm enterprise was 
0 77»675* of which the biggest items of expenditure were ploughing and
harrowing on the one hand, and harvesting on the other; they accounted
for 31 per cent each of the estimated cost. The average yield was eight 
bags per acre, giving a total production of 2,*t00 bags of paddy, valued 
at 0 168,000. The estimated net return to operational capital was 
0 90,3251 or 116 per cent.
The net revenue from the above estimate suggests at least that rice
farming on a large-scale was potentially very profitable. But it also 
underestimates its profitability because, as we shall see, it assumes that 
all of the rice was sold to the Government Rice Mills at •official* prices. 
We have already noted that most big rice farmers sold the greater part of 
their rice at black market prices. While the majority of the large 
rice farmers did not make a profit on such a scale from year to year, we
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might safely estimate that between 30 and *fO per cent of these made very
substantial profits at least every second or third harvest.
The extent to which rice production was profitable to some of these
farmers was well-illustrated by Mr. Ampah, the Managing Director of the
Government Rice Mills in Tamale. His *KX) acre farm was situated off
the Kumasi Road, about twenty-five miles south of Tamale. During the
1977/78 harvest he produced 2,000 bags of paddy and realised sales of
over / 200,000. His output for the two previous years on the same farm
averaged between 1,000 and 1,200 bags each year. He had already paid
11all outstanding loans from the proceeds of previous harvests.
According to Ampah, his profits in 1977/78 were “sufficiently substantial”
to enable him to purchase a new "Mercedes Benz 230” for cash.
This farmer was not alone in making profit on such a large scale.
Alhaji Sumani Zakaria was another. Despite overall bad weather
conditions in the North during some years, Zakaria boasted of producing
more rice on his farms each year "than the whole of the Upper Region put 
12together". He claimed that in the four years leading to 1977/78, he
13produced more than 10,000 bags of rice per year on average. Perhaps
no other farmer in the region produced on such a regular scale, although
some came very close and produced larger outputs during the occasional
year. Alhaji Kpabia, for example, produced 2^,000 bags in 1978/79
from 2,000 acres, while in 1976/77 and 1977/78 he harvested 8,000 and
1^ f*f,600 bags respectively from 800 acres. Alhaji Sule, the Gushie Na,
one of the largest rice farmers in the North in terms of acreage -
3.000 acres in 1978 - produced 22,000 bags in 1973, 20,000 in 197 ,^ and
158.000 in 1977. The intervening years were 'poor1 in comparison.
Why was it that large-scale farmers were able to achieve such a
/
relatively high level of productivity (and profitability) when, as we have 
seen, most small-scale farmers could hardly break even let alone make
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a profit? The crucial difference lay in the relatively low use of 
labour by large-scale farmers, given the high cost of labour, together 
with the subsidised cost of alternative inputs. Commercial success 
depended therefore upon a number of factors: substituting mechanical
methods for labour, obtaining such mechanical inputs at a potentially 
profitable (i.e. subsidised) cost relative to the prevailing 'price* of 
the product, and better still, obtaining more than the 'official' price 
for a large proportion of the product. All of these of course depended 
upon 'contacts', and which the large-scale rice farmer was better equipped 
to exploit.
Big Rice Farmers, the 'Kalabule' Trade and Profitability
The extremely high (black market) level of prices which prevailed 
in Ghana (not only for rice but for all goods) was the central feature 
of the 'kalabule' syndrome. 'Kalabule' was used to describe a ruthless 
phenomenon of profiteering and corruption which characterised Ghanaian 
society during the Acheampong years, but which continued unabated throughout 
the Limann administration (1979/81). Even the ruthless attempts by 
Rawlings* Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) failed initially 
to curb the 'kalabule* thrust.
The main cause of such rampant profiteering was the exchange rate 
policy and the attempt to regulate imports and prices for agricultural 
products. When Acheampong (NRC) was installed into office in 1972, one 
of his first measures, as we have seen, was to re-value the currency and 
this practically negated the effect of the December 1971 devaluation by 
the Busia regime. At the same time the country was suffering from a 
severe balance of payments situation which led the NRC to introduce a 
system of import and price controls. Despite "a widening gap between 
official and black market rates of exchange, the Acheampong regime refused
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to devalue the currency - perhaps because it had to justify its own 
seizure of power in January 1972 when it removed Busia on the grounds of 
having devalued the currency* By 1976/77f the black market rate of
exchange had increased alarmingly to between six and eight times the 
official rate of exchange, and by 1979 this had increased further to about 
ten times the official rate. The regime attempted to control such 
an alarming increase in black market profiteering by adopting a rigid 
system of price controls, but as this was administered by corrupt 
officials (who were also actively engaged in such profiteering), it made 
no significant impact upon the control of prices.
Some scholars of the Ghanaian economy, notably Jeffries, have argued 
that the regime’s policy of import control,combined with "chronic excess 
demand",led directly to an increase in government borrowing from 
commercial banks which in turn led to imported goods being sold at 
exceedingly high prices.^
The ’kalabule* trade had serious implications for the rice industry 
in the North in terms of its effect upon official purchases and on the 
supply of mechanical farm services to farmers. As fax as the sale of
paddy was concerned, purchases fell well below official targets for 
most years, with two notable exceptions: 197^/75 which was a ’bumper’
crop year, and 1977/78 when government prices increased from 0 30 to 0 70 
a bag (Table 5.3)• The low level of purchases during other years was 
due to overall low productivity, especially during 1976/771 but was also 
due to the intense smuggling activities of the bigger farmers. The bulk 
of the rice produced in the North was either smuggled out of the country 
or hoarded and sold at very high ’market’ prices. The smuggling of rice 
was not effectively checked by the authorities since of course they were 
involved in it. According to the Rice Mills, the smuggling of paddy 
in the North amounted to between four and five times what was sold to the 
government every y e a r .
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TABLE 5.3: Purchase of Paddy by Government Rice Mills, Tamale, During 
1970/71 - 1977/78
Year Target (Bags) Total Purchased
1970/71 - *f7,*f00
1971/72 - kZtZbb
1972/73 - 28,108
1973/7^ 1^6,920 78,616
19 7V75 1^6,920 3^,790
1975/76 262,700 55,519
1976/77 382,700 18,689
1977/78 382,700 1*f1,206
Source: Government Rice Mills, Tamale, 1978,
Smuggling was profitable for two main reasons. First, rice fetched
a substantially higher (nominal and real) price in the neighbouring
countries than it did on the home market. It was always difficult to
obtain reliable information from the farmers about current prices in
neighbouring countries (since no-one wanted to be associated with
smuggling), but it was believed that prices in some countries fetched
18lfup to four times more11 than in Ghana. Officials at the Rice Mills
believed that the "official" price of paddy was "between 20 and 50 per
19cent below prevailing market prices". This was a gross under­
estimation of the real situation and illustrated either ignorance on 
their part or plain wishful thinking. The other main reason why rice 
was smuggled out of Ghana was because it brought' foreign exchange which 
could be used by the farmers for purchasing foreign goods. Unlike the
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cedi, it was worth something.
Farmers who did not have the connections or the facilities to smuggle 
could still fetch very high prices by selling on the local market. It 
was, in fact, common practice for farmers to hold back a portion of 
their crop until the off-season when market prices were at their highest. 
Hoarding was not confined only to the big farmers; some small farmers, 
as we have seen, engaged in it - it was their only means really of earning 
a •decent* income.
The sale of rice at black market prices was one very important source 
of profit for producers. The supply of scarce mechanical services 
(tractors and combine harvesters) to non-owners was another lucrative 
source of profit to those owners with connections. These farmers were 
given import licences which were used to purchase agricultural machinery 
and equipment which were hired out to smaller farmers or non-owners at 
very high rates. Such •business1 was the source perhaps of even greater 
profit than the actual production of rice, especially as there was 
no official * control* over rates levied by private owners. By 1978, 
these owners of machinery were charging between 0 90 and 0 120 per acre 
for ploughing,and between # 50 and 0 60 extra per acre for harrowing. 
Moreover, before owners hired out their machinery, farmers were required 
in most cases to supply their own lubricants and fuel. Thus the hire
of farm machinery by private owners represented a quick and cheap means 
of amassing wealth.
The •kalabule* trade therefore contributed directly to the very large 
profits which the very prominent rice farmers realised under Acheampong. 
Even when their individual output was relatively low, as indeed they were 
from time to time, these farmers still made large profits from 
hiring out their machinery. But what were the causes of low output 
among the big rice farmers?
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Causes Affecting Output of Large-Scale Farmers
Despite the large-scale rice farmers* overall advantage in terms of 
their access to inputs and resources generally, their average output was 
only marginally better than that of the small-scale producer during the 
1977/78 harvest. Interviews with the farmers suggested that the 
pattern was not significantly different during the previous three or four 
years. While our sample survey showed that the small rice farmers 
produced 2.1 bags of paddy per acre on average during 1977/78, the large 
farmers did only fractionally better at 2.74 bags per acre during the 
same period. The concept of *average* output must, however, be treated 
with great care. V/hile some farmers experienced very poor yields more 
regularly than others, a number of these farmers (especially those with 
adequate farm machinery) produced well above faverage* (i.e. average based 
on our sample survey) yields regularly, even under the most unfavourable 
conditions.
All rice farmers were affected, though not necessarily to the same
extent, by the bad weather conditions which hit the region so severely
from about the middle 1970s. But certain types of hazards, such as 
20
bush fires, had a greater total effect upon large farms than they had
upon small ones. For example 44 per cent of the big farmers in our
sample claimed that their farms were affected by bush fires in 1977/78
from which approximately 4,700 acres were destroyed. Alhaji Zakaria
21lost an entire farm of 1,200 acres at Jimle m  that year.
The vulnerability of farms to bush fire was vastly increased by the 
serious shortage of combine harvesters in the region. Table 5 *4 shows 
the distribution of combine harvesters among farmers in our survey.
Only 20 per cent of the large-scale rice farmers in our sample owned 
combine harvesters: a total of twenty-six between them. According to
the Ministry of Economic Planning, there were about 180 combine harvesters
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TABLE 5.^ -: Large-Scale Rice Farmers, Northern Region, Distribution of
Combine Harvesters (Private)
Fanners No. of Combines Total Farm Acreage
Alhaji Mumuni 
Amandu
Alhaji Alhassan Osuman 
Fuseini
Alhaji Ibrahim Yahaya 
R.I. Alhassan 
Alhaji Yakubu
Alhaji Salifa Abdul-Rahamani 
Alidu
Alhaji Huseini
Moutrage
Angenu
Alhaji Sumani Zakaria 
Gushie Na
Total
2
2
3
1
3
2
5
2
26
k60
200
200
250
500
500
600
600
850
1,000
1,590
1,100
5,000
5,000
13,650
Average acreage to be harvested per combine = 525 acres.
Source: Survey of Large Scale Rice Farmers, N/R, 1978.
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distributed throughout the Northern Region at the start of the 1978
farming season, of which the Ministry of Agriculture with 37 of these, was
22the largest stockist. One of the largest hiring agencies, DEMCO, owned
10 of these harvesters, while the Nasia Rice Company had about 20 which
were serviceable; the majority were owned privately.
A large number of the combine harvesters in the region were inoperative
during the 1977/78 harvest due to breakdown or lack of spares. For
example, only 75 per cent (27) of those owned by the Ministry of
23Agriculture were operational during 1977/78 , while it was estimated that
only 60 per cent of all combine harvesters in the Northern Region as a
2kwhole were operational. The shortage of spares for combine harvesters
(as indeed for all other items of agricultural machinery) was a reflection 
of the over-optimistic assumption made in the early days of the Acheampong 
regime as regards the future foreign exchange position. That position, 
as we have seen, deteriorated when cocoa prices began to fall and 
corruption among public officials and members of the government increased 
to an unprecedented scale, thus rapidly depleting the country’s foreign 
reserves.
Again, referring to Table 5.k above, it will be seen that the mean 
acreage to be harvested per combine harvester was 525 acres - slightly 
above their estimated operational capability of 500 acres per combine 
harvester. But with a high proportion of these machines out of service, 
the burden on owners increased considerably. Given also that only 60 
per cent of the combine harvesters in the region were actually put into
service during 1977/78, (and with an estimated 90,000 acres of rice to
25be harvested mechanically) the problems which (some) farmers faced could 
not, therefore, be underestimated.
The overall situation was not helped by the inflexible, if 
understandable, policies of the hiring agencies, especially DEMCO, which
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did not find it ’economical* or ’safe* to allow their combine harvesters
to travel long distances between farms. Of course this policy was not
unrelated to the bad state of the roads and the insufficient attention.
given to the problem by the government. According to its Executive
Director, the Company had been forced in the past to turn down several
applications for its machinery mainly because farms were located well
outside the thirty-six mile radius of Tamale within which it operated,
26
and where roads were generally impassable by combines. Such policies
had the effect of forcing some farmers to look well outside the region
for the services of combine harvesters, as illustrated by the example of
Dwumfuoh who obtained the (belated) service of one such harvester from
27the Ashanti Region in 1977/78. The search for alternative sources,
with the inevitable delays, often resulted in great loss of crop from 
drying follicles (especially as the harvest coincided with the severe 
harmattan), as well as exposing the field to the additional risk of bush 
fire.
A number of forces were therefore at work to account for the poor
level of output among some big farmers in the region. Statistics were
not available, unfortunately, as to what proportion of the rice crop to
be harvested failed each year, but according to unofficial opinion, the
three harvests immediately following the 197^ *bumper* crop realised an
28estimated annual loss of between *f0 and 50 per cent on average. This 
opinion was reinforced by a Bank Project Consultant whose team visited 
several rice farms during the 1977 season and reported that "between 30
29and 40 per cent of the crop was lost due to failure to harvest on time".
Of course bush fires and drought were not the only causes of low output
by some large-scale rice farmers; poor crop yields were caused, though
✓
to a lesser extent, by inadequate land preparation. Field officers at 
the Ministry of Agriculture estimated that about 25 per cent of owners
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of tractors and equipment (ploughs and harrows) were not sufficiently
30trained in their use so as to produce efficient land preparation.
The causes of low productivity among the big rice farmers were 
therefore varied. Some of these ’causes’, for example bush fire, could 
be * controlled’ (or its risk minimised at least) by the proper timing 
of the harvest which depended in turn upon the availability of combine 
harvesters. The relatively low output of some of the big farmers, 
however, did not necessarily represent a loss of profit since, *
as we have seen, these farmers either smuggled or traded their produce 
- on the black market at prices several times above the official price. 
The ability of the big farmers to smuggle vast quantities of rice 
out of the country depended of course upon ’contacts1 • V/e will now 
examine the types of relationship that developed between these farmers 
and which were also crucial for the launching of their clandestine 
activities.
Social and Economic Relationships Between Large-Scale Rice Farmers
The big farmers co-operated in several ways for purposes of deriving 
reciprocal benefits which might be conducive to their individual or group 
needs. It was also a response, in a way, to the declining economic 
situation-, through which they hoped to secure adequate inputs and services, 
including transport, for the efficient conduct of their farming. The 
network of relationships that developed between these farmers was based 
upon ’gate’ or ’skin’ identifications.
The small farmers also responded to the general economic situation 
by grouping themselves (also according to chieftaincy ties), whenever 
possible, with a view to deriving collective benefits from available 
resources. But they did not have either the influence or the political 
connections that were necessary to tap these resources, so in effect any
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relationships which developed between them proved highly unproductive in 
terms of material benefits. There were examples of small farmers 
receiving assistance from the big and prominent ones who acted as ’patrons' 
in order to consolidate political followings, but any such help was 
generally very limited and was directed to supporters of one's own gate.
The difficulties which small farmers encountered in obtaining inputs 
while their bigger counterparts acquired these with relative ease, formed 
the basis of a potentially serious conflict between the small and big 
farmers, especially between those who were on opposite chieftaincy sides. 
These small farmers regarded the big ones as either appropriating resources 
that were made available by government or, what amounted to more or less 
the same thing, using their considerable influence to monopolise the use 
of such available resources.
The complex network of relationships w M c h  developed among the big
rice farmers found expression in various ways. Those farmers with
inadequate machinery, especially combine harvesters, were supplied with
such services by other group members. Benefits deriving from group
membership was of course reciprocal in nature: farmers gave something in
return for 'favours*. The nature of such reciprocity depended upon the
individual's personal circumstances, and what in fact he had to offer.
For example, in return for ploughing and harvesting for two of his
colleagues, Alhaji Abdul-Rahamani obtained from them transportation
services which were used to carry fertilizer from Tema to his farms in
the North* and to convey goods to various commercial centres throughout
Ghana, such as Bolgatanga, Navrongo and Bawku in the Upper Region, and
31Kumasi, Accra, and Secondi-Takoradi in the South.
The reciprocity between farmers was not necessarily confined to 
such 'routine' matters as the exchange of tractor or combine harvester 
services for transportation services. They might be of a more
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•permanent* nature. As Alhaji Abdul Raharaani put it, some of the
services rendered by one farmer to another might ’’seal the bonds of trust
32and friendship11 between the parties concerned. Thus, as a result of 
the "friendship” between Alhaji Zakaria and the Kukuo Na which was "sealed” 
after the chief directly intervened to secure for him about 500 acres of 
extremely fertile land in the Karaga valley in 1975* Zakaria ploughed 
(and harvested) the chief’s 400 acre farm every year at ’control*, i.e. 
subsidised prices. Zakaria was also given a regular supply of lubricants 
by this chief who received supplies through ’reliable contacts* in 
Upper Volta.^
Relationships of this nature were not restricted to small groups of 
two or three farmers, but might be extended to include several others, 
depending upon the needs, bargaining strength, or influence of the 
individual parties concerned. Thus Alhaji Sumani cultivated farms for 
several commissioners based in Accra, in addition to supervising those 
of two senior military officers who were stationed in the North. The 
Director of the Cotton Development Board also farmed for commissioners 
(notably the Brong Ahafo Regional Commissioner, Colonel Thompson), using 
tractors owned by the Board. The Direbtor of Nasia Rice Company also used 
the Company’s vast resources (tractors, combine harvesters, bull-dozers) 
to cultivate rice farms for senior military officers, commissioners, 
including Major Kotei (the Army Commander) and some high-ranking public 
officials.
This fraternity of rice farmers consisted of an elite group made up
of commissioners, executives, high-level civil servants, businessmen, and
of course prominent rice farmers. Because of their relationship to
positions of influence these people were able to monopolise resources so
✓
that, invariably, they were in a position to offer something of mutual 
benefit to each other. More crucially, they formed the nucleus of a
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group of farmers around whom smuggling was organised. Of course
smuggling required the co-operation of several agents, but because of
their contacts and efficient level of organisation, farmers could overcome
such obstacles as border checkpoints and customs with remarkable ease.
Government officials (who might be rice farmers with a vested interest
in smuggling) would intervene either directly or indirectly to facilitate
the process. For example, during April 1978, the Northern Regional
Commissioner issued strict instructions to Border Guards to allow several
34
consignments of rice from Saveluguand Tamale to cross into Upper Volta. 
Colonel Zumah, a former Northern Regional Commissioner (who was also a 
very big rice producer),was well-known for the assistance which he gave 
to colleagues in smuggling rice and other goods out of Ghana. His 
activities extended well beyond the borders of the Northern Region and 
into the Upper Region. I was reliably informed by an Upper Regional 
large-scale rice farmer how in 1975 Colonel Zumah, who comes from this 
region, personally escorted to Paga (Ghana/Upper Volta border) a lorry 
bound for Upper Volta carrying 600 bags of rice belonging to my interviewee, 
and had it cleared at the checkpoint "like a flash of tropical 
lightning” ^
As we have already pointed out, the social network which involved 
the big rice farmers developed around local chieftaincy affiliations 
and support for the Acheampong regime. The Abudulai rice farmers also 
formed parallel relationships,but the scale of their operation, and their 
level of achievement,was considerably limited in comparison, since they 
did not enjoy the institutional support or the privileges that were 
reserved for their rivals. In other words, tiiey did not have much to 
offer to each other by way of mutual aid.
The forms of relationship that have been described above were 
confined to the very privileged among the class? of big rice farmers.
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-In the following section we proceed to discuss a completely different type 
of relationship between farmers belonging to this class or, more precisely, 
between the privileged and non-privileged members of this group of large- 
scale rice farmers.
Conflict within the Class of Big Rice Farmers
Within the class or group of big rice farmers was a sub-group which 
at first gave the impression of belonging to a different 'class', but who 
were in other respects members of the group of large-scale rice farmers. 
These consisted mainly of farmers who started farming comparatively 
recently - generally after 197^ - when the banks were cutting down 
drastically on their financial support to farmers. Both groups had 
several features in common: large acreages, membership of the Rice
Growers' Association, chieftaincy allegiances. The main difference 
between the two was in the ownership of agricultural machinery, a 
distinction which formed the basis of the conflict between them. There 
was another very important difference: members of the sub-group did not
have the 'connections' of their privileged counterparts.
This situation gives rise to one very important question: why did
these farmers hold such vast amounts of land which they could not manage 
to cultivate efficiently? The answer rests in part with the mistaken 
belief that big acreages increased the chances of making a quick 'kill', 
but also with a concern more for status than with economic profitability. 
Size was related to status, so that the 'big' farmer became socially 
acceptable. The most important single factor influencing the possession 
of farms of such unmanageable proportions was the fact that the use of 
land was obtained 'free', i.e. agricultural land was not bought but 
leased to the farmer upon payment of a small (nominal) fee, or the 
presentation of a 'gift' to the custodians of the land. Although
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custodians were not always *generous* with land leased to rice farmers, 
there were no established rules governing its allocation, so that the 
discretionary policy adopted meant that a farmer who could establish a 
good relationship with a custodian (chief) was virtually assured of as 
much land as he possibly needed, or even more. As far as the majority 
of farmers were concerned, the ultimate objective was the size of the 
farm, not the quality of the farming*
As a result of their lack of mechanical equipment these fanners had
to rely to a very large extent upon owners of machinery or other sources
to cultivate their land, or most of it* Or they might depend upon
sources from outside the region to provide tisctor services which 
sometimes involved the payment of large sums io bribes* Furthermore, 
these farmers experienced considerable delay in gaining the services of 
farm machinery, whether tractors or combine harvesters*
We will now address ourselves to the question of who these discontented 
farmers were, their relationship to the local political system, and then 
go on finally to examine how the conflict made itself manifest. The 
discontented farmers within this group were generally supporters of the 
Abudulai gate. As we have already seen, these did not derive any 
important benefits from the local patronage system, since their side did
not enjoy the privileges that were reserved for the Andanis. It
consisted also of a few Andani supporters who objected in the main to the
disparity between one group of farmers and the next. But Andani
discontent was different in nature to that of the Abudulais. We will 
distinguish this difference by illustrating the nature of Andani discontent 
among this underprivileged group of farmers with the •typical* example 
of Tahidu Inusah.
/
Inusah started rice farming in 1975 and had a 500 acre field in'
Diari, but was never able to cultivate more than half of this area in
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any one season. He did not own any machinery but was generally able to
hire one from the local agencies or from private owners. With the help
of a loan from Barclays Bank he was also able to purchase fertilizer from
the local Depot, although from time to time he had to supplement his
allocation by buying from private traders.
Inusah was a strong supporter of the Andani gate and campaigned for
the government during the referendum on Union Government. As a result,
he expected the regime to reward him with loans which he intended to use
to purchase machinery, and was clearly frustrated when that did not
materialise. He believed that the leading members of the EGA enjoyed
an unfair advantage because of their close connection to political leaders.
According to this farmer, these "big men" represented their own interests
rather than those of the fanners as a whole. He argued as follows:
They have to realise that we (Andanis) came to power because of 
the effort of all our supporters, and not only of a few big men.
I campaigned for "Yes" in all the villages around Tamale ...
I am a number one supporter of Na Andani. Some of the big men
in the Association are not members of Andani ... they are not even
from the North, and they are the ones who get all the help from 
the government ... is this fair? ^
Inusah insisted that a more equitable system of resource allocation
was needed. He was not opposed to "big men" as such, since, according to
him, it was every farmer*s ambition to become big. However, he felt
very strongly about "the way and manner" these people sought to promote
their personal interests before those of the Association as a whole.
According to him, unless "these greedy men change their attitudes there
37will be no hope for the rest of us".
This was perhaps the crux: of the matter. Andani supporters wanted 
a change in the *attitudes* of the leaders, not in the existing social 
and political system itself. To dismantle the system of patronage 
existing in Dagbon would most certainly reduce the influence of the 
Andanis. Such a possibility was totally unacceptable to Andani
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supporters, irrespective of their relationship to positions of influence.
As one of them fittingly put it:
We can only complain about how some farmers on our side get all 
the help from Government, but they are still on our side ...
Alhaji Sumani (Zakaria) is Andani ... Ziblim Andan is Andani ... 
Ibrahim Mahama is Andani. If we rise up against them we are 
only going to make our own position very weak and make our enemies 
(Abudulais) stronger. So all we can do in this situation is to 
meet the big farmers and make them understand our own needs ... 
that*s all.^g
If the problem of allocation and distribution of scarce farming 
resources led to a mere recognition of the existing situation by Andani 
supporters, it did, however, bring out a full manifestation of conflict 
between the Abudulai supporters and those privileged rice farmers in the 
Association. The Abudulais were affected in one way or another by the 
overall shortage of farm inputs and the general difficulties facing all 
farmers, but their position was rendered even more precarious by the 
institutional bias against them. They were virtually isolated, and 
found it extremely difficult to operate effectively within the •system*. 
Their underprivileged position weakened seriously their ability to conduct 
their farming operations meaningfully, since their relationship with 
banks and agricultural agencies were generally strained. Such a denial 
of opportunities finally led to the conflict between them and the 
prominent rice farmers.
Such.conflict often surfaced at RGA meetings where the Abudulais 
were strongly represented, or even at personal levels of representation 
between the Abudulais and the authorities. Buring one such 
representation to the Regional Office by B.A. lakubu on behalf of the 
Regent of Savelugu in June 1978, Yakubu protested (to the Regional 
Commissioner) against the political pressures that were being put on the 
Regent for failing to perform the funeral of his father (the former Yo Na), 
who had died several years earlier. Yakubu naintained that his client
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had not performed the funeral, a sumptuous occasion both in terms of
eating and drinking, because he had experienced a series of bad harvests.
He emphasised, however, that the situation had not improved by the
authorities* continuous refusal to grant the Regent either a loan or
other facilities to obtain the relevant inputs which were vital for
successful farming in the North. It was, he warned, a situation that
might eventually lead to "open confrontation" between the two sides
(the Abudulais and the Andanis), "since the authorities could not go on
to systematically exclude one family and their supporters from
participating in the development process, and of the right to improve
39their material well-being".
For the moment, however, the main arena of * confrontation* between 
the two *sides* was the RGA general meetings where the Abudulai faction 
continued to press their claims against unfair discrimination by the 
leadership. It reached a culmination at one such meeting in 1977* 
when the Abudulai supporters called on the entire executive to resign 
because of their general incompetence. Unfortunately for the Abudulais, 
this strategy had the unforeseen effect of reinforcing the position of 
the Andani faction within the RGA by having the leaders officially endorsed 
as *agents* or representatives of government policy within the Association.
In this Chapter we attempted to demonstrate that only those privileged 
and well-connected big rice farmers with easy access to resources (and 
smuggling) actually made a profit from rice farming. The less 
privileged ones depended upon these farmers or local agencies to tackle 
their own activities, but the overall shortage of inputs caused mainly 
by the rapid decline of the Ghanaian economy, together with the local 
system of patronage, led to an ever-increasing frustration on the part of 
the weaker farmers, and sometimes to * confrontation* betv/een these and 
their prominent counterparts.
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But as we might have already inferred, chieftaincy was central to 
an understanding of the existence and continued domination of a powerful 
group of rice farmers in the North* We will proceed in the next 
chapter to examine its social, economic and political importance.
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CHAPTER 6
LARGE-SCALE RICE FARMERS,
CHIEFTAINCY AND THE STATE
We have already seen that the Acheampong regime*s 
programme for encouraging rice cultivation in the North 
favoured those with the status, influence and connections 
necessary to obtain bank loans and to gain access to 
fertiliser and mechanised inputs at government-subsidised 
prices. An important element in such status, however - an 
important intervening variable, as it were, between the 
individual aspirant rice-farmer and the government and other 
official institutions - lay (for Dagombas at least) in one*s 
relationship to the Dagbon chieftaincy. In this chapter we 
will therefore examine the social, economic and political 
importance of the Dagbon chieftaincy and show how certain 
groups, including large rice-farmers who were aligned with the 
ruling Andani family or "gate" (either through membership or 
voluntary support) derived huge benefits from that gate's 
political alliance with the ruling military regime. Members 
and prominent supporters of that gate had access to mobility 
opportunities via Andani patron/client networks.
Economic Importance of Chieftaincy in Dagbon
Traditional rulers in the North had always enjoyed a high 
degree of prestige among their subjects. Chiefs were regarded 
by their subjects as both spiritual and political leaders, and 
they also played an important economic role in their community
\
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Although colonial rule undermined their authority to some 
extent, it did not remove the legitimacy of the traditional 
rulers. On the contrary, the importance of the chiefs to the 
continued survival of the local administration was so vital 
that by 1932, as we have seen, the government was forced to 
incorporate these rulers into its system of "indirect" rule.
The continued practice by politicians in more recent 
times of manipulating the traditional political system in the 
North was more clearly demonstrated than ever before by the 
Acheampong regime's involvement in Dagomba politics from 1974 
onwards when, as we pointed out earlier, it removed the 
reigning Abudulai paramount chief, Abudulai IV, and replaced 
him with the Andani candidate, Yakubu. Having effectively 
appointed the Andani candidate to the skins of Yendi, the 
regime undertook to protect its client's interest, for which 
in return it sought (and received) several rewards. The most 
important of these, as we shall see, was the campaign by the 
Andani faction in favour of Unigov.^ Of course, the Andanis 
desperately needed the regime to remain in power since a 
change of government could lead to their own gate being 
deposed. This has been the pattern in Dagbon since the time 
of Nkrumah: each change of regime saw the rival faction 
petition the new government (often successfully) for the 
removal of the reigning paramount chief on the grounds that he 
was unconstitutionally installed. In their own interests, 
therefore, the Andanis fought tirelessly to win support for 
Acheampong in the North. The prize they received in return 
was the recognition of their status as an important* "ally" of 
that regime, as well as access to various state institutions and 
top government officials in Accra, including Acheampong himself.
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The alliance between the Andani faction and the Acheampong regime
provided members and prominent supporters with one of the chief means
by which economic gains could be achieved. As a result of this
relationship, they received numerous benefits such as import licences
and huge bank loans through the personal mediation of Acheampong.
During the Unigov campaign several vehicles were allocated by the
Regime to its chief supporters in the North, and these were used for
other private activities, such as commercial transportation.
Furthermore, the'aspirant rice-farmers among the prominent supporters
made important gains in the area of land allocation. One of the most
important benefits (to the farmers) was in the business of land
allocation. As land came under the control of village chiefs who were
loyal to the ruling gate - this was achieved by the replacement of several
Abudulai chiefs by members of the ruling faction - large areas of land
were allocated to Andani supporters for farming purposes and denied to
Abudulai supporters. Some of the best rice-fields in Dagbon were
allocated between 1974 and 1977 to farmers whose support for the military
regime was well known. Besides obtaining as much land as they wanted,
these farmers also shifted freely from one area to the next, depending
upon their individual needs. Alhaji Ibrahim Mahama, a well-known
Tamale lawyer, acquired land for two rice-farms and a cattle-ranch between
1975 and 1976. As a prince from the Andani family he was left in no
doubt as to the "importance of chieftaincy connections to successful
2
business operations in the North". Another prominent member of the
Andani family who benefited enormously from his "status and privileged
position" was Ziblim Andan of the Cotton Development Board. He owned
two rice-farms in Karaga and helped to secure land there for "some very
3
good people from Accra" whom he knew. Richard Alhassan Alhassan, the
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Dakpema (Tamale fetish priest) was another highly respected member of 
the Andani family who was very influential in several areas of decision­
making, including the allocation of land to the Cotton Board of which he 
was the Chairman. Privileges were not restricted only to "blood" 
members of the Andani family, but were extended to all prominent 
supporters.
The importance of Andani-ship to aspirant rice-farmers did not lie 
simply, or even primarily, in the direct benefits which such an allegiance 
provided as regards rice-farming. Of course it helped to gain access 
to large acreages of suitable land, but as we have seen, this was not 
the main precondition for commercial success. The main precondition 
lay in access to (scarce) subsidised inputs and cheap bank loans, and 
the chiefs did not normally directly intervene here. But in order to 
gain such access one needed already to have some "capital" - and there 
were various ways in which the Andani chiefs could enable their most 
important supporters to become such "men of capital". The process by 
which Andani-ship enabled people to become commercially successful, 
large-scale commercial rice-farmers was generally, therefore, a somewhat 
indirect but cumulative one.
Despite their privileged status and the vast opportunities gained 
during the Acheampong period, the Andanis did not form a "class" defined 
initially in terms of ownership of the means of production which seeks 
to further its interests over and against another class. It was a 
matter of supporters of a local political faction (an ascriptive, 
traditional group in a sense) gaining privileged access to various state 
agencies, banks and local government positions in return for providing 
various services to the ruling military junta. The working of this 
reciprocal arrangement was referred to briefly in the last chapter when it
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was mentioned that certain well-connected, large rice-farmers in the 
North cultivated land for several commissioners who were either based 
in the South or who, though based in the North, were too preoccupied with 
their official day-to-day duties. These arrangements will be elaborated
further in the course of the remaining chapters. However, it is important
to emphasise at the outset that this situation differed from a "class 
situation" most notably by virtue of its fragility and its dependence 
on the incumbency of Acheampong and his regime. The fall of Acheampong 
inevitably threatened, and later weakened considerably, the position of 
these farmers.
The Importance of Chieftaincy Connections to Large Rice-farmers
The enskinment of Mion-Lana Andani as Ya Na in 1974 coincided with
the intensification of the rural development programme in the North and
of rice-farming in particular. Since Acheampong had been instrumental
in installing the Andani candidate, it was therefore only to be expected
that supporters of this faction would in turn back his government. As
we have already mentioned, the Andanis formed an "alliance" with the SMC
which further ensured that their interests were well guarded - at least
during the regime's period in office. The importance of the SMC to the
Andanis was succinctly expressed by one of their princes who explained
that since Acheampong intervened in Dagbon, local politics had changed,
and the Andani family had enjoyed a new status of which it had been
deprived until then. According to him, the family was accepted not
only in Dagbon, but throughout Ghana. As he summed up: "The Regional
Administration approve of us, they work hand-in-hand with us...and of
course we are known by the Government in Accra....We are known throughout 
4
Ghana".
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The significance of this new era to the big (Andani) farmers was
that the stage had been set for them to operate as an important and
influential social group in Dagbon. According to Alhaji Zakaria, the
most important advantage was that they (the big Andani farmers) were
given access to people in high places. As he said, "It was important
to become friends with the commissioners and *big? men so that we may be
able to get all our needs". As a result of his personal contacts,
Zakaria was able to obtain an Import Licence from the Government,-which
was used to purchase "several" items, including tractors, four of which
were still waiting to be collected at Tema Harbour at the time of 
6 'interview.
Naturally, some farmers (especially those with strong business and 
professional connections among the prominent supporters) were in a more 
privileged position than others in terms of their relationship to 
positions of access, and these often bargained on behalf of their less 
influential colleagues. In this way several rice-farmers were able to 
obtain agricultural inputs and services which otherwise would not have 
been available to them. These services included the use of farm 
machinery - mainly tractors and combine harvesters - from the Ministry of 
Agriculture, DEMCO, the banks, or the Northern Regional Development 
Corporation (NRDC). For example, the NRDC came to the assistance of 
one desperate rice-farmer after a prominent colleague and government 
supporter intervened on his behalf. According to Issah Mohammed, he 
had barely ploughed a hundred acres of his three-hundred-acre field when 
his tractor broke down. He contacted his "friend", Alhaji Abdul^Rahamani, 
a farmer with important connections, who took him directly to the NRDC 
where he was promised a tractor as soon as possible. Mohammed claimed 
that within three days he got the tractor and was able to plough the rest 
of his field.®
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By far the most sensitive but important area of assistance was the
granting of loans to the farmers. Lesser-known farmers could, and
often did experience difficulties in securing loans and overdrafts from the
commercial banks, but with the recommendation of a well-known and
financially secure farmer, a loan could be negotiated. Alhaji Sumani
Zakaria claimed that whenever he personally recommended a farmer to his
bank manager for a loan - though he would not normally recommend one
whom he knew could not make a success of his farming - that farmer
9
would not, as a rule, be turned down. Although it cannot be
ascertained here precisely to what extent the influential big rice-farmers
assisted their less privileged colleagues in obtaining loans, it is
undoubtedly clear that, during the period of intensified rice production
in the mid-seventies, banks were influenced by the recommendation of
"established" farmers. The matter was put into some perspective by a
senior officer of Barclays Bank in Tamale whose responsibility it was
to interview and recommend farmers to the Bank for loans. According
to this officer, it was always in the interest of the Bank to concentrate
on farmers that were recommended by customers who had themselves established
10
a good relationship with the Bank. In that respect Alhaji Sumani 
Zakaria was well equipped, for his reputation as a successful farmer 
and businessman was beyond dispute, and besides he was involved in a 
network of political and economic relationships that extended far beyond 
the boundaries of the North. Several other influential big rice-farmers 
were instrumental in helping colleagues obtain loans from the banks.
Foremost among these were Alhaji Ibrahim Mahama, Ziblim Andan, Dakpema 
Richard Alhassan Alhassan, and two prominent officers of the RGA, Alhaji 
Yakubu and Abu Alidu, who were Chairman and Organiser respectively.
Barclays Bank was not the only financial institution to be 
influenced by the recommendations of the "big" farmers; Standard Bank
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was another. During the 1978 season this Bank, like most others in
Tamale, had decided on cutting down drastically on its loans to farmers
because of the increasing rate of default. Again, like other banks
in the region, Standard was mainly concerned with recovering outstanding
loans, so that only ten new farmers were sponsored by the Bank during
that season, and with greater emphasis being placed on security
b a c k i n g I n  cases where farmers could not provide such security,
usually to the value of two-thirds the size of the loan required, they
could be considered only if supported by a "recognised” customer.
Thus, of the ten new customers awarded loans by the Standard Bank in 1978,
12
seven were backed by prominent and influential farmers or businessmen.
Of course there were other avenues besides financial institutions 
and sources of inputs that were exploited by members of the Andani faction 
during the height of their power in Dagbon. The pro-Andani farmers 
were in a strong position to develop good relationships with local chiefs 
which were used to their full advantage as far as obtaining land leases 
in the North was concerned, especially around the most fertile rice 
valleys. Quite apart from securing large tracks of land for their own 
needs, these farmers were also able to obtain land for their Southerner 
friends, including military officers.
Although the period of Andani ascendancy in Dagbon during the mid­
seventies witnessed a corresponding rise in status and opportunity for 
members and prominent supporters of that gate, it did not affect the 
unity of the Abudulai faction. In fact it could not; the Abudulais 
were a close-knit and well-organised social group which revolved around 
the leadership of Mahamadu Abudulai, the former Ya-Na and inspired 
leader of that faction. It was unlikely that they would allow 
unfavourable circumstances such as a "temporary" loss of power to affect
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the fabric of their social organisation. It was, however, in their 
specific relationship with government and banking institutions that the 
Abudulais suffered the most serious setback, though one or two were able 
to overcome the prevailing nepotistic system in Dagbon and operate 
fairly successful businesses and farming enterprises. One such 
prominent supporter was R.I. Alhassan, a Tamale lawyer and former CPP 
Member of Parliament who became a fairly successful rice-farmer during 
that period. Alhassan started rice-farming in 1969, long before the 
Andanis came to power, at a time when the institutional bias against the 
Abudulais did not exist. Since this farmer had the resources to finance 
his private enterprise independently of the banks - he claimed that by 
1978 he had paid off his loans outright - he did not experience personally 
the resentment against the Abudulais by local farming agencies.
Opposition was, however, directed at him for different reasons: his 
opposition to the concept of Unigov and to the Acheampong regime in 
general. It was a position that affected not only Alhassan, but Abudulai 
supporters en masse, for as a political group they were institutionally 
and systematically opposed to that regime.
Neither did the regime disguise its intolerance of the Abudulais.
As we shall see later when we consider the activities of the regime in 
the North during the Unigov campaign, supporters of this faction were 
ruthlessly pursued and suppressed by its agents. Local opposition 
against the Abudulais reached it peak during the three or four months 
that preceded the 1978 referendum on Unigov, when members of this faction 
met increased resistance from all quarters, including the state-run 
enterprises. This is not imply that all officials were against the 
Abudulais; they had some supporters among public officials, especially 
at the Ministry of Agriculture, but these were holders of junior offices
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and were not in any position to shift the balance of power or influence
in their sidefs favour, or to be of any real assistance to individual
members of their group. On the other hand, the managers of the main
corporations or bodies, including of course some political organisations,
were generally either members or supporters of Andani who were appointed
by the regime directly or its local representatives.
These appointees co-operated fully with the regime (and its local
agents) in implementing its policies which were generally unfavourable
towards the regime's opponents. Sometimes executive heads of agencies
who were neutral as far as factional politics was concerned, were
required to ’'co-operate" with the regime in promoting its policies in the
North which meant, invariably, showing favour towards its supporters.
The executive of DEMCO, a privately-run enterprise (but which, like all
other private farming agencies in the North, was granted tax concessions
by the government) was strongly reprimanded by the Regional Office in
November 1977 for hiring out one of its combine harvesters to a suspected
anti-government (Abudulai) supporter in preference to an Andani farmer
whose farm was situated well outside the company's operating zone.
According to the Director, he was "warned" by the Regional Commissioner
that his action was against the "spirit of OFY" and that in future he
would be required to "co-operate" more fully with the government so as
14
to achieve set goals. Such tactics did produce the intended effect
of showing favour to selected clients. As the Director said, although
the company was a private concern, they were also participating in the
government's agricultural programme, so that it was in their best
15
interests "to take advice from those in high places".
One of the most sensitive area of agricultural policy was the 
allocation of bank loans to farmers. It was cornnon belief among the
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regime's opponents that the local banks provided assistance only for
its most prominent supporters. Although the banks considered opponents
of the regime for agricultural loans (and a few Abudulai supporters did
succeed in getting limited assistance) there were mechanisms which
guaranteed that only selected farmers would be given substantial loans
to conduct rice-farming on a large-scale basis. Through the banks' own
16
rice-farmers' associations advisory councils were set up to advise
management on the suitability or otherwise of applicants. Such
advisers consisted of the most experienced and successful farmers among
the banks' customers and who, invariably, were members of the RGA. The
NIB, for example, did not give any loans to farmers without "consulting
fully" its experienced advisers who, in 1978, consisted of Ziblim Andan,
Alhaji Abdul-Rahamani, and Chief Farmer Yakubu, all of whom were prominent
Andani members or supporters, as well as leaders of the RGA. Barclays
Bank also adopted a similar practice of consulting "experienced and
successful" members of its farmers' association before making decisions
i7
about loans to farmers. Alhaji Zakaria and Alhaji Ibrahim Maharaa, 
two of Acheampong's most fanatical supporters in the North, served as 
advisers to the Bank. Both were leaders of the RGA, while Mahama was 
a prince of the Andani family, Zakaria was without doubt one of its 
leading supporters. It was unlikely, therefore, that these big and 
influential rice-farmers would recommend candidates for bank loans who 
were declared opponents of the regime and of their own gate.
The subtleties employed by the authorities to discourage or even 
exclude the opponents of the regime were clearly perceived by the 
Abudulai farmers. There was not a single Abudulai supporter in our 
survey of large-scale rice-farmers who claimed to have received a loan 
from the banks for the purpose of conducting his farming on such a scale.
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B.A. Yakubu, a former Gushiegu chief and member of the former NLC,
applied for one such loan and was turned down, according to him, without,
any reasonable explanation. Yakubu insisted that "the Abudulai family
[were] not recognised because of their failure to recognise and support
18
the Acheampong regime". According to him, there was a deliberate
policy on the part of the authorities of excluding that family from
participating in the development process in general, and in the profitable
rice-farming enterprise in particular. It was for this reason that he
believed his application for a loan was rejected without any given
reason, even though he was in a "very secure financial position to
19
guarantee repayment". It was the Andanis, he argued, who abused the
banks by not repaying their loans, and despite that, they were still
given priority everywhere in Dagbon. Yakubu further emphasised the
widely-held opinion among Abudulai supporters that it was not only the
banks that failed to recognise their side, but all other local
institutions, including the Regional Administration. According to him,
that was a "humiliating and intolerable situation" which would bring
"open conflict" between the two sides if the situation was not quickly 
20
resolved.
So far in this chapter we have been concerned with the interrelationship
between chieftaincy and national level politics, and the importance of
gate connections to Dagombas for successful rice-farming in the North.
Access to suitable rice-fields was crucial to successful farming.
Strictly speaking, land was not a scarce resource as far as the North
was concerned, but by 1977/78 when there appeared to be a renewed
interest in large-scale rice-farming after a "cooling-off" period in the
* /
previous two years or so, the resulting demand for suitable land by 
aspirant rice-farmers set off a series of intriguing manoeuvres involving
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those aspirant farmers, their associates among the prominent farmers, 
and local chiefs. The process by which such activities were brought 
about is the subject of the following section.
Gate Connections and Land Allocation
We have seen the importance of Andani-ship in helping rice-farmers 
gain access to large acreages of suitable land. Sometimes this was 
achieved at the expense of Abudulai farmers. During the course of my 
fieldwork I discovered four distinct cases (among others) in which 
farmers in the North who were either supporters or members of the Abudulai 
gate were ’’dispossessed" in favour of pro-Andani farmers. The main 
reason given by the chiefs for stripping these farmers of their land, 
was that they had more than they could manage to cultivate. It was 
common experience throughout the North to find farmers (including both 
Andani and Abudulai supporters) with exceedingly large acreages, the 
greater part of which they could not cultivate because of the lack of 
initial capital and the shortage of farm inputs, such as mechanical 
equipment. As we have seen, this was one of the main sources of 
conflict between these farmers and the very big and well-connected 
(i.e., the fully-equipped) ones. The case of Abukari (and the supporting 
ones) suggest that there was a political motive behind the policy to 
deprive these farmers of their land. Of course it was all done in a 
very subtle way. While in some cases economic criteria would be used 
for retrieving the land (a perfectly valid case if applied universally), 
in others it might be a more straightforward case of gate politics.
But each of these cases had one thing in common: the land was retrieved
from these farmers at the behest of prominent Andani farmers who used 
their position to secure such land for their own friends.
But why should chiefs adopt the policy of retrieving land from 
farmers when there was such an abundance of this resource in the North?
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The answer lies in a combination of factors. Although there was much 
farming land available in Dagbon, some of it, as we suggested earlier, 
was more suitable for rice cultivation than other, especially where such 
land was located near river valleys or tributaries of the Volta River.
By 1976/77 most of this land had been taken by local farmers, though 
a large proportion remained uncultivated. Thus it was in the best 
interests of prospective rice farmers if they could gain possession of 
such fertile land, rather than seek new fields in areas that were 
generally considered inaccessible by road transport and less suitable 
for rice cultivation. Chiefs were persuaded by their big-farmer allies 
to allocate these lands to their new clients.
There was another crucial reason influencing the decision by chiefs 
to retrieve land from existing tenants. The leasing of farming land 
developed into a very lucrative business to chiefs who made very substantial 
gains both from bounties received after harvest and other facilities 
provided by the farmers. Although there were no specific rules laid 
down as to how much, if anything, a farmer should give to a chief or 
tindanaa after the harvest, it was customary, however, for farmers to "dash" 
something to the chief in appreciation. The amount given depended upon 
the farmer's yield of course, and could be anything up to twenty or 
thirty bags of paddy. Generally speaking, the chiefs stood to gain more 
from farmers who identified with, or supported his, rather than the rival 
gate.
The provision of free mechanical farm services was perhaps one of 
the most important and economically rewarding facilities offered by large 
rice-farmers to chiefs. Most of these chiefs had their own farms, so 
that the leasing of land to farmers who were in a position to plough and 
harvest for them was an important incentive, and cannot therefore be
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underestimated. Thus the retrieval of land by chiefs from certain 
groups of farmers and allocating it to better-equipped and politically 
compatible clients made economic sense, and was of mutual benefit to 
both chief and client.
We will now examine the case of Abukari in some detail (and supported 
to a lesser extent by further examples) to see how the above factors 
working in combination with gate politics influenced the decision to
retrieve land previously leased to these farmers.
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Case Study: Abukari of Moshi Zongo, Tamale
Abukari had acquired about two hundred acres of land near Janga, 
along the Volta tributary, in 1974, but had cleared and brought under 
cultivation about half that area by 1976. A few weeks before the 
beginning of the farming season in 1977, Abukari paid a visit to his farm 
where, to his amazement, he found that most of the remaining land had 
been cleared and that three tractors were ploughing through the entire 
field. He was informed by one of the tractor operators that they were 
carrying out orders by their "master”. Abukari went to the village 
chief to complain. .After all, he had been cultivating that land for 
three years and had spent his own money to clear it, so that according 
to him, he failed toseewhy someone else should ’"'seize" his land. He 
was informed by one of the custodians (but not by the chief himself) that 
the land had been given to him in error as it did not come within the 
jurisdictional boundary of the village; for that reason it was being 
reclaimed.
A subsequent visit to the village by the author which aimed to 
establish the validity of Abukarifs claim did not prove successful, since 
the chief involved was away from the village and hot available for comment. 
One of the elders intimated, however, that the farmer involved was not
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efficient, and that he had more land than he could manage. His land
was therefore given to another farmer, who they (the custodians) were
22
sure would utilise it better. The practice of retrieving land from
a farmer was not common in Northern Ghana, but as we have noted, it
remained a possibility. Thus if it were true that Abukari failed to
put his land to "good" use, or did not have the necessary resources to
utilise,it, the reason given for his eviction was valid according to the
23
criteria for land retrieval.
The case against Abukari, however, appeared to stand on very weak
ground. As he argued, if it was established that he had too much land
and could not cultivate all of it - and he readily admitted to finding
great difficulty in cultivating the cleared portion of his field due to
lack of capital - then the chief should have asked him to return only
the surplus area instead of retrieving the entire field, as in fact
happened. After* being directed to the farm in dispute by a village guide
to prove the ’’good" use to which the land was being put by the new
tenant-farmer (an area of about four hundred acres, i.e., Abukari*s
plot plus an adjacent, newly-acquired field), we discovered three tractors
equipped with implements ploughing that land. The identification plates
on these tractors disclosed that two of them belonged to a senior military
officer at "Mile 9" Barracks (Airborne Force) in Tamale, while the third
was owned by the Ministry of Agriculture. After a lengthy discussion
with one of the operators, it was finally admitted that the land belonged
to the officer. In a subsequent interview with that officer he admitted
to having acquired the land early in 1977 after being told by a friend
how "a certain farmer [Abukari] was holding good land that he could not
24
afford to cultivate".
The officer concerned was introduced to the chief by S.Y. Imoru,
an executive member of the RGA, and a very close ally of the Janga chief.
Imoru himself farmed about five hundred acres in Janga, and did not
experience any problems in persuading the chief to lease the land to
the officer who paid the nominal fee of two hundred cedis, together with
25
the customary supply of kola nuts and spirits. The chief had a
fifty-acre groundnut-farm which was located within a few hundred yards
of the officer’s, and which the officer agreed to plough free of charge.
Because of its proximity to the White Volta the land was suitably
located for irrigation, and this officer had already started negotiations
for purchasing the appropriate machinery from West Germany. He claimed
that he had never met Abukari, but was willing to compensate him, at
26
least in part, for expenses incurred in clearing the land.
While the promise to plough the chief’s land was an important 
factor in influencing the decision to transfer the land to the officer, 
there were other motives involved. The chief was undoubtedly influenced 
by the status of the officer and his position of authority (he held the 
rank of Major in the Army). Military personnel had come to enjoy a 
position of great power and influence, and soldiers were regarded locally 
as the embodiment of state power. Furthermore, the military was
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directly responsible for restoring the chief's gate to power in Dagbon. 
The involvement of the RGA official was also important. Imoru was a 
leading Andani supporter and therefore had a common political identity 
with the Janga chief, who was installed by the Ya-Na in 1975 following 
the de-skinment of the local Abudulai chief. He was also a leading 
Unigov campaigner (like all other prominent RGA farmers), and was well 
acquainted with the chief through his political activities in the village 
and the surrounding areas. Imoru was also instrumental in obtaining land
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in Janga for two other military officers based in Accra. It would
appear that the collaboration between a top-ranking military officer and
a prominent rice-farmer with Andani connections, together with the
lucrative economic gains which such an association made possible, provided
sufficient validity to justify the retrieval of land from Abukari who,
after all, was a relatively "small” man by comparison. When the
identity of the new tenant was later disclosed to Abukari, he quickly
put his own position into perspective: "As for me, oohl I no be fit to
29
fight soldier man".
Abukari's position in relation to the Andanis and the regime was 
unambiguous. Although not a blood member of the Abudulai ga'ce, he was 
nevertheless a leading supporter and, according to him, a close friend 
of both the late Yo-Na, Abudulai IV, and the deposed (Abudulai) Regent of 
Savelugu. Abukari attended several meetings in Savelugu in support of 
the Abudulai gate, and in 1976 he was "chairman" of one such meeting 
held at the Old District Office in support of the Regent, Alhassan.
He was also a well-known opponent and critic of Acheampong, and although 
he did not campaign openly for "No" during the referendum, his views about 
the incompetence of the government, especially as regards its farming 
policies, were frequently raised at RGA meetings which he attended.
He was foremost among those members who regularly called for the 
resignation of the RGA executive. His position, therefore, made him an 
obvious target for supporters of the regime. The stripping of his land 
was the price paid for the strong anti-government/anti-Andani position 
which he held.
While Abukari's case demonstrated that farmers with "wrong" gate 
and political connections and attitudes could be ’"dispossessed" in favour 
of those with status, the other examples merely reinforce that position.
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Alhassan Fuseini and Amadu Ahmed .had each obtained two large tracts
30
of land in Gushiegu in 1913 and 1974 respectively. Fuseini cleared 
and cultivated about two hundred acres of his six-hundred-acre field, 
while Ahmed had less than half of his five-hundred-acre plot under 
cultivation. The lack of machinery and starting capital were given 
as the main reasons for failing to cultivate the rest of their land.
In February 1978, both farmers were called by the Gushiegu chief 
(Andani) and told that their excess land would be retrieved and given 
to someone else. Despite these farmers1 protests, their lands were 
reallocated to farmers who claimed to have the means to cultivate them. 
Fuseini's uncleared land was given to a senior employee of the Cotton 
Development Board in Tamale, while Ahmed's was allocated to a senior 
driver employed by the Ministry of Agriculture.
Both recipients were supporters of Andani. Seidu Harruna, who
worked for the Cotton Development Board, was encouraged to take up rice-
farming by Ziblim Andan (the Board’s director) who, as we have seen, was
one of the most influential members of the Andani family - Harruna1 s
31wife was related to the Dakpema. Yakubu Mahama, who obtained a lease 
on land previously held by Ahmed, was both an active supporter and a 
member of the Andani family.^  Before joining the Ministry in 1977, he 
was the District Secretary of the Ghana National Reconstruction Corps 
(GNRC), an organisation set up by Acheampong supposedly to promote 
agriculture in the regions, but which subsequently developed into a 
political wing of the SMC. Mahama's activities with the GNRC brought 
him into contact with most prominent rice-farmers in the North. Ziblim 
Andan was instrumental in helping both recipients obtain their plots 
in Gushiegu, where he had several farms himself. •
The evicted farmers, on the other hand, were well-known and active 
Abudulai supporters. Fuseini, who lived in Gushiegu until 1974 when 
he came to Tamale, was secretary to B.A. Yakubu who was then Gushiegu 
chief (1969-1974). He was also in the forefront of the campaign in 
1969 to have Mahamadu Abudulai elected as Ya-Na. Ahmed was among 
the best-known supporters of the Abudulai gate, and in January 1978 he 
was arrested twice in Savelugu, where he lived, for leading violent 
protests by Abudulai supporters during the Unigov campaign.
Finally, there was a case which concerned Osuman Alhassan of
33Savalugu, who was a direct member of the Abudulai family. Alhassan had 
held a three-hundred-and-fifty-acre field in Nabogo since 1973, and had 
cleared approximately two hundred acres which he cultivated every year. 
According to this farmer, he was deprived of all his land (not just the 
uncleared area) in April 1978, without "reasonable11 explanation by the 
custodians. A messenger from the village was sent to inform him of the 
chief's intention to retrieve his land on the grounds that he had left 
it uncultivated for too long. When Alhassan visited the farm a few 
days later, he found that most of the remaining land had been cleared, 
and soon afterwards the whole field had been ploughed. His land was 
given to a junior brother of the Kumbungu chief who had been newly 
installed by the Ya-Na.
Thus in each of the above examples the evicted farmers had strong 
connections with the Abudulai faction, and were outspoken critics of 
the Acheampong regime. Though on the basis of the above evidence it 
could not be convincingly argued that there was a deliberate attempt to 
^dispossess" such rice-farmers, there was no doubt that the powerful 
pro-Andani, pro-Acheampong farmers could, and often did, use their 
privileged position to increase their own landholdings or that of their 
clients.
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Gate Competition and Local Government
The influence of prominent supporters was by no means limited to
their relations with village chiefs. Such influence extended throughout
all political structures in Dagbon, especially the Dagomba District 
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Councils. The importance of these Councils to the individual 
chieftaincy gates lay in the fact they provided each side with the 
opportunity to be represented at local government level, and to formulate 
or influence policies that were in their side's best interests. Control 
of these Councils was crucial to both sides, but the big prize was the 
Western Dagomba District Counci11 (WDDC) based in Tamale, a statutory 
planning area which exercised authority over a wide range of functions 
including health, sanitation, town planning, licensing and entertainment, 
public places, markets and lorry parks. The Council was also the sole 
rating authority in the area with exception, of course, of the central 
government, and controlled poll tax, property rates, and market tolls.
From 1978, the functions of local district councils in Ghana were 
radically extended, and the local elections of that year were regarded 
with greater interest than previously by the Northern people for reasons 
we shall see later. The new local government system attempted to fuse 
the previous functions of local authority with those of the local 
departments of decentralised ministries of central government such as 
Agriculture, Public Works, Planning, Community Development, Treasury, 
Parks and Gardens, Wildlife and Public Health. Under this new system 
of local government the elected representatives of the people would be 
responsible for taking major policy decisions, while the implementation 
of those policies would be carried out on a day-to-day basis by the 
District Chief Executive working in collaboration with local departmental 
heads. The new system represented a radical departure from the old 
order, and was regarded by the authorities as an important step towards
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"effective decentralisation" which would lead to a "meaningful combination
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of scarce resources and manpower for accelerated development". As
far as the competing gate factions were concerned, therefore, it was
important not merely to be represented on the Council, but to secure
a working majority in order to exercise control over policies.
Between 1960 and the local government elections of 1978,
candidates were nominated to the Council by the District Chief Executive
(DCE). The volatile nature of chieftaincy politics in Dagbon initially
required that both sides in the dispute be represented equally on the
Councils, at least as a gesture of impartiality on the part of the
government. This principle was adopted, in theory at least up to about
1970, but the overwhelming predominance of Andani representatives on both
Dagomba District Councils during the Acheampong period made a mockery of
the principle of fair representation.
Under the system of nomination adopted by the SMC, members were
recruited not so much on merit as on the basis of their political
allegiance, and nominations were very strongly inclined towards the
Andanis. Thus the composition of the former Eastern Dagomba District
Council (EDDC) (i.e., prior to 1978) was made up of seventeen members
representing the Andani faction, while the Abudulai side consisted of 
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only six members. Their minority position on the local Council 
effectively reduced the Abudulais1 influence on EDDC business. Their 
views were simply not "officially" recognised, and their presence there 
was a mere formality.
The composition of the WDDC reflected a similar political bias.
The fourteen nominated "commoner" members of that Council were divided
y
equally between the two chieftaincy sides, but the balance of influence 
was shifted overwhelmingly in favour of the Andanis by the nomination of
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seven of their members (chiefs) to represent the traditional ’’interest”.
The chiefs representing the traditional ’’interest” on the WDDC during the 
SMC period were as follows:
1. Gulkpe-Na, Abudulai Bukari I
2. Kumbung-Na, Sumani Issah
3. Nyankpalana, R.D. Damba
4. Zobogu-Na, J.S. Kaleem
5. Zanballon-Na, Abudulai Yakubu
6. Dakpema, Richard Alhassan Alhassan
7. Sanerigu-Na, Andani Andan.
One notable omission from the list of nominations was the Tolon-Na,
Yakubu Tali, a divisional chief with wide experience in public life, who
had been a Northern representative in the Legislative Assembly in the
pre-independence period, and was subsequently elected a representative
for the Tolon constituency in the CPP government. The Tolon-Na, however,
was a leading member of the Abudulai gate, and also its chief spokesman,
and an outspoken critic of the Acheampong regime. There was therefore
no place for him as a representative of the traditional "interest” on the
WDDC, even though each chief was supposedly "picked according to his
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status and ability". Thus the deliberate exclusion of Abudulai chiefs
from the WDDC under the prevailing system further demonstrated the nature
of the scheme to consolidate Andani power and the influence of the Acheampong
regime in Dagbon. Two of the junior chiefs representing the Andanis at
the WDDC had status and influence extending far beyond the local
political arena. The Sanerigu-Na was nominated because of his political
influence in his capacity as Police Commissioner in charge of the Police 
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Hospital in Accra, while the Dakpema was the Chairman of the Cotton 
Development Board, as we have already seen. The third sub-chief
representing the Andanis was Zobogu-Na J.S. Kaleem, a former Regional
Director of Education who, despite old age and physical decline, was
. 41
nominated because of his "outstanding personal abilities".
The strong Andani composition of the District Councils made them
effective in interpreting and carrying out central government policy as
illustrated by an incident during the 1978 referendum on Unigov. During 
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the campaign, Acheampong's agents called at the EDDC offices in Yendi
to collect "Yes" posters only. The DCE advised that they collect both
types (i.e., including "No" posters) to display to the public. A quarrel
ensued in which the DCE was accused of being a "southerner" and an
anti-Unigov man, at the same time having his authority challenged.
After they had threatened the DCE, the mob forced its way into his office,
collected the "Yes" posters and destroyed the "No" ones. A few days
later this official was reported to the Castle (the SMC administrative
43centre in Accra) as a saboteur and enemy of the government. The
incident was subsequently raised by the small Abudulai contingent at a
Council meeting, but it was never seriously considered since the Council
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decided that it had more important matters on hand. Neither could the
DCE persuade the Council to take up the issue since his authority was
seriously undermined because he was suspected of being anti-Unigov.
We have seen that the composition of the Councils under the system of
local government practised in Dagbon during the Acheampong period was 
decidedly biased in favour of the Andanis. The 1978 District Council 
elections, therefore, gave the Abudulais an opportunity to contest 
these elections in an attempt to win a majority and redress the balance 
of influence on the Dagomba District Councils. The important feature of 
these elections as far as Dagbon was concerned was the interest taken"by 
rice-farmers who were allied to both chieftaincy gates. At least one of 
the contestants in each ward was a big rice-farmer.
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Farmers, Chieftaincy, and the 19.78 Local Government Elections
The interest shown by some candidates in the 1978 local government 
elections was governed to a large extent by their desire to test their 
popularity as a preview to the 1979 elections. It should be mentioned, 
however, that in many local council areas participation in the elections 
was very low; many. Ghanaians did not see these elections as an opportunity 
for meaningful democratic participation. The situation was different 
in Dagbon because of the predominance of factional politics there and 
the desire by each faction to win control of the local Councils.
Control of the local Councils, and more particularly the WDDC, would
provide new opportunities for th© winning side to influence policies
affecting not only ’’traditional" matters, but those previously
administered by central government departments, such as the Ministry of
Agriculture. It was generally accepted by the farmers (large and small
alike) that a decentralised Ministry of Agriculture would be in a better
position to assess the needs of the local farmers and provide them with
the necessary inputs. It was no accident, therefore, that large rice-
farmers were so actively involved in these elections, irrespective of their
gate allegiances. But what did these big rice-farmers stand to gain by
contesting ? Whose interests were they representing? Although each
candidate proclaimed himself as a champion of the farmers, it was
abundantly clear that each faction had different conceptions of who "the
farmers" were. According to one Andani candidate, their elected members
would use the Council as a basis to rally support for their "cause" and
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to promote the welfare of "farmers" in roughly the same way as the RGA. 
After gaining effective control of the Council they would obtain grants 
or loans from the central government to provide farm inputs, especially 
machinery, for the local farmers. As my interviewee bluntly put it, 
control of the Council would reinforce the Andani power base in Tamale,
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so that together with the RGA, the Regional Office and the Regional House 
of Chiefs, the Andanis ’’would act as a strong force, and the rice-farmers
46
would gain in many ways as a result”. How specifically all farmers
would gain from a politically biased Council in a situation where farmers,
like the rest of the community, were neatly polarised between two rival
factions, was not fully elaborated. According to this candidate, it
was sufficient merely to "recognise" the problems, and help would be
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given "to those in greatest need".
The WDDC was, of course, in a position to assist the farmers. Under
the proposed system of decentralisation councillors were empowered to take
major policy decisions which would be implemented by the DCE.
Agriculture was certainly within its terms of reference, and the Council
could liaise with the Ministry of Agriculture - indeed the two bodies
were expected to work very closely on related matters - and secure better
facilities for the farmers, especially the smaller ones. The extent to
which this could be achieved in Dagbon, however, depended upon the
"connections" of councillors.
As far as the candidates of the Adubulai faction were concerned,
their planned strategy (predictably) was to use their "voice" on the
Council to show that the Andani farmers had "taken everything from
government for themselves, and that there was not one, but two sides in 
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Dagbon". Since the Andanis already exercised considerable power and
influence over all local, state, government and "traditional" bodies, it
was therefore crucial, according to these Abudulai supporters, for their
side to win control of the WDDC if Andani power were to be restrained in 
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in Dagbon. Thus it is clear that the big rice-farmers who contested 
the local Council elections in Dagbon were not primarily committed to*' 
promoting the interests of farmers as a class or group, but those of their 
own individual political group; every other consideration was of secondary 
importance.
The decision by prominent rice-farmers to participate in local
government elections which, if they were to win, would need the support
of small farmers who perceived themselves as belonging objectively to a
different social category, seemed inconsistent and illogical. But this
is a general problem, not only in Ghana, though perhaps especially acute
there. An attempt to explain this phenomenon as related to Dagbon was
given by Alhaji Iddrisu Kpabia, an Andani candidate, and a very big and
successful rice-farmer indeed. According to him, although the Dagomba
were "loosely separated into two chieftaincy groups", .such division had
not penetrated through all structures of Dagomba society, especially the 
5"0 •
small farmers. Furthermore, according to Kpabia, the small farmers as
a collective group were not seriously represented at any level in Dagbon,
and since they suffered from the same problems as all other farmers in
the district, including rice-farmers, they were likely to support someone
who had experienced their own problems and who understood their particular 
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needs. On such a basis, therefore, the big rice-farmer candidates 
were justified in presenting themselves as representatives,if not 
championsjof the small farmers.
Such mistaken view, however, were not shared by the vast majority
of small farmers who insisted that these candidates did not represent the
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"general farming interest", but that of their own class or "type".
Besides, these small farmers were sceptical about the role of local
councillors whom they charged with a reputation ©£ "quarrelling among
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themselves over petty-petty things rather than serving the people".
Some of these further argued that local councillors merely served the 
interests of their sponsors, i.e., the regime, and that the proposed 
system of local government would be no more effective in dealing with the 
problems of the community. As one small farmer pit it, "They [the
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councillors] take their orders from Accra. What do the men in Accra know
about our problems in Tamale here? What have they done about our water
and electricity needs....Now these men [the local election candidates]
are talking as if all of a sudden everything will be fine. Those of
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us who are experienced, we know better” .
The claim by the big rice-farmer candidates that they represented 
the interests of all farmers, including small farmers, was therefore 
unfounded. The small farmers* support for one candidate in preference 
over another was based mainly upon local political, i.e., chieftaincy, 
considerations, and the related patron-client system that was such 
an important characteristic of Dagomba society. We shall see later 
when we discuss the political attitudes of fanaers during the 1979 general 
elections how precisely this mechanism worked.
The significance of the local elections to the big farmers is best 
illustrated by the results: out of sixteen elected WDDC councillors,
75 per cent were large rice-farmers, most of whom were either members or 
supporters of the Andani faction. (See Table 6.1, next page.) The 
Andani position on the newly-constituted Council was reinforced by the 
nomination of eight of their supporters (who were also large rice-farmers) 
to represent the traditional "interest”, as follows:
1. Gulkpe-na, Abudulai Bukari I
2. Yo-Na, Yakubu Abudulai III
3. Kumbung-Na, Sumani Issah
4. Dakpema, Richard Alhassan Alhassan
5. Zobugu-Na, J.S. Kaleem
6. Sanerigu-Na, Andani Andan (Medical Superintendent of the 
Police Hospital, Accra) ✓
7. Zanballon-Na, E.Y. Mahama (Deputy Director of Public 
Prosecutions)
8. Alhaji Ali Osman.
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TABLE 6*1 : Elected WDDC Councillors (1978)
NAME WARD GATE LOYALTY PROFESSION
O.S. Mahamadu
Alhaji Ibrahim Abudulai
Alhaji Iddrisu Kpabia 
tMadugu)
Alhaji Ibrahim Yahaya 
(Kukuo-Na)
Alhaji Abukari Alhassan 
Bruna Alhassan 
Yakubu Sule
Alhassan Yakubu
Alhassan Salifu 
Edmond Mahama Sheini
Mahama Yamusah 
Mariayatu Damba 
Abudulai Davidson Kaleem 
Mahama Ibn Stephen 
Mahama Tahiru 
Mahama Abukari
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Andani
Andani
Andani
Andani
Andani
Abudulai
Andani
Andani
Abudulai
Abudulai
Andani
Andani
Andani
Andani
Abudulai
Abudulai
Rice-farmer
Rice-farmer
Rice-farmer
Rice-farmer/
businessman
Lecturer
Rice-farmer
Teacher/
rice-farmer
Teacher/
rice-farmer
Rice-farmer'
Teacher/
rice-farmer
Farmer
Public servant
Teacher
Priest
Rice-farmer
Rice-farmer
Note: Mariayatu Damba, a princess from the Andani gate, was the only
woman on the WDDC.
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Alhaji Ali Osman was the only nominated candidate who was not a member 
of the Andani family; he was, however, a strong supporter. In 
effect, out of the twenty-four members constituting the WDDC, no less 
than nineteen (79 per cent) represented the Andani interest - a 
considerable position of strength indeed.
What was the relative importance of being both a large rice-farmer 
and an Andani supporter? We have already seen that as Andani 
supporters these farmers were politically well connected, and had very 
strong ties with various local institutions, such as the RGA. The 
control of the WDDC by their colleagues meant that the Andani big rice- 
farmers had won further allies in Dagbon to reinforce their strong 
economic, political and social position all round. One of the first 
measures proposed by the members of the Council for assisting local rice- 
farmers was the seeking of a special agricultural loan from the central 
government to purchase machinery which, according to the authorities,
55would be sold or hired to farmers "depending on their circumstances".
The Council also proposed to set up a Special Committee to collaborate
with the various agricultural agencies in the district, such as the
Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Economic Planning, Nasia Rice
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Company, DEMCO, and the Banks. These proposals, however, were 
intended to facilitate the rice-farming activities of a specific and 
already privileged group of farmers - the Andani big rice-farmers and, 
to a much lesser extent, Andani supporters among the smaller farmers via 
the existing patron-clientelist system.
The enhancement of the Andani position throcrgh the patronage of the 
WDDC was, however, limited, for although the WDEC was given wider 
jurisdiction as a result of the government's policy of decentralisation, 
it did not have either the professional expertise or the financial
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resources at its disposal to formulate and implement complex policies of
the type required to carry out an agricultural development programme
even at the district level. The most that had been achieved in this
respect by November 1978 was a series of proposals by the Council, and
a number of meetings with the different bodies with which the WDDC was
expected to collaborate. As the DCE rightly pointed out, the tasks which
these councillors initially set out to achieve "were far too complex and
57
ambitious for the Council to handle".
If, at first, the Andani councillors failed to translate their
"ambitious" proposals into concrete policies, they did, however, succeed
in using their position to secure economic benefits both for themselves
and their clients on an individual level. One of the most prominent
WDDC councillors, O.S. Mahamadu, admitted to using his position to obtain
two combine harvesters from Nasia Rice Company for one of his friends who
cultivated rice in Karaga. He also "hired" two lorries from the NRDC,
ostensibly to convey Council property from Diari to Tamale, but in
reality to carry paddy rice from Nasia to Bolgatanga for one of his
brothers.^® The Dakpema (a representative of the traditional "interest"
on the Council) was also instrumental in securing the services of trucks
from the Ministry of Agriculture to cart rice from Daboya to Tamale and
59other parts of the region for several of his clients. It must be noted 
that only Andani councillors were involved in such transactions. The 
Abudulai members had their own supporters who were also in need of 
favours, but they were not strong enough politically to influence those 
in key positions, or challenge local favouritism.
In this chapter an attempt has been made to elucidate the 
relationship between chieftaincy and the big farming interests in the 
North. It was shown that the big rice-farmers supporting the ruling
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Andani gate used their privileged position to secure benefits for 
themselves and their friends through the patron-client system in Dagbon. 
Thiis chieftaincy connection was important to socio-economic mobility in 
the North. That position was made possible by the interference by the 
central government in local traditional affairs, and which chose to 
operate through chieftaincy-based allegiances that were still very strong 
and through which it was easier to win support for a cause (for example, 
Unigov) rather than via individuals. Support for a gate would bring with 
it support for all its followers on ,,traditional,, grounds, whereas one 
would not hope to win over a majority in the area purely on the basis of 
the distribution of economic benefits, since these were insufficient to 
go round.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 6
1. Unigov (Union Government) was a form of government proposed 
by Acheampong which was based on the principle of national 
consensus. It was designed specifically to exclude 
political parties, and participants would be chosen on the 
basis of their standing in the community. The concept of 
Unigov will be discussed fully in the next chapter.
2. Interview with Alhaji Ibrahim Mahama, Tamale, 6 June 1978.
3. Interview with Ziblim Andan, Tamale, 9 June .1978.
4. Interview with Baba Yakubu Abudulai, Tamale, 25 April 1978.
5. Interview with Alhaji Sumani Zakaria, Tamale, 24 June 1978.
6. Ibid.
7. As a state corporation, the NRDC was not permitted to hire 
out machinery to private clients, but the close connection 
between the influential farmers and the top officials 
facilitated the use of the Corporation's machinery and 
equipment.
8. Interview with Issah Mohamed, Tamale, 25 May 1978.
9. Interview with Alhaji Sumani Zakaria, Tamale, 2 4 June 1978.
10. Interview with Mr. A. Klubi, Deputy Manager, Barclays Bank,
Tamale, 15 July 1978.
11. Interview with A. Boamah, Agricultural Consultant, Standard 
Bank, Tamale, 6 July 1978.
12. Ibid.
13. Abudulai supporters were in effect playing a waiting game 
since they believed that their gate would be restored to 
power as soon as a favourable situation, i.e., a change of 
government, occurred.
14. Interview with M. Opoku, Executive Director, DEMCO, Tamale, 
5 July 1978.
15. Ibid.
16. Each one of the commercial banks in Tamale had its own Rice 
Growers' Association, which consisted of rice farmers among 
its customers. These Associations provided members with 
the usual facilities for obtaining farming inputs, 
including, of course, loans.
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17. Interview with A. Klubi, 15 July 1978.
18. Interview with B.A. Yakubu at Wulshie Na1 s palace, Tamale,
26 July 1978.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Based on an initial interview with Abukari in Tamale,
21 April 1978.
22. Informal discussion with Janga elder, Janga, 4 May 1978.
23. The Nyankpalana, one of the longest serving chiefs in
Dagbon (19 45-1979), pointed out that this practice was not
common in Dagbon, but a chief could retrieve land already 
allocated to a farmer if that land was not being put to 
"good" use, or if the farmer did not have the means to 
cultivate it. Interview with Nyankpalana at Nyankpala,
10 June 1978.
2 4. Interview with Airborne Force (ABF) officer, Tamale,
15 August 1978.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. According to this ABF officer, after he had gone through 
the preliminaries with the chief - offering of kola nuts, 
fees, and the pouring of libation - the chief expressed his 
gratitude for the way the government was helping his 
people, and hoped that he (the chief) would continue to 
receive the "blessing" of the regime.
28. Interview with S.Y. Imoru, RGA Executive Officer, Tamale,
30 June 1978.
29. Interview with Abukari, 30 April 1978.
30. This account is based on several informal interviews with 
the farmers involved, and with the former Gushiegu chief, 
B.A. Yakubu, during June 1978.
31. Interview with Seidu Harruna, Tamale, 30 June 1978.
32. Mahama claimed that he was a distant cousin of the Yo-Na, 
but that his support for Andani was based on this gate's 
association with prosperity in Dagbon. Interview at 
Tamale, 2 July 1978.
33. Alhassan claimed to be a nephew of former Yo-Na Abudulaa 
Abudulai IV.
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3 4. Dagbon was served by two district councils: the Eastern
Dagomba District Council with offices in Yendi, and the 
Western Dagomba District Council based in Tamale.
35. Daily Graphic editorial, 14 October 1978.
36. The 1978 local government elections were the first to be 
held in Ghana since 1958, the period of CPP rule.
37. Originally, the Dagomba District Council consisted of 
eighteen elected members in addition to six others 
nominated by the Traditional State Council to represent its 
interests, and which included nominees from both gates.
38. It should be noted that the traditional members on the WDDC 
were nominated by the Northern Regional House of Chiefs, 
where the Andani influence was particularly strong, and not 
by the DCE.
39. Interview with Mr. Tetteh, DCE, Tamale, 1 August 1978.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. "Campaign" here refers to the government campaign to win 
support for Unigov. Although opposition was not officially 
banned, different tactics were used by the authorities to 
intimidate non-supporters and reduce opposition in the 
process.
43. Interview with Mr. Tandoh, Yendi, 2 4 August 1978.
4 4. Ibid.
45. Interview with O.S. Mahamadu (elected member for Tamale 
Ward 1), Tamale, 7 July 1978.
46. Ibid. It should be noted that the Regional Administration 
was not "controlled" by the Andanis in the true sense, but 
several of the top officials there were supporters.
47. Ibid.
48. Interview with Bruna Alhassan (elected member for Tamale 
Ward 6), Tamale, 4 July 1978.
49. Ibid.
50. Interview with Alhaji Iddrisu Kpabia, Tamale, 3 July 1978.
51. Ibid.
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52. Similar views were expressed by several groups of small 
farmers, notably from Savelugu, Lamashegu and Gumbehene.
53. Ibid.
54. Interview with Adam Issah, Tamale, 15 August 1978.
55. DCE Files and interview, Tamale, 29 October 1978.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Interview with O.S. Mahamadu, 30 October 1978.
59. Informal discussion with Dakpema, Tamale, 30 November 1978.
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CHAPTER 7 
THE POLITICS OF THE RGA
In the previous chapter we attempted a discussion of the relationship 
between chieftaincy and rice-farmers, and showed how the successful big 
rice-farmers in the North derived certain benefits through their 
connections with the ruling gate. The analysis will be carried further 
in this chapter and will focus on the political behaviour of these 
farmers, in particular the role that they played during the 1978 
referendum on Union Government, or Unigov. We are concerned with showing 
that the big farmers' attitudes and behaviour during the referendum was 
directly influenced by the support which they received from the regime 
both as individuals and as a group, i.e., as privileged members of the RGA. 
The big farmers' relationship with the regime was clearly based on 
patron-clientelism. Besides gaining access to important government and 
farming agencies and banks, these farmers also had access to top political 
leaders through whom they received important favours such as loans and import 
licences. We have seen that patron-client relationships are a two-way 
process, with the patron offering economic aid and special favours in 
exchange for what has been described as "external support".*
While the influence of the rice-farming interests was of great 
importance for the question of support for, or opposition to the regime, 
the crux of the matter was the Andani/Abudulai conflict. This was 
embodied in the pattern of politics within the RGA. Thus we will attempt 
to show how, while the benefits gained by local institutions and groups, such 
as the RGA leadership, played an important part in the question of support
v
for the government, this was in turn a reflection of the mediating role of 
chieftaincy in relation to national politics on the one hand, and to local 
mobility opportunities on the other.
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The Large Rice-farmers and the 1978 Referendum on Union Government
The 1978 referendum was held by the SMC supposedly in order that
the people as a whole could decide on whether or not to accept the SMC's
own proposal for a future form of government: Union Government.
Before discussing the role of the large-scale rice-farmers in the Unigov
campaign, however, it is necessary first to explain what was meant by
the concept and how it was locally understood. On what ideological or
rational grounds was it based? As presented by the Report on the Ad Hoc
2
Committee on Union Government, Unigov excluded political parties from 
participation in elections since they were alleged to have repeatedly 
failed the country and to have exacerbated communal and (tribal) decisions. 
Moreover, Union Government was intended to be sufficiently broad-based 
to include all sections of the community, including the Armed Forces and 
the Police. According to government leaders, Unigov was a form of 
National Government, but one based less on the idea of "coalition" 
government of the type associated with war or national crisis, such as 
in Britain during the 1930s, than on the cultural heritage of the Ghanaian 
people - a heritage that was supposed to emphasise the sovereignty of the
4
people and "community government".
The rationale behind this newly-proposed form of government lay in
the idea that the system of party politics had failed to provide stability
for the country because it was based on a foreign model, namely the
Westminster model of government. Besides, the two military coups that
had brought down the Nkrumah and Busia governments respectively were
presented as an indication that the military was bound to play a leading
role in national politics. According to its proponents, the soldiers having
✓
participated in power-sharing would not be prepared to surrender the 
role and to return to barracks where they would he relegated to their
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traditional function of defence and security. As Ghanaian citizens, 
members of the Armed Forces ’’had the right to want to take part from now 
on in the decision-making process".^ A suitable compromise, therefore, 
was to incorporate the Armed Forces and Police into a national government 
in order to achieve stability in the country. Thus, Union Government 
was defined by the Report as being a form of government representative 
of the people and having as its philosophical foundation the concepts of 
’’national unity and consensus” . Representatives would be selected from 
all levels and sections of the community on a basis other than membership 
of an institutionalised political party or parties.^
As far as the majority of Ghanaians were concerned, and contrary to 
the government's propaganda, this was a novel political concept, and most 
people did not understand what it meant, or how precisely it was supposed 
to work. Even Ghanaian officials conceded that they did not fully Vr 
understand the concept of Unigov, and that no constructive attempt had 
been made to elucidate it with any precision. Consequently, they were 
having great difficulty in presenting the government's position to the 
public. The national press, acting as the mouthpiece of the regime, also 
experienced great difficulty in elucidating the concept. One weekly 
publication, for example, after failing to demystify the confusion 
surrounding the idea, could only appeal to the conscience of opponents to 
re-examine the whole issue since it was a fact "that any new concept for 
political development anywhere had never been clearly defined in the early
g
stages”. It was not unusual, therefore - so it was argued - for
proponents of such concepts to be misunderstood, and for their ideas to be
9
rejected as impracticable even by well-meaning intellectuals. Notwith­
standing the vagueness of the concept, however, the SMC mounted an intense 
and extensive political campaign early in January 1978 with a view to 
winning majority support for the notion.
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The majority of large-scale rice-farmers in the Northern Region had 
been supporters of the ruling Andani gate which, as we have already seen, 
firmly supported the SMC government of General Acheampong. Consequently, 
the referendum was overwhelmingly supported by large and well-connected 
rice-farmers, some of whom were active campaigners for Unigov. It was 
in the best interest of these farmers to advocate a l!YesM vote, since the 
newly-proposed form of government was clearly designed to preserve the 
dominance of the existing (military) government leaders and, more 
especially, the policies which had been responsible for the development 
of that group or "class" of farmers. The high and widespread level of 
corruption which the regime implicitly condoned was in fact beneficial 
to these farmers since the system tolerated their own corrupt activities 
Thus the "kalabule" system which flourished under the military regime was 
therefore perfectly compatible with the aspirations of these farmers.
Two of the most active government supporters in the North during the 
Unigov campaign were Alhaji Sumani Zakaria, one of the principal 
beneficiaries of the Acheampong regime, and O.S. Mahamadu, a prince from 
the Andani gate and a rice-farmer of considerable achievement.^ There 
were, of course, several other active pro-Unigov campaigners among the 
farmers, especially from within the executive of the RGA. Although the 
RGA was formed ostensibly to represent the interests of all rice-producers 
in the region, in effect it did not cater for the small-scale ricerfarmer, 
and as we shall explain later in this chapter, it was completely dominated 
by a nucleus of well-connected and politically influential large-scale 
producers. It was from amongst these big farmers that the regime 
recruited its most fanatical supporters. Backed by substantial government 
resources, including finance and transport,** these government supporters 
launched one of the most intensive campaign programmes which spanned the 
entire Northern Region, but with special focus on Dagbon.
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The pro-Unigov rice-farmers did not acknowledge any theoretical
difficulty in defending the concept. Rather, according to them, it
offered a real opportunity for the development of the North. As these
supporters claimed, there would be no feuds between rival political groups
under the proposed system, since all candidates would be chosen on personal
merit based on their standing in the local community, and would be committed
to work in the interest of the country as a whole. According to one such
supporter, Unigov, as proposed by Acheampong, presented the North with its
12
best opportunity for development since the Nkruaah days. This was one
of the main reasons, he claimed, why he was personally supporting the
government on the issue. Furthermore, he argued, Unigov would bring
stability to the Dagomba who had throughout their history been plagued
by chieftaincy disputes. According to this interviewee, the
intervention by politicians in Dagomba chieftaincy affairs was directly
responsible for the division within the Dagomba people,
because each party that comes into power will try 
to install a chief who will control the people 
for that party...because the North is very 
important to the politicians in the South 
since if there is no unity between the North 
and the rest of the country, it could cause 
serious political problems. So that when 
parties are abolished and government is based 
on a common interest then there will be no more 
need to rely on chiefs for support. The chiefs 
will then return to their traditional role...With 
Unigov we the Northerners will start to concentrate 
on the development of the region. Since farming 
is our main business we will try to produce as much 
as we can in order to feed the people.
Again, according to this interviewee (and his views were consistent
with those of many of his counterparts), Unigov was supported by
the farmers because it would first of all encourage economic development,
/
and then unite the politically divided North. These sentiments, however,
\
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did not reflect those of all farmers, but were rather typical of a 
specific group of rice-farmers - the big and privileged ones supported 
by the regime.
Such general political and economic rationalisations of the virtues
of Unigov must obviously be taken with a pinch of salt. In most cases,
more personal motives were at work in the shape of the several forms of 
reward and favours that had been granted to large-scale farmers.
Alhaji Zakaria, for example, was prepared to acknowledge this when he 
explained that,
We campaigned for Unigov because we wanted 
the government to do for us all that we wanted.
I made sure that all my villagers voted 'Yes'
so that when they [the government] win we get 
what we ask for...The SMC government, I will 
say, have done very well since they have been
able to satisfy us with all our needs. Not
only the big farmers, but I would say the small
farmers also, have received some gains from the
SMC government. ^
This opinion, however, was more consistent with the achievements of
the big farmers who, as we have seen earlier, were the main beneficiaries
of SMC favouritism. By comparison, the small farmers gained very little
and were relegated to a state of dependence on their more privileged
colleagues.
The big farmers often employed devious tactics to win support for 
their cause. They made vague promises to the villagers, such as the
improvement of their living conditions or, more significantly, improving
the supply of agricultural inputs to the farmers* Representations were
often made to the village chiefs on behalf of the government. Thus, about 
the middle of February 1978, three top officials from the RGA - Abu Alidu 
(the Organiser), Alhaji Zakaria, and Ziblim Andan - approached the 
Nyankpala chief, the Nyankpalana, with their Unigw "package". According 
to them, they had come in an official capacity to inform the villagers that
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the government had "taken notice" of the difficulties which they (the
farmers) experienced by travelling to Tamale to obtain their commodity
supplies. The RGA delegation pointed out that since the villagers were
all very hard-working people and spent most of their time on their farms,
it would save time and effort if a farmers1 store was set up in the
village. The chief was led into believing that all the details had been
worked out by the Regional Office in Tamale, and that the plan would soon
be implemented. His subjects were informed accordingly, and their
optimism ran very high. This was undoubtedly a gesture which convinced
the chief that the Acheampong regime was taking a "very serious interest"
in the welfare of his people, and of Northerners as a whole. As a result,
he instructed all his people to vote "Yes" at the r e f e r e n d u m . T h e
village, of course, never got its store.
The making of promises to the Northerners was not confined to the
"agents" of the government alone. During his meet-the-people tour in
January 1978 when Acheampong was promoting Unigov as "the re-affirmation
of the authentic African political values of united effort, individual
loyalty and involvement of all in political decision-making"*^ (whatever
that was supposed to mean), he did not miss out on the opportunity to
inform supporters of the government’s concern and dedication to their
cause. At a durbar with the chiefs in Yendi, the Head of State promised
that the remaining stretch of the Tamale-Yendi road, one of the most
dilapidated trunk roads in the North, would be tarred with immediate 
17effect. As far as the Upper Region was concerned, Acheampong reportedly
stated that 50 million cedis had been made available for the construction
18and tarring of 680 kilometres of roads there. The question of road
/
communication was of crucial importance to the North since the area was 
predominantly agricultural, and passable roads were vital for access to 
the urban markets.
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Membership and Support within the RGA
The RGA, which was established in 1973 to represent the interests of
the rice-growers in the region, developed into one of the most effective
19wings of the government in the North during the late 1970s. During
the Unigov campaign, the association was instrumental in promoting the
government cause and, as we have mentioned, its leaders were among the
most active campaigners in the North, sometimes employing the use of force
20to discipline opponents.
We have also mentioned that the RGA was pro-Andani and enjoyed strong 
political influence on the basis of the Andani association with, or 
control of, various institutions such as the WDDC (where, prior to 1978, 
councillors were nominated by government officials), the Regional House 
of Chiefs, or the Regional Administration where Andani influence was 
particularly strong. Before discussing the specific role played by the 
Association during the campaign (and its general support for the SMC) it 
will be necessary to make certain observations about it. The main 
questions to be answers are, first, "Who constituted the RGA?", and 
secondly, "Whose interests did it actually represent?" In other words, 
we must attempt to answer the question of whether Assocation was truly 
representative of its entire supposed membership.
Although the ability to take advantage of government policies and 
subsidies initially rested on good connections with the ruling dynasty 
of chiefs and government officials, by 1977/78 the most successful Dagomba 
farmers had established the RGA as a relatively independent basis of 
bargaining power and a nucleus of large-scale rice-farming interests. 
Membership was in theory open to all rice farmers, including the very 
small growers, but in practice these were not effectively represented by it. 
Indeed, they were not even members. A detailed discussion of the small
farmers’ responses to the RGA will be given in the following chapter.
Let us state for the moment that most of these farmers did not know of 
the Association, and even those who knew about it were not prepared to 
join since they perceived it as a big-farmers' club. (Of course, it 
was also in the interests of the organiser to keep these farmers ignorant 
of the objectives of the RGA.) As.far as the small rice-farmers were 
concerned, it was those big and privileged counterparts who stood to gain 
from the benefits of membership. Thus they recognised how the whole 
system of subsidised rice production really worked.
The policies advocated by the RGA amounted to more of the same - i.e., 
pressure for more subsidised inputs, such as foreign exchange to buy 
tractors or combine harvesters - rather than policies which would have 
benefited the majority of small rice-farmers: for example, the replacement
of subsidised inputs by much higher "official" prices. The lack of such 
a policy created a potential conflict between the underprivileged farmers 
on the one hand, and the big and well-connected on the other, and which 
nevertheless was moderated and "contained" by the patronage which some of 
the larger farmers extended to small farmers.
Our sample of large-scale rice farmers shows that not all such farmers 
were registered members of the Association by the middle of 1978. Only
72.9 per cent of those interviewed were members, as the table below 
indicates.
TABLE 7 •! • Large-scale Rice-farmers1 Membership of the RGA 1978
Number Percentage
Members 
Non-members 
Total sample
51
70
19
100.0
72.9
27.1
Source: 1978 Survey of Large-Scale Rice-farmers, N/R).
Although a membership rate of over 70 per cent would appear to be high
the important point is the relationship between membership and the
representative activities of the Association. A large number of members
claimed that they were unhappy with the assistance they received from the
RGA. In recent years the Association had not been able to help its
members to obtain either fertiliser or mechanised farm services - this
situation was actually due less to inertia on the part of the Association
than to bad planning on the part of the government - and as a result had
seen an increase in the ranks of its disgruntled members. At the same
time the RGA witnessed an increase in the benefits (mainly in the form
of machinery) that were allocated to certain top members, including the
executive and a few privileged members, which led to the belief among
some members that the RGA provided for only a nucleus of its membership -
those members referred to by the rank and file as the "big" men. Such
benefits encouraged strong criticism of the executive, both from within
and from outside the Association. For example, one farmer from Savelugu
(and a former member of the Association) expressed his disillusionment thus
"I do not find them [the Association] to be helpful. They help no one
except themselves, and unless you belong to their company you are wasting
your time. I soon realised that they were cheating the farmers....that’s 
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why I left11. • This farmer himself cultivated three hundred acres of 
rice and owned two tractors which he had purchased some years previously 
with his own resources, as well as a combine harvester which he purchased 
with the help of a loan from Barclays Bank.
The theme of the "inner circle" within the RGA was one of the most 
exploited topics by outside critics and dissatisfied members alike. The 
general criticism was that the executive did not consult the membership on 
important issues, but instead discussed these among themselves. As a
result, only the leadership benefited from the policies of the Association.
Some farmers claimed that they were deliberately and systematically
excluded from important Association meetings. One such farmer, Abudulai
Alidu, had been a member for four years and, according to him, had never
been invited to a meeting. News of the meetings tended to reach him
after they had actually taken place, and the explanation usually given
was that the organisers could not contact all the members. As far as
this member was concerned, it was a deliberate attempt on the part of the
executive to keep certain outspoken members away from the meetings in order
to save embarrassment to the "top people”. Furthermore, according to
Alidu, ”It is rather unfortunate that they run this Association in the name
22of the farmers, when we all know who the real beneficiaries are".
It is obvious, therefore, from comments of this sort that a conflict 
of attitudes existed within the general membership of the Association, and 
that its general policy was under constant attack. According to our 
survey, only 60.8 per cent of the members were satisfied with the policies 
of the RGA, while 39.2 per cent expressed dissatisfaction with such policies 
(Table 7 -2,.below).
TABLE 7.2 : RGA Members' Attitudes towards the Government,
Unigov and the Association
Number Percenti
Satisfied with government help 33 64.7
Not satisfied with government help 18 33.5
Supporter of Unigov. 35 68.6
Non-supporter of Unigov 16 31.4
Satisfied with policies of RGA 31 60.8
Not satisfied with policies of RGA 20 39.2
Total number of members in sample: 51
Source: 1978 Survey of Large-Scale Rice-Farmers, N/R
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The table suggests that there was a strong correlation between the
satisfaction derived from the policies of the RGA (60.8 per cent) and the
help given by government to farmers in general (64.7 per cent). These
statistics suggest further that members identified the Association’s
policies with the general agricultural policies of the government as far
they related to the North. The RGA was therefore regarded as an agent,
if not an embodiment, of government policy by the majority of its members.
According to one of the leaders, the rice-farmers supported government
policy because it was in their ’’best interest” to do so, and General
Acheampong was very ’’co-operative and helpful” in assisting those farmers
to get farm machinery, bank loans, and, in seme cases, import licences.
As far as he was concerned, the policies of the government were designed
to help the farmers and the people in the North, so that all members of
the Association were urged ”to support government policy, especially those
that relate directly to agriculture, since agriculture is our only means
of developing the North....in the RGA we fully support the government,
23
and we expect all our members to support it as well....”
The actual influence which the RGA exerted over government agricultural
policy could not have been that decisive or even significant if viewed
from the national point of view; but in certain areas of policy, such as
the pricing of paddy, the Association has acted as an effective pressure
group in order to secure better prices for the farmers. When the RGA
was first established in 1973, paddy was bought by the government rice-mills
at 2 cedis for a 108 lb. bag, but with pressure from the Association, it
24
increased at intervals to 12 cedis, 50 cedis, and 70 cedis per bag.
In December 1978, the Commissioner for Agriculture, Colonel S.M. Akwagyiram, 
announced after a meeting with the members of the RGA in Tamale that th"e 
government had agreed to raise the price of paddy to 90 cedis per bag
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as a result of "strong representation" by the Association about
25
the prevailing high cost of production.
Although such policies relating to the price of paddy were beneficial 
to all rice producers, government pricing policies on the whole acted 
against the interests of most farmers for the main reason that subsidised 
inputs could be obtained only by some: those with connections, as we have
already seen. Some of the less-privileged members gained something in 
return for supporting the leadership, generally in the form of the hire 
of farm machinery, supply of transport and other inputs. But these 
''gains’' were petty by comparison with those realised by the leaders 
themselves. In any case, such benefits were not the direct result of 
government policy and depended upon the inclination of the farmer/owner, 
and in view of the catastrophically high prices paid by the recipient 
farmers, such ’’benefits” represented nothing but a net loss to these 
farmers.
Among the members, however, there were some who claimed to receive 
no assistance from the Association. Although these benefited of course 
from the regular increases in the price of paddy, such members did not 
receive assistance from the leading farmers because they did not belong 
to the same chieftaincy faction or, what amounted to the same thing, were 
not supporters of the government.
It will be noticed from Table 7.2 (above) that 31.4 per cent of the 
RGA members were non-supporters of Unigov, and 33.5 per cent were 
dissatisfied with the help received from the government, while 39.2 per 
cent were dissatisfied with the performance of the Association as a whole. 
Table 7.3 (below) suggests that the majority of these farmers were either 
supporters or members of the Abudulai faction.
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TABLE 7.3 : Political Attitudes of non-Government Supporters based 
on Chieftaincy Affiliation'Among RGA Members
Abudulai Andani Non-committed Total
Non-supporter of Unigov 14 2 16
Non-supporter of government 15 1. 2 18
farming policy
Dissatisfaction with RCA 18 - 2 20
policies
Note: "Non-committed’1 were those farmers who insisted they had no gate
loyalties; they were both "southerners”
Source: 1978 Sample Survey of Large-scale Rice-Farmers, N/R.
The only Andani supporter who disagreed with the farming policies of
the government (and of the RGA) explained his attitude in terms of the
failure of the Association to secure more fertiliser and tractor services
26for farmers in the more remote areas. Members* support for the policies 
of the RGA depended upon a number of factors, such as their personal 
relationships with the leaders, but the most important single factor was 
chieftaincy allegiance.
Power, Influence and Control within the RGA
So far the analysis has been concerned with the question of the 
national-level political loyalties of Association members. We proceed 
to discuss the question of control within the RGA, and will attempt to show 
how the RGA was used to promote the interests of its leaders. We have 
seem from Table 7.2 that 60.8 per cent of the members, in our sample were 
satisfied with the official policy of the RGA, These members were the 
main core of its support* It would be misleading, however, to
assume that such members had any significant influence on the general 
policies of the RGA. Instead they supported those policies in return,' 
for assistance in one form or another which they received by virtue 
of their loyalty to the leaders. Such help extended to the whole range
\
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of subsidised inputs and facilities. For example, during the 1978 
season considerable panic was created among the rice-farmers in the 
North by the acute shortages of fuel caused mainly by the breakdown 
of tankers and the familiar lack of spares, but also by the general 
shortages throughout the country. This resulted in a drastic cut­
back in the total area cultivated in the region. The loyal members 
of the RGA did not as a rule suffer the same degree of inconvenience 
as the rest, because they either obtained their supplies on the 
recommendation of its highly influential leaders, or were 
given limited supplies personally by those leaders who were generally 
able to secure adequate quantities. A story recounted by Yakubu 
Alhassan illustrates the influence which the leading members of the 
RGA could exert under difficult conditions. For a whole week during 
the fuel crisis Alhassan had been trying to purchase a supply of diesel 
oil from the local Mobil filling station. Both his tractors were parked
on his farm about sixty miles from Tamale for lack of fuel. According 
to him, he paid the manager fifty cedis in bribes hoping that he would 
be given a supply of this fuel, but each time he called at the station 
he was told to return later. Eventually, according to Alhassan, he was 
told by the manager that the "big alhajis" (including some of the RGA 
leaders) were putting pressure on him for not selling larger quantities 
of oil to them, and had threatened to report him to the Regional Office 
for alleged anti-government sentiments. Thus, if Alhassan's story was
correct, these farmers were prepared to use political blackmail in order
27
to enhance or reinforce their position of economic privilege. In the 
end, Alhassan was forced through sheer necessity to buy a drum of oil
A
privately from one of these farmers for "more than three hundred cedis" -
28nearly four times its cost price.
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The leadership of the RGA consisted of members of the executive and 
a few other ordinary members possessed of especially influential political 
connections both locally and at the national level. The group's common 
interests gave rise to a strong social network and sense of solidarity 
between them, so strong in fact that at the height of their influence 
they could not be effectively challenged by outsiders. Their supremacy 
was reinforced by the fact that they were protected by key government 
officials at both the regional and national levels, and who, invariably, 
derived notable benefits, such as land acquisition and management of their 
farms, from their association with this group. Furthermore, the members 
of this privileged group were not merely large-scale farmers - indeed 
several were not genuine farmers - but rather men with substantial business 
or professional interests which placed them in an especially favourable 
position to cultivate a variety of economic and political connections.
Thus Alhaji Sumani Zakaria was not just one of the biggest rice-farmers 
in the North, in itself a position worthy of very high social esteem, but 
had a thriving transport business with several lorries, passenger trucks 
and taxis. He was also a big property developer in the North with the 
largest "storeyed building" in Tamale. Alhaji Ibrahim Mahama, a farmer 
and cattle-rancher, was a legal practitioner with a very successful 
business in Tamale, and acted as legal adviser to the RGA. He was also 
the owner of an aviation charter business based in Accra. Alhaji Mahama 
was later to become a founder of the Social Democratic Front Party and its 
presidential candidate in the 1979 elections. Another prominent and very 
influential member of the executive committee was Alhaji Salifu Abdul- 
Rahamani. He was an agent for Japan Motors, a position which he used to 
help many of his colleagues to acquire tractors and'other vehicles. He 
was also a transport owner, and by his own admission cultivated farms for
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’’one or two good friends in Accra” . He was believed to be responsible 
for cultivating one of Colonel Felli’s farms in Karaga. Alhaji Yakubu 
was the RGA President. Although he had no other known business enterprises 
outside rice-farming, he held several influential positions, such as Chief 
Farmer for the Northern Region, and was also a former member of the 
Western Dagomba District Council. Other ”de facto” members of the 
executive included traders, senior military and police officers and heads 
of public corporations. The executive head of the NRDC had a fleet of 
lorries, tractors and combine harvesters at his disposal, which he hired 
to colleagues and of course utilised for his own personal concerns. The 
director of Nasia Rice Company - a company set up in 1974 for the purpose 
of developing rice-farming in the region and financed mainly by the 
commercial banks - had control of a fleet of about fifteen serviceable 
combines in 1978, and a considerable number of tractors and implements, as 
well as lorries and other forms of transport. It was a well-known fact 
that the Company’s machinery was used to farm for commissioners based in 
the South and for some privileged local farmers. As overall controller 
of the local operations of the Ministry of Agriculture, the regional 
director was in a highly favoured position to assist those close to him.
The main beneficiaries were senior civil servants and military officers, 
most of whom abused their position by failing to pay for the services of 
machinery hired out to them.
One of the most notorious examples of a public official's favouritism 
towards colleagues involved the Director of the Cotton Development Board, 
who had at least two rice-farms of his own and which were cultivated with 
machinery belonging to the Board. He hired some of the Board's tractors
v
to his close allies in the North, but he used its machinery to farm for 
several top commissioners, including the Chief of Defence Staff, the Border 
Guard Commander, the Regional Commissioner, and above all, the Head of State.
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From time to time members of. the "top brass11 of the executive met
privately to discuss matters of mutual interest. The subject of discussion
at such meetings did not always relate to matters of general interest to
members, such as the price of paddy, but were more specific to the needs
of the individual farmers involved. Topics frequently discussed at these
meetings included, for example, the procurement of import licences, or the
purchase of fertiliser from sources outside the Northern Region. The
latter was a regular subject of discussion among the farmers during the
1978 season because of the serious shortage at the Tamale Depot which
forced them to look for alternative sources. During that season most of
these farmers obtained their supplies from the southern depots: Andan
from Koforidua, Abdul-Rahamani from Tema, Kpabia from Sunyani, while
30Zakaria obtained supplies from Ho and Koforidua.
At a meeting held at Zakaria*s home in Tamale in late April 1978, and 
attended by eleven of the most influential rice-farmers in Tamale, the 
question of land irrigation formed the major subject of discussion.
According to my informant, all the farmers in attendance had farms in areas 
that were particularly suitable for irrigated faraing. The meeting was 
also attended by the local representative of Japan Motors who was also a 
big rice-farmer. He assured the meeting that his company could arrange 
to bring in the necessary equipment once credit facilities were granted.
As a result, the farmers agreed to send a delegation to Accra to put 
their case to the government, and in about the middle of May three of their 
representatives were despatched accordingly. These consisted of Alhaji 
Zakaria, Abu Alidu (the RGA Organiser) and S.Y. Imoru, a farmer with 
considerable influence in government circles in Accra, having been 
National Vice-President of the Special Marketing Utoit. Subsequent 
discussions with the delegates suggested that they were well received
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personally by Acheampong who promised that he would do everything possible 
31
to assist them. In June these farmers were informed by the Office of 
the SMC that the Head of State had approved their request for help, and 
were requested to submit details of their specific requirements, including 
costs. According to Zakaria, the government would have granted an import 
licence to their group of farmers, as distinct from the Association, but 
before they could work out the details, Acheampong was suddenly removed 
from office.
Although the big farmers could be persuaded to talk about their
relationship with top government officials and matters relating to farming
in general, they were unwilling, understandably, to talk about their
"clandestine" activities, such as smuggling or hoarding. One could
nevertheless gain an insight into these activities if sufficient rapport
and confidence could be established with people who were familiar with
‘the activities of these farmers. One such informant with whom I became
close was a younger brother of an executive member of the Association.
Early in November 1978, my informant brought to my attention how the big
farmers in Tamale "put their heads together and plan how to send their rice to
32Togo and Upper Volta". According to him, his senior brother had "more
than 200 bags" ready to despatch to Bawku in the north-east. His rice
was being transported together with that of another prominent Tamale
farmer, both of whom were later spotted at the lorry station making
arrangements with the driver. The driver denied, however, that he was
carrying rice, and when asked about the nature of his cargo claimed
33
instead that he was taking a consignment of maize to Bawku!
The smuggling of rice had been officially banned by the government, but 
the farmers were so well organised through their social and political 
networks that they continued to smuggle most of their produce across the
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borders without any fear of incrimination. It was widely believed that
the former Northern Regional Commissioner, Colonel Zumah, used his
position to help his friends smuggle their rice across various border
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points in the North. Border guards were simply not in a position to 
question the authority of a senior officer, especially the Regional 
Commissioner, and the smuggled goods could be cleared fairly quickly after 
the formal payment of a bribe at the checkpoint. Although the payment 
and acceptance of bribes had been common in Ghana since independence and 
even before, the kalabule system which prevailed in Ghana during the 
seventies involved government complicity in corruption and smuggling on a 
scale hitherto unequalled. Thus the well-planned and systematic 
organisation of the leading rice-farmers provided them with further 
opportunity to continue to exploit one of the central characteristics of 
the political system to further their own ends.
This system did not challenge the operations of such economically and 
politically powerful groups as the leading members of the rice-farming 
community in Northern Ghana - as long as they were pro-government and, 
in the local context, pro-Andani. In fact, the system encouraged them 
to collaborate in such rackets in return for their unqualified support.
In the last few pages we have attempted to show who the powerful rice- 
farmers of the RGA were, and how they co-ordinated their efforts in order 
to promote both their group and individual interests. We saw that most 
of their activities were external to the Association, i.e., conducted 
outside its jurisdiction, while at the same time the RGA was used as an 
extension and reinforcement of their power. How then did the top members 
maintain their position of power and influence within the Association in 
face of fairly strong opposition from the rank and file of the membership? 
The answer lies in the fact that the executive had come to regard their
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Association as an "agent" of the national government, and saw themselves 
as being entrusted with carrying out government policy locally, so that 
any opposition to them would in fact be construed as opposition to the
regime, and opponents were liable to be handed over to the authorities
35to be dealt with accordingly.
By 1977/78, the "opposition" within the RGA was becoming increasingly 
restless and disenchanted with the performance of the leaders. There was 
a general shortage of farm machinery, especially combine harvesters; old 
tractors were breaking down and spare parts were unobtainable; at the same 
time there was a growing demand for transport to convey both workers and 
goods to farms situated several miles away, while the shortage of fuel,
which was so acute during the 1978 farming season, added to the growing
36frustration of those farmers. The Association could not live up to 
the expectations of the rank and file; there was simply not enough "aid" 
to go around, and whatever little was available went to the privileged 
members. The relative ease with which the executive and top members were 
obtaining supplies of inputs encouraged some of the less-privileged members 
to voice their protests at the unequal distribution of benefits accruing 
from membership and to withdraw, while others adopted a bitter and hostile 
attitude towards the executive. Alhassan Sulemana was one of those who 
was so frustrated with the performance of the leaders that he decided on a 
personal audience with an executive member to inform him of the growing 
discontent among the general membership, and of his own hopeless situation. 
During the 1977/78 harvesting season, Sulemana had not been able to hire 
a combine harvester in time, and his rice was rapidly drying up. The
situation was becoming ever more serious as a result of the strong harmattan
/
winds which had a desiccating effect on crops. His paddy field was 
therefore seriously exposed to the risk of bush fire. The executive member,
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whose farm was situated near Sulemana’s at Nabogo., promised either to hire 
his combine to him after completing his own harvesting, or to use his 
influence to obtain one for him from some other source. None of these 
promises materialised, and Sulemana had to wait until early January to 
start harvesting, by which time his rice had suffered from a serious 
loss of grain. Sulemana estimated that he would have harvested more 
than two thousand bags of paddy instead of the four hundred which he 
actually realised. From that moment, according to his own testimony, 
he was convinced that the Association was hot performing in the best 
interests of its ordinary members. He never attended a meeting
37thereafter, and had lost all his "respect" for "those cheating men".
Some dissatisfied members had already protested long before
Sulemana. In January 1977, during one of the Association's meetings at
the Cultural Centre in Tamale, some of the members made their grievances
known and expressed their dissatisfaction with the general running of
the RGA, going so far as to call for the resignation of the entire committee.
According to one member, the executive felt very "uneasy and nervous" at
the call for their resignation. It was the first time in the history
of the Association that they had encountered such undisguised opposition
to their leadership. As this member put it,
They knew themselves that they had let the 
members down. Someone asked them why it was
that only a few received help when the Association
was supposed to be helping everyone. The Chairman 
replied that they were doing their best to help all 
farmers, but that the general economic situation 
made it impossible to satisfy eveiyone's needs.
We, the members, were not satisfied with that 
answer, and they, the executive, were accused of 
corruption and incompetence.^
The executive, however, was not prepared to accept such 
outright condemnation and retaliated swiftly by first accusing 
the discontented members of being factional and
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ideological, and secondly, of being anti-government. As a result, the 
dissident members were reported to the Regional Office for being "anti- 
government" and were warned by the Regional Commissioner that as members 
of the Association they were expected to follow and support the leadership 
and if any member failed to do so he would be considered an enemy of the 
government and would pay the consequences. If the admonition from the 
authorities was effective in moderating overt opposition to the RGA 
leadership, it did not help to win over any support for its policies.
On the contrary, non-supporters continued to express their opposition
•  ^ , 40privately.
By having identified itself with official government policy, the 
Association was in effect reinforcing its authority locally. By the time 
that the referendum was being held, its position as an official government 
supporter became more prominent as its leaders became actively engaged in 
"campaigning" for "Yes" votes.
The RGA, Chiefs, and Local Support for the Regime
Campaigners in the North adopted various strategies, including the 
use of violence, to win support for the regime. The most effective 
strategy, however, was the manipulation of the local chieftaincy, since 
it is widely-accepted that Dagomba chiefs generally command the loyalty 
of their subjects on most issues; the pro-Unigov farmers of the RGA were 
quick to exploit this situation. Although the Andanis ruled in Dagbon,
not all the divisional chiefdoms there were controlled by their candidates 
For example, Tolon, under the Tolon Na (Yakubu Tali), and Savelugu, under 
the Yo Na (Regent) Alhassan, were strong Abudulai chiefdoms. In addition 
to these divisional chiefdoms there were several sub-chiefdoms (villages') 
that were controlled by Abudulai chiefs. Consequently, several chiefs
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were "deskinned" during the period immediately preceding the referendum.^ 
The practice of deposing chiefs is not, strictly speaking, recognised 
by the Dagomba constitution but, as we have already indicated, from time 
to time politicians have intervened to have their clients installed.
This practice had never been demonstrated better than by the intervention 
of the SMC in Dagomba politics during the period leading to the referendum. 
The regime was becoming increasingly uneasy about the growing opposition 
to Uriigov in some Abudulai villages, most particularly those around 
Tolon, Savelugu, Karaga, and Gushiegu; it was important, therefore, to 
find some means of bringing these villages under the control of chiefs 
sympathetic to the regime. Furthermore, the dissident chiefs controlled 
areas in which some of the most productive rice-fields in the North 
were situated. It was likely, therefore, that the big and power rice- 
farmers would want these areas to come under their sphere of influence.
At a meeting held at the Regional Office in Tamale in early February
1978, and attended by at least five top officials from the RGA - Andan,
Zakaria, Mahamadu, Abdul-Rahamani and Alidu - and (apparently) senior
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officials from the Regional House of Chiefs, it was unanimously agreed 
that urgent steps were required to secure certain skins from Abudulai 
chiefs since, in the first place, these chiefs acted as a ’’hindrance” 
to Unigov, and secondly, they were reluctant to allocate sufficient land 
to Andani farmers. All the members present agreed that Savelugu was 
the prime target and that, with its proven histoiy of factional violence, 
the. Ya Na would be perfectly justified in "sacking" the incumbent chief. 
Tolon, on the other hand, was considered to be too "hot" to interfere 
with in view of the Tolon Na’s influence in the North as a whole.
The meeting urged that the Ya-Na be advised to act quickly, since 
some of these village chiefs made it difficult for supporters of the
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regime to conduct their "campaign". Urgent action was recommended on
Savelugu in particular, because the Regent was regarded as being one of
the most "unco-operative" chiefs in the North. Furthermore, it would
not be difficult to remove him since he had not performed his father's
funeral rites - an important precondition for accession to a skin in 
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Dagbon. Thus, while these farmers' leaders gave the impression that
certain chiefs in Dagbon should be removed because they were anti-government,
they were also motivated by another important consideration: access to
fertile rice-lands in areas controlled by these chiefs.
The policy of replacing dissident chiefs by those loyal to the Ya-Na
was, of course, not a new practice. In recent years it had been adopted
by former Ya-Na Mahamadu Abudulai IV, who installed several Abudulai
princes to key skins until his own removal from Yendi by Acheampong in
1974. One of Mahamadu*s appointees, B.A. Yakubu, the former chief of
Gushiegu (traditionally one of the most important chieftaincies in the
whole of Dagbon), was in turn "deskinned" by Na Yakubu Andani in 1974,
on the grounds that he was not constitutionally installed, since Mahamadu
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himself was deemed not to have been properly elected to Yendi.
Soon after the installation of Na Yakubu Andani, a list of dissident 
chiefs who were required to pay homage to him was drawn up, failing which 
they would "lose their skins". A communique issued by the Office of the 
NRC to the Regional Commissioner, Tamale, recommended that the chiefs 
be allowed no more than five days to meet their obligations. That 
list included sixteen sub-chiefs from the Abudulai gate as follows:- 
Alidu Andani, Yelizoli Lana; Seidu Abukari, Lamashe Na; Salifu Yakubu,
Nyol Na; Alhassan Abudulai Ziblim, Sang Lana; Abudulai Abudu,
Gbungbalaga Lana; Alhassan Bukari Haruna, Bogindana; Alhaji Alhassan Sule, 
Gushie Na; Adam Sulemana, Zogu Lana; Issahaku Alhassan, Tugu Lana;
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Ashietu Abudu, Kugulogu Lana; Samata Alhassan, Gundo Na; the others 
were Bo Na, Kutum Lana, Nakpanso Na, Nyankpalana, and Zinabu Alhassan 
(no specified skin) who had since died.^
The chiefs, however, paid homage to the Ya-Na and retained their 
skins, although some (such as Sang Lana) were later to be "de-skinned". 
Initially, this was no more than a threat and was intended to draw the 
chiefs' attention to the authority of the Ya-Na. The loyalty of the 
threatened chiefs to the Ya-Na nevertheless remained doubtful in many 
cases, whilst in some it was clearly non-existent and opposition between 
the two camps continued. By the time of the Unigov referendum the North 
was clearly divided between the two camps, with no group commanding 
reliably wider support than the other. The anti-Unigov contingent was 
very strong and, if the government were to win, it was therefore necessary 
to move against this political force. It was around this time that 
the government intensified its tactics of surveillance, coercion, and 
violence to suppress anti-Unigov elements in general and Abudulai supporters 
in particular. Several village chiefs were reportedly removed from their 
skins during the weeks immediately preceding the referendum, especially 
around Savelugu, Yendi, and Karaga.
The campaign to unite the country behind the government continued 
well after the results of the referendum were known. Despite the 
government's official "victory" there was still substantial opposition 
in the country, in particular from the professionals and students. In 
Dagbon the anti-Unigov lobby was far from being subdued, as groups and 
individuals refused to accept results which they regarded as having 
been manipulated and designed to perpetuate the regime and the corrupt 
political system associated with it. There were reported clashes in 
both Yendi and Savelugu between groups loyal to the regime and those
opposed to it. At a public dance in Savelugu on 9 April 1978, two 
groups clashed once again, with several people wounded on each side and 
a number of them detained by police.
As a result of the disquiet in several parts of the North immediately 
following the referendum, the government felt bound to step up strategies 
aimed at removing opposition. The policies adopted by local agents of 
the government in dealing with the anti-government elements must be seen 
in this context. The removal of the Regent of Savelugu in early July 1978, 
must also be construed within the framework of this broad strategy. It 
also, however, finally cleared the way for the appointment of a divisional 
chief who would be more sympathetic to the interests of the large rice-farmers.
When the Regent was appointed to the Savelugu skin in June 1976,
following the death of his father, Yo Na Abudulai III, there was apparently
no official objection to the appointment. By early 1978, however, when
the country was seriously divided on the Unigov issue, Savelugu, like
many other strong Abudulai constituencies in the lorth, adopted a strong
anti-Unigov platform. During the campaign the District Chief Executive
called upon the Regent requesting him to order his subjects to vote
"Yes”, but he was reluctant to obey this directive. According to the
Regent, he believed that it was morally wrong to ask his people to vote
"Yes” when he .personally was not a supporter of Unigov; instead, he
agreed that his people should be left to vote according to the dictates of 
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their conscience. A few days after the DCE's visit, a rally was held 
in Savelugu which was attended by some of the big rice-farmers from 
Tamale. The Regent was expected to attend in order to show solidarity 
but refused to do so because, according to him, he was not informed and, 
besides, to do so would have been a betrayal of his own position. His 
refusal to attend the rally was construed, therefore, as an expression of
opposition to the government, and from that moment he and his supporters 
were subjected to persistent harassment and violent attacks by government 1 
supporters.^
Soon after the results were known and Savelugu was found to have
voted ”NoM (although most of the surrounding villages voted "Yes"), the
Regent was forcibly ejected from his official residence. According to
him, the DCE came to his palace accompanied by the army and police
and informed him that he was not longer the ’’rightful" chief, and was
therefore ordered to quit immediately. As he said, he was not in a
position to resist (and indeed offered no resistance) because he felt
that the government was powerful and, in his opinion, "second only to 
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God" - in its power of course, not in its moral authority! However,
the official reason given for the deposing of the Regent was that he had
failed to perform the funeral rites of his late father, thereby presenting
it as a non-political decision.^ The Regent counteracted this claim
by stating that, in the North, the funeral of a dead chief can be
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performed at any time, "even one thousand years later". The real
reason, according to him, why the funeral of his late father had not been
performed was because he was not able to produce sufficient food from his
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farm to meet the demands of such a big occasion.
In any case, the authorities had successfully removed a dissident 
from a very important chiefdom. He was succeeded by the Andani candidate,
Yakubu Abudulai, former chief of Zangballon, a village situated only a few 
miles from Savelugu. The enskinment of the new Yo Na witnessed several 
minor conflicts between the two factions in the Savelugu district. By 
mid-July 1978 several sub-chiefs from the Savelugu district were in the
/
process of being "de-skinned" by the newly-installed Yo Na. The act that 
evoked the greatest passion was the "de-skinment".of Botingli Na, Adam, who
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had occupied that skin for about, two years. His occupation of the 
Botingli skin was terminated on the grounds that he had been (wrongly) 
installed by the ex-Regent who was also deemed to have occupied the 
Savelugu skins unconstitutionally. Adam was not prepared to surrender, 
especially as he had built the official palace with his own resources.
He claimed to have the support of twelve of the fourteen households in the 
village, and was prepared to face the newly-appointed candidate with his 
local "army". The Yo Na, on the other hand, would not allow his authority 
to be challenged, and was about to despatch his own warriors, armed with 
spears, bows, arrows, and other weapons to Botingli (about three miles 
from Savelugu), when the timely intervention of the police prevented what 
would otherwise certainly have been a bloody confrontation between two 
loyal "armies"**^
The replacement of Abudulai chiefs by Andanis was therefore one of 
the most effective tactical manoeuvres deployed by the authorities in 
their attempt to win support for the SMC government. While the RGA 
leaders attempted to give the impression of neutrality as far as these 
matters were concerned - after all, skin politics was one of the most 
delicate issues in Dagbon - they were in fact veiy instrumental in having 
their own candidates appointed to the more important skins. Their 
patronage was also well directed. During the fertiliser shortage of 1978, 
articulated lorries from Tamale carted several hundred bags to the 
farmers in the Savelugu district. Improved tractor services, even if by no 
means adequate to meet all farmers' needs, were also provided in Savelugu 
during that season. One rice-farmer who did not himself own any farm 
machinery had no doubt that the installation of the new Yo Na was directly 
responsible for the generous assistance given to local farmers. His 
arguments are worth noting:
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"Since the referendum we have had a change of 
chiefs in Savelugu and in some of the surrounding 
villages. Now the chiefs co-operate better with the 
authorities, and there is no misunderstanding as far 
as the distribution of fertiliser is concerned.
The Germans (GGADP) bring fertiliser to the villages 
and the farmers are informed....Since the new chief 
was installed I have seen that the government is 
taking a greater interest in the farmers. Last 
year, for example, I could only plough 100 acres of 
my rice-field, but this year I cultivated over 
200 acres with the help of some farmers from Tamale, 
and I would have been able to farm more if it was 
not for the shortage of fuel which restricted the use 
of tractors. The reason why the big farmers are
taking an interest in us here in Savelugu is because
we supported Unigov. Our chief is doing his best
to get help for us. He is well known in Tamale,
and some of the big men come here every Friday to 
greet him".
Such sentiments reflected those held more generally by farmers in Savelugu 
who supported the Yo Na, and it was clearly their opinion that the . 
increased help which they received from leaders of the RGA was a direct 
consequence of their support for the regime.
But why did the influential RGA farmers have to support local farmers
by providing them with various farming inputs when these farmers1 support 
had already been won through the installation of sympathetic chiefs?
The answer is not straightforward, but political considerations were 
certainly involved. Those members of the Association who did not receive 
adequate assistance were those supporting the Abudulai side. Conversely, 
those farmers in Savelugu who received increased assistance after the 
referendum were generally supporters of the Andani faction. Further, the 
Savelugu district was a very rich farming area with out-districts 
constituting vast areas of virgin land - areas that would, no doubt, be 
sought after by the prominent farmers. The stepping-up of assistance to 
the local farmers therefore had the important effect of reducing possible 
opposition to the big farmers’ "invasion" of the village lands. This
policy was adopted in most areas with productive rice lands which were
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controlled by Andani chiefs, such as Karaga, Gushiegu, Janga, Mion,
Tampion and Nanton. In each of these villages subsidised inputs were
regularly supplied to local farmers. The rationalisation of this policy
was best summed up by the RGA organiser: "We the big farmers, we need
the villagers...we need their co-operation. If they don't like us they
can destroy our farms...therefore we must try to assist them by giving
some fertiliser, ploughing for them, and helping with carting their
foodstuffs. It is the policy of the Association to help all farmers,
55 .
not only those registered with us, but those in faraway areas..."
One important qualification however should be made: help was only offered
so long as those areas supported the regime, and were rich in farming-land.
RGA Leaders' Relationship to Acheampong; in the post-Referendum Period 
How successful were the big rice-farmers in winning support for the 
regime in the North during the referendum? Official results suggested 
that there was overwhelming support for Unigov anong Northerners.
According to the statistics, the government (i.e., "Yes") won every 
constituency there. The strongest opposition was met in the Abudulai 
stronghold of Tolon where 43 per cent voted "No". In Yendi and Savelugu, 
traditionally two very strong Abudulai constituencies, only 41.6 per 
cent and 27.9 per cent respectively voted "No" (see Table *7.4 below).
Such statistics, however, are misleading, and do not reflect the extent 
of the unpopularity of the Union Government concept. One explanation 
for the government's victory in the North lay in the failure of many 
people to vote. According to the Electoral Commissioner's office there 
were 412,196 registered voters in the Northern Region, of which only 
191,616 or 4bo5 per cent voted. One of the chief, reasons for the lovr^  
turn-out was the anticipation by a large number of anti-Unigov supporters
\
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TABLE 7.4 : 1978 Referendum Results - Northern
Constituency Yes No
Tamale 16,043 8,098
Tolon 6,926 5,210
Walewale 6,882 2,624
Nalerigu 12,110 1,797
Bunkpurugu 11,040 1,570
Nanumba 15,683 3,5.88
Gushiegu 8,342 3,590
Savelugu 6,640 2,566
Mion-Nanton 7,326 2,788
Chereponi-Saboba 9,956 2,035
Yendi 8,302 5,903
Gonja-West 9,653 3,400
Gonja-Central 13,379 3,895
Gonja-East 10,862 1,488
Total Northern 143,144 48,552
Region
Total Ghana 1,303,376 851,238
Region
Number of 
Registered Voters
57,124
24,731
24,049
26,290
22,321
42,493
25,603
19,892
17,257
21,324
35.785 
36,561
32.786 
25,980
412,196
8,793,197
Source: Adapted from The Mirror, 7 April 1978.
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that the results would be rigged anyway, making it pointless for them to 
vote. Many potential "No" voters also abstained because of the fear of 
intimidation by government supporters, while many others, especially from 
remote villages, were deliberately misled as to the actual date of the 
referendum. Such tactics were clearly designed to reduce the impact of 
opposition in areas that were positively anti-Unigov.
Some observers have also questioned the reliability of the Electoral
Register (and the apparent low turn-out). Jeffries, for example, has
argued that the 1978 Register was grossly inflated, and that was largely
due to a form of multi-registration encouraged by the government in which
registration officers were paid according to the number of voters that were
registered before the referendum. This system, he argued, was suspect,
and might have been adopted "in anticipation of the attempt to rig the
referendum".^ This assertion was reinforced by some observers in the
North who believed that the disproportionate distribution of "Yes" to
"No" votes in the very strong Abudulai centres, suggested that either
Abudulai supporters were under-registered, or the Register was "filled with
57non-existent Andani (and pro-Unigov) voters".
As far as the Unigov campaigners amongst the big rice-farmers were 
concerned, the results (in which they played such a crucial part locally) 
represented a "great victory" for the government. The adopted position 
of these leading farmers as local agents of the regime was considerably 
enhanced during the period between the referendum and the removal of 
Acheampong in July 1978, when the regime became increasingly uneasy as 
a result of renewed opposition to Unigov from students, intellectuals, and 
professionals who had challenged the validity of the referendum results.
An intensified national campaign was organised to suppress this opposition, 
and the RGA leaders were among those actively engaged in stamping it out 
locally.
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Several of these leaders were rewarded individually for their loyalty
to the regime. By July 1978, many of these had already been granted,
or were about to receive, import licences. Alhaji Sumani Zakaria, for
example, had been in receipt of one such import licence in January 1978,
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which was used to purchase several tractors abroad. Within a few days 
of the referendum the Organiser of the RGA was also granted an import
59licence for the specific purpose of purchasing four combine harvesters.
The RGA itself was awarded a licence which the leaders regarded as an 
important breakthrough for the Association, and a "fair reward for the 
support given to the government during the campaign".^
The award of the import licence to the RGA gave rise to an internal 
dispute among its top officials over its utilisation, and in the process 
revealed that the executive, although united by factional and political 
considerations, did in fact hold differences in approach as far as some 
aspects of policy were concerned. It was split into two groups over 
this issue. The first group, represented by Alhaji Yakubu, the Chairman, 
and Abu Alidu, the Organiser, opted for the licence to be used to purchase 
farm machinery and spares which would be sold to members at government- 
controlled prices. This group also proposed the setting-up of a Farmers1 
Services company by the Association which would be responsible for advising 
farmers on various technical aspects, as well as providing maintenance 
of machinery. It was envisaged that this scheme would have been launched 
by the end of 1978.61
: On the other hand, the second group consisting of Alhaji Zakaria,
Alhaji Abdul-Rahamani and Imoru, argued for the formation of a trading 
company by the Association for the sole purpose of importing machinery 
and spares to sell directly to members. They claimed that the rival 
proposals were too ambitious and would involve the Association in
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unnecessary expense. According to Zakaria, this group’s chief spokesman,
if that proposal were accepted, the licence would have been utilised by
by a private firm on behalf of the RGA, and would have been particularly
costly since it would have involved middlemen who in the main would be
recruited from amongst the big rice-farmers seeking to make a quick 
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profit. By July 1978 (when Acheampong was removed from office)^ 
however, the RGA had not as yet received the corresponding Letter of 
Credit from the Bank of Ghana.
The differences between the two groups as regards this issue did
not represent any major or developing ideological rift within the
leadership, nor did it affect or influence its relationship with individual
members. It was a purely internal matter based on differences of
approach rather than general policy. The leaders were only too aware of
the need to pull together for their benefit as a group. As Zakaria
conceded, he was sure that a compromise would have been reached before
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final arrangements were made. Zakaria was, of course, the most
influential of the RGA leaders, and was generally regarded among Northerners
(including the big rice-farmers) as Acheampong's chief local ambassador.
It was not a reputation to be placed in jeopardy. This eminently
sensible and powerful personality was always aware of the need for unity
among the leaders, and was therefore never prepared to sacrifice such an
ideal for personal gains. As he explained:
We the members of the Association have to be loyal 
to the government. We must put our heads together 
and work to make the Association successful. As 
for me, I would not pull one way when the Association 
was pulling in another way, because for me that would 
be a sign of weakness. All of we big farmers here 
know what the Association means to us. If I gain 
something, my friends gain too. So I would say 
it is better to forget about small differences.^^
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The importance of the RGA to its leadership is well illustrated by 
the above sentiments. Its leaders were united, and co-operated fully 
in activities relating both to farming and other business in general.
Their cohesiveness as a group was made all the more easy by virtue of 
their membership of, or support for, the ruling chieftaincy gate.
We have seen in this chapter that the support by the Acheampong 
regime for the Andani gate and the reliance by the regime in turn for 
support by that gate, meant that a strong and mutual relationship developed 
between the two sides. The regime gave considerable economic benefits : 
to its local supporters. Those amongst the big rice-farmers who supported 
the ruling gate were therefore well endowed to reap benefits. Furthermore, 
the leadership of the RGA which was Andani-controlled, developed into a 
powerful nucleus of Acheampong support, while by 1977/78 the Association 
itself became a political wing of the SMC. These leaders, who were also 
prominent pro-Unigov activists, received huge personal benefits from 
Acheampong in addition to the various forms of assistance they already 
received through political connections both locally and nationally. 
Supporters of the Andani/Acheampong alliance within or outside the RGA 
benefited from these arrangements through local patron-client networks. 
Non-supporters were of course, generally excluded from the aid-giving 
process. These consisted mainly of Abudulai supporters among the members 
of the Association. There was, however, another very important group of 
farmers who, as a group, were denied assistance: the small-scale rice-
farmers. These were not admitted to the RGA, as we have seen, thus being 
deprived of any further assistance with their farming activities. Such 
policies by the authorities led to very specific responses on the part of 
the small-scale rice-farmers, which we will attempt to examine in the next 
chapter.
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CHAPTER 8
SMALL RICE FARMERS1 ORGANISATIONAL RESPONSES INCLUDING CO-OPS AND THE SMU
The system of distribution of subsidised farming inputs which 
favoured the prominent rice farmers in the North was responsible to a 
large extent for the various types of responses amongst the small 
producers. Several reasons were advanced by local aid administrators 
for the lack of help given to these farmers, most especially with bank 
loans. These farmers were generally considered a liability since they 
could not comply with the banks* loan repayment policies. They were also 
considered to be inefficient rice producers. The small rice farmers of 
course did not accept the validity of such considerations. The point, 
however, was that they were the victims of a social system in which 
personal attributes such as status was heavily emphasised, and as a result 
they were in no position to compete with, or even challenge, their more 
privileged counterparts.
Originally, it was part of the government’s ’official* policy to
give assistance to small holders through established local agencies. Some
help was administered, especially by the ADB daring the period up to
1 9 7 W 5 »  but that was selective and minimal. But with the intensification
of large-scale rice farming from about 197^/75 small rice farmers found it
much more difficult to obtain inputs, and by 1973 the situation had become
intolerable with acute shortages of all types of inputs. By that time,
however, government policies as regards small rice farmers had become
official rhetoric and were inherently designed as Bates has argued, to
benefit only the well-connected farmers and the administrators of the
programme of subsidies. We have seen how the RGA leaders benefitted
✓
from such connections. This situation increased the fears of the s'mall 
farmers and led to specific responses from then. We will first consider 
the rationalisations which influenced such responses.
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Discontent Among the Small Rice Farmers
As we have seen in earlier chapters, the small rice farmers endured
very serious setbacks in their farming operations as a result of the
governments agricultural policies. Of course many of these recognised
how the whole system of subsidised rice production really worked.
According to them, the situation in the North which finally resulted in the
neglect of the small farmer was not an accidental process. Some argued that
from the outset there was a silent conspiracy between the big farmers and
the institutions concerned to stop them (the small farmers) from
participating in commercial rice farming but, they pointed out, this
strategy became more obvious as resources became more scarce. Large-
scale rice farming therefore remained the prerogative of the privileged
farmers - businessmen, public servants, professionals, politicians and
military officers - who in the main did not possess the technical know-how
to utilize the available resources. According to the organiser of a
2
small farmers* co-operative, the NBB, even if the government had any 
intention of helping small farmers, its programme was stalled because of 
the "greed and selfishness" of those big farmers who were encouraged by 
the profitability of rice in the early days.'* The latter were afraid 
of the challenge from those small farmers who were the traditional food 
producers in the North (and by implication better farmers), and as a 
result set out to monopolise the institutions by "dashing big money" to 
officials in order to gain favours. According to my interviewee, such 
farmers had penetrated through all local institutions connected with rice 
farming - the Ministry of Agriculture, Nasia Rice Company, NRDC, DEMCO, 
and of course the banks. At the same time these big farmers were 
enjoying the protection of the law by "befriending the local military 
officers" and those in power in Accra "who made -it possible for them to 
smuggle rice across the borders". There was no way, therefore, the small
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rice farmers could successfully compete with their bigger counterparts. 
Again, according to this farmer, the process of excluding small farmers 
was complete when the commissioners started to get involved in rice 
farming and entrusted the running of their farms to their big-farmer 
associates while on business in Accra,'* Finally, the big farmers "kept 
company” together in the RGA where they shared the accrued benefits.
In the end, what should have been a programme for the development of the 
whole region and the benefit of all its people had in effect become the 
private monopoly of a few men who were not competent farmers, but who 
participated because of their accessibility to inputs, and the 
profitability of rice farming given such subsidised inputs,^
The small farmers* resentment was further reinforced by the 
prevailing view among the big farmers that these should be confined to 
traditional food crop production for which they were better suited, while 
rice production, which was more cost intensive, should be left to the 
large farmers. Such views were confirmed by the expressed attitudes of 
big farmers themselves (See Table 8 «1)*
TABLE 8.1: Big Rice Farmers* Expressed Attitudes towards Small Farmers
in Terms of Selection of Crops 
Small Farmers* Expected Crop Selection No, %
All other food crops except rice 58 82,9
Other foodcrops including rice 9 12,8
Rice only 3
Total 70 100
Source: 1978 Survey of Large Scale Rice Farmers N/R
According to this Table, the vast majority of big rice farmers 
(82.9 per cent) were in favour of small farmers concentrating on
*5traditional food crops of which they were regarded as being most efficient,'
Economic arguments were also advanced. Some of these claimed that the 
grave shortages of farm inputs and the resulting high level of competition 
for such inputs was likely to affect the small farmer much more than 
others, while others maintained that the participation of these small 
farmers in commercial rice production was a "waste of everybody*s time 
and resources".^
The small rice farmers rejected such claims which they regarded as
'excuses* given to justify the unfair advantages which those big rice
farmers enjoyed, Ibrahim Alhassan, a small rice farmer, was not
convinced by such "petty-petty talks", since his experience and those of
his colleagues did not seem to add credibility to such judgments on the
part of the big rice farmers. He argued thus:
When they say we have no experience in rice farming, we would 
like to turn back and ask them how much they themselves have got,
I for one started cultivating rice since I started farming with 
my father at Taha, more than twenty-five years ago, and have had 
my own farm since fifteen years ••• It's the same with all the 
farmers here ••• they all started by cultivating rice small ••• 
and now that there is profit in rice farming they (the big 
farmers) have suddenly realised that we the small farmers do not 
have the necessary experience.^
The argument was taken further by one of the organisers of the Lamashegu
6mall rice farmers* co-operative who rejected totally the claim that small
farmers wasted time and money:
Whose money is being wasted? How many of us small farmers get 
loans from banks or tractors from Agric (Ministry of Agriculture)? 
They (the big farmers) rather are the ones who waste money. In 
the past two years I have been forced to hire tractors from 
private people because the Agric. people said there were none 
available. And I could obtain not even one bag of fertilizer 
at the depot (Ministry of Agriculture Fertilizer Depot, Tamale).
As far as I am concerned, the small farmer is not inefficient.
If they give us the help that we ask, I know for sure that we will 
produce rice on a profitable basis, because we are better farmers.^
i
This small farmer maintained that it was the "deliberate intention" of 
those people (the big farmers and the administrators of subsidised inputs) 
to keep the small farmers* progress in check because of their "fear of 
competition" from the small farmers. His argument was advanced further:
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They do hold us back because that is the only way that they 
• themselves can make their gains. ... M e  are told that rice 
is subsidised so we must sell to the Government Rice Mills.
That's unfair because we buy a bag of fertilizer from private 
sources sometimes for 15 cedis or more, and pay sometimes more 
than 90 cedis per acre to have our land ploughed. They give 
us no encouragement; what we see here axe the big farmers and 
their friends enjoying the benefits of government-sponsored 
farming at the expense of us the small farmers.^
Such sentiments underlined quite clearly the perceptions of the
small farmers as regards government policies which benefitted only the
big farmers with connections, as for example, the prominent members of
the RGA. These perceptions led to specific responses to the RGA, which
we will now briefly consider.
Small Rice Farmers and the RGA
The RGA, as we noted in the last chapter, was formed supposedly to
represent the interests of all fanners in the region, irrespective of
size, but in effect it did not admit small producers. Out of 76 small
rice farmers included in our sample survey, only one was a member of the
Association. He claimed that up to the time of being interviewed he
had not received any form of assistance from it - he joined in March
1977 - but remained hopeful that he would receive help at some time in 
12the future.
The only other small-scale farmer in our survey who had ever been
a member was Issah Musah, a school teacher from Tamale,who had a 20 acre
rice farm. He objected to the Association, however, on the grounds that
it was too preoccupied with political issues while it tended to overlook
the serious problems which confronted the farmers. As he put it:
The Association was so busy playing 'politics' that they seemed
to forget about the needs of most of their members ... mainly
those of us without machines. From the meetings I attended it
was obvious to me that only a few members had a say, and these
were the ones who gained from the Association. You had to be
on their side if you wanted any help ... You had to support
the right chief. And if you were a Southerner you were bound
to come against opposition from some of the Northerners ... The
Association was too divided (i.e. too cliquish) to serve our 
interests.
13
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The majority of small.rice farmers, however, did not even bother to 
join the RGA, Most of these knew about the Association; and, even if 
they could not define clearly its aims and objectives, they were 
perfectly aware that it existed to promote the interests of the most 
prominent among its members. The point, however, was that those big 
farmers* interests did not correspond with their own. As far as the 
small farmers were concerned, there were two distinct groups of farmers 
in the North: the small and neglected fanners, and the big and privileged
ones nwith loans and tractors"• It was this second group that the 
RGA represented. Generally, the opinion expressed by the small rice 
farmers was that they were not "big" enough to qualify for benefits from 
membership of the Association - a view which the Association did nothing 
to dispel, unfortunately. The following assortment of remarks may be 
regarded as fairly representative of such views:
1. "I have no loans from the bank so I am not fit to be a member."
(W. Nemaye, 19.3.78)
2. "I am not a member because I don*t feel up to their standard as 
far as means and resources are concerned.1*
(Alhassan Yahaya, 19*8.78)
3* "I am aware of it (the Association) but I am not rich enough to be 
a member."
(Musa Alhassan, 29*8.78)
bm "Only the rich ones are rewarded, so it*s a waste of my time."
(Seibu Mahama, 15*8.78)
5* !lJ$y position is not high enough, so I will not benefit from their 
help."
(Sulemana Yakubu, 30.5*78)
The leadership did not accept that the views of these farmers were 
a reflection of the RGA*s failure to provide assistance to all members, 
irrespective of size or political belief. According to these leaders, 
it was the farmers who had shown a reluctance to come forward and 
therefore had to accept the responsibility for their misunderstanding of
1 A- •the function of the RGA. The Organiser compared the relationship
between the small rice farmers and the RGA to that of a "beautiful lady"
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whom men were afraid to approach because of the fear of being turned 
down. According to him, the RGA worked in the interests of all rice 
farmers in the region, whether members or not, as demonstrated for 
example by its negotiation over the price of paddy. Again, according to 
the Organiser:
The executive do not ask for one price for its paddy and a different 
price for the members. We negotiate on behalf of all our members.
It is unfair, therefore, to say that the Association gives 
representation only to one group of farmers at the expense of 
others.^
These were views held by one of the leading members of the RGA 
executive and constituted an obvious •defence* of the leaders* position. 
They should not, therefore, be taken at face value. The relative 
priorities attached by the RGA in practice to the raising of the price of 
paddy and in securing subsidised inputs for members must be seen in their 
proper context. The former, after all, would benefit all rice farmers 
who sold their produce to the official Government Rice Mills. On the 
other hand, the latter would tend to favour the big and well-connected 
farmers since they were the ones who acquired these subsidised inputs.
Small Farmers* Co-operatives: An Alternative
The formation of small farmers* co-operatives was not new to the 
North. The Nkrumah government encouraged small farmers to group together 
to utilise the benefits of mechanised agriculture when tractors were first 
introduced to the region. The development of such co-operatives 
declined in the post-Nkrumah period, and by 1972 they were practically 
non-existent among the small farmers there. The failure of the 
Acheampong regime to provide subsidised inputs for these farmers, and the 
rapidly increasing demand for such inputs, led to a renewed interest in 
the co-operative movement, so that by 1977/78 several small rice farmers* 
co-operatives had been formed in the North. The formation of such
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co-operatives was, in a sense a desperate attempt, since the benefits 
of membership were bound to be limited in view of the small farmers* weak 
economic and institutional position vis-ll-vis the big and well-connected 
ones. They had no access to bureaucrats, owned no farm machinery 
between themselves, and did not have the contacts to secure crucial 
inputs. The most important benefit realised from group membership was 
a kind of economy of scale achieved by reciprocal labour services.
During my period of research I came across and noted the activities 
of several small farmers* groups from Yendi, Savelugu, Bimbilla, and 
Tamale. They differed from each other in their level of organisation 
and in their overall membership. In some cases there was no formal 
organisation, as provided for example, by the Lamashegu Farm Group where 
a register of members was kept by the Secretary who requested their 
services whenever required by other members of the group. There were 
no membership fees or meetings, and no elected committee. Members were 
recruited from the environs of Lamashegu by the Secretary. These groups 
also varied in size of membership: one from Yendi consisted of about
twenty members, whereas the Savelugu Community Farmers had a membership 
of about one hundred. Each of these groups had one common objective: 
to pool together their resources (generally labour) so as to reduce the 
difficulties experienced from rice farming locally.
The ‘Never Bad Boys* (NBB) group of Tamale was one of the best 
organised small farmers* co-operatives in the North. It started as a 
bicycle rental group with twelve members in 1962 and without any intentions 
of going into the farming business. But a sharp decline in the rental 
business, combined with the importance which rice farming had gained in 
the early 1970s, led to a change of outlook. By 1978 the group consisted 
of about seventy members, most of whom were full-time farmers; it also 
consisted of a number of taxi-drivers, tractor operators, and employees 
(labourers) of the Ministry of Agriculture in Tamale, who were all
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part-time small rice farmers. During the so-called "rice boom” period
of the early seventies several of these farmers unsuccessfuly approached
the financial institutions for loans. However, they pooled together
whatever resources they had to get their group off the ground. Emphasis
was placed on labour services, with members helping on each other's
farms during the various farming processes - ploughing, weeding, or
harvesting. According to the Chairman, their members wanted to take
advantage of the profitability of rice farming, but their limited resources
prevented them from investing in farm machinery, and so they had to
utilize their greatest asset - labour. They therefore rendered their
17services free of charge. At some stage the group decided upon
cultivating a group farm, but the severe shortage of farm machinery and
other inputs in the region were factors which decided against such a
venture. According to one of the group's leaders, the NBB obtained a
lease on a four-hundred acre field in Jimle (Yendi Hoad) in 1976, but
were unable to obtain tractors from any of the local agencies, including
the Ministry of Agriculture, or private owners to cultivate it. They
would have had no problems, naturally, with labour services, since these
would be given free of charge; they would have also been able to raise
sufficient funds to purchase fertilizers but, as the Chairman said, the
group was "too weak to challenge these very big and powerful farmers for 
18tractors”. The project was temporarily abandoned, though it was
intended to re-evaluate it as soon as another opportunity came up.
Meanwhile, the members continued with their individual farming enterprises,
depending on colleagues for help with labour services.
The NBB was not a pressure group, and was not officially recognised
by the authorities in Tamale, although its Chairman claimed that it was
19known by "nearly all the big men in town". This lack of recognition 
was one of the chief reasons for the various operational problems that its
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members experienced throughout* By 1977 when small farmers were
fighting for survival after a series of setbacks caused by drought and
poor harvests, it was their conviction in the merits of the group and the
hope that the situation might later improve that kept them going,
according to the Chairman* As he pointed out, the conditions under
which they were operating were unfavourable from several points of view.
This was how he expressed their feelings:
We paid between 1*f and 16 cedis for a bag of fertilizer which we 
bought from the big farmers. They bought that same fertilizer 
from Agric. for 6 cedis a bag. Then they force us to sell our 
rice to the Rice Mills at 70 cedis. Now where do the big men 
sell theirs? Not to the Rice Mills ... they smuggle most of it 
to neighbouring countries and they make huge profits. Then, 
take the problem of transport, and tractors. Since we do not 
own them, they charge us too much ... So who is gaining from 
this business? We cannot compete against the big farmers, 
because they already have the advantage over us. Everyone is on 
their side, including the government. We are only struggling 
to survive, especially as we do not have any other means of 
existence.^Q
These views summed up fairly accurately the desperate situation in 
which these farmers found themselves around the mid-1970s. If this 
situation were to improve it would have required a radical reappraisal of 
agricultural policies as regards small farmers. Early in 1978 the 
Special Marketing Unit (SMU) was introduced to the North by the authorities 
as a small farmers* organisation. How did the farmers respond to it, 
and what did it achieve as far as providing a realistic level of 
assistance for these farmers was concerned?
Small Rice Farmers and the SMU
The SMU was set up nationally in 1976 sis a pilot exercise and was 
originally attached to the Ministry of Agriculture. Its main function 
was to assist farmers with the marketing of their produce. Producing 
areas were organised into units, usually consisting of two or three 
villages, by marketing organisers who negotiated with farmers the price
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levels at which their prodiice was to be sold. The Food Distribution
Corporation (FDC), the sole buyer of farmers* produce, was responsible
for its transportation from the villages. As a pilot scheme the SMU
was hardly successful in meeting the small farmers* needs as demonstrated,
for example, by the operation of its Bimbilla branch. Early in 1976
a tractor was allocated to this Unit for the purpose of carting small
farmers* produce from remote areas. The demand for its services was so
21high that local organisers were forced to request another. The
administrators in Accra, however, were not co-operative and suggested
that in their estimation the allocated tractor was adequate for local
needs, and that it was not possible to review the matter until a much 
22later date. Despite such bureaucratic constraints, the SMU continued
to appeal to the rural populace since there was a demand for the type of 
services it provided.
It was this sort of demand for help by small farmers throughout the 
country which later suggested to the regime that it should capitalise 
on the situation and mobilise such farmers into 'Units* for the purpose 
of winning political support. Even if there was already some support 
for the regime among a section of the small farmers (and it was by no 
means certain that the majority of them supported the government up to 
that time), the setting up of the Unit officially as a small farmers* 
organisation, with the promise to help members in various ways, was in 
fact a strategy designed only to win wider support among this group of 
farmers. With this objective in view, the regime decided to take over 
the 'management* of the SMU, and in June 1977 its control was effectively 
transferred from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Office of the SMC 
in Accra where it was headed by Lt. Col. Akompi.^ in compliance with 
this strategy, all Regional Agricultural Economists were ordered to hand 
over the local administration and operational control of the Unit to the
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"most senior and responsible District Organiser" (appointed by the SMC)
24
in their region.
Membership recruitment in the North started in January, a few weeks
before the March 1978 referendum. It was the first time in its history
that the Unit was organised on a membership basis, with members having
to register and carry identity cards. Recruitment centres were set up
25in every agricultural district in the North. According to the
District Organiser in Tamale, the object behind the recruitment and
registration of members was to enable the Unit "to keep a record of the
26number of farmers needing help".
Membership of the Unit was regarded as a promising and exciting
prospect by the majority of local farmers. According to the District
Organiser, within two months of starting its membership campaign, the
Unit had already registered about 70 per cent of the small farmers in
27the Tamale district, and about 60 per cent in the North as a whole.
Even if these statistics are questionable (and there was reason to 
suppose that the District Organiser, a staunch pro-Unigov supporter, 
was himself making capital of the issue) there was no doubt about the 
enthusiasm with which the Unit was received by many small farmers. As 
far as they were concerned, the SMU was a small fanners • version of the 
RGA, and was formed with the specific purpose of providing them with all 
their needs. Help was promised in nearly all areas related to farming; 
the purchase of fertilizers, tractor services, transportation, and most 
crucially, loans.
The SMU*s promise to solve the small farmers* problems was therefore 
the crux of its appeal. For the first time in several years these 
farmers started to believe that the government was actually taking an 
interest in their welfare. As one group of these farmers in Nyankpala 
pointed out, for many years they had been asking the government for help
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with tractors and fertilizers, but it was only after General Acheampong•s
visit to the North that the government seemed to appreciate their
alarmingly precarious situation. According to them, whereas the
authorities had previously entertained only the big farmers, they had now
recognised the contribution which they - the small farmers - were making
in terms of feeding the nation. Consequently, the establishment of
the SMU, or their •Association1, as they preferred to call it, was an
29acknowledgment of their growing importance as a group (of farmers).
District Organisers were equally enthusiastic about the prospects
of the Unit. For example, during meetings with the farmers, notes
were apparently taken about individual and group needs, and regular
reports were submitted to the Unit’s headquarters in Accra. By
February/March 1978 when the SMU was at the height of its popularity in
the North, a tractor was allocated for the whole of the Northern Region,
but according to the District Organiser, their aim was to get at least
30none tractor for each station in the North1*.
Of course the regime had to make a gesture if it wanted to win the 
support of this important sector. Hence the allocation of the tractor 
to the area. It was a totally inadequate response. How did the 
authorities expect just a single tractor to serve the immediate and 
colossal needs of the thousands of small farmers in the region? It 
simply could not. But, as far as the regime was concerned, such a 
gesture had the important (and desired) effect of winning support for it 
among the small farmers. The farmers in turn mistakenly regarded this 
as a mark of the regime*s •commitment• to their cause, and the promise 
of more to come simply reinforced this opinion. Furthermore, there were 
promises that fertilizers and other urgent farm inputs would be made 
available. According to the District Organiser, arrangements had been 
made with the Ministry of Agriculture to supply every small farmer with 
his needs.
The SMU, Small Rice Farmers and Political Support
Local organisers claimed that the Unit was instrumental in winning
support for the government during the referendum. Members were strongly
advised to vote "Yes", though it is conceivable that not all of them did
so. Many joined not because they were supporters of the military regime,
but because they welcomed the prospect of receiving help with their basic 
32farming needs. It was taken for granted that if a farmer was a card-
carrying member of the SMU, then he was automatically a supporter of the
regime and would accordingly qualify for help by the Unit. This was not
necessarily the case in practice. As one member explained: !lIf I did
not join, I would have no chance of getting small help from anyone.
33So I had to pretend I was for f,Yes,f.
The actual extent in the North of the small farmers* support for the 
government during the referendum cannot be accurately judged in the absence 
of a systematic opinion survey and, even if such a survey had been
conducted, it would be difficult to assess its reliability in view of the
. . 3**prevailing conditions under which the campaign was conducted. It is
known, however, that the Unit*s success in recruiting members was highly
uneven from one area to another. Its greatest degree of success in
Dagbon was in traditional Andani areas, such as Tamale or Mion, while in
Abudulai controlled areas the level of recruitment was considered to be
very poor. This pattern suggests that there was a correlation between
membership of the Unit and factional support. The views of the Tamale
District Officer tend to confirm this hypothesis. He observed that
it was easier to recruit members in Andani supported villages because of
the co-operation of the chiefs. As he further explained,
Our chiefs informed all their villagers about the work of the Unit 
and told them all to join ... We didn*t have difficulty in 
registering members in Mion, Gushiegu and many other stations.
I would say that every small farmer in these villages joined the 
Unit. But in some villages like Tolon and some parts of Savelugu, 
and I would say Yendi as well, it was not so easy to convince the
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fanners. Only a few joined. It is because of their chiefs 
who did not co-operate.,-
y?
These, of course, were very strong Abudulai constituencies.
While the SMU succeeded in recruiting a large number of pro-Andani
small farmers who were supporters of Unigov, it also attracted a few
Abudulai supporters. The difference was that: these Abudulai farmers were not
supporters of the regime and therefore did not vote for Unigov. Those
who joined did so to take advantage of membership benefits. As one
Abudulai supporter from Tamale admitted: MI became a member because they
promised us help ... anything that would relieve me of my misery was worth
36taking a chance, but I was not for Unigov"•
As far as Dagbon was concerned, the SMU, therefore, was not very 
effective in itself in gaining support for Unigov. Rather, most of 
those who joined were already likely to vote for Unigov because they were 
supporters of the pro-government local faction.
The vast majority of Abudulai supporters declined to join the SMU 
because they considered that it was manipulated by the authorities in 
order to win support for the government. For example, during discussions 
with a group of such supporters at the ex-Regent*s palace in Savelugu, 
it became clear that these regarded the Unit as a political organisation, 
and that they had therefore resisted all inducements to join. Several 
recruiting officers had come to their villages at one time or another, 
making various promises to the local people, but on each occasion they 
had been "chased away". On one occasion, even the Army and Police were 
called to a meeting in Savelugu where farmers were being recruited.
However, even when political pressure was brought to bear upon Abudulai 
supporters to join - such as the threat by the DCE (Tamale) that if they 
did not join the Unit and vote for Unigov they would be regarded as 
enemies of the State and would suffer the consequences - these farmers 
did not yield to these threats. As one member of the group explained:
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They know our people have received no help from the authorities*
For many years now we have been left to provide for ourselves ••• 
they used to give us fertilizer, but now all the depots in the 
district are empty* They are telling us to join their 
Association (the SMU), because if we don*t join we will not receive
help. But that is a trick, because when the time comes to give
the help they are promising, they will give it to their friends 
instead.
!>(
Of course these small fanners were aware that as Abudulai supporters they
did not expect to be given any favours in a system of patron-clientelism
that was controlled at the local level by Andani networks* Sentiments
similar to the above were expressed by other Abudulai supporters
throughout Dagbon, but more especially in Yendi, Tolon, and Tamale.
The popularity of the SMU among those of its supporters in the North
was very short-lived, with the result that it suffered a sharp drop in
membership. A number of factors contributed to its decline. In the
first place, despite official rhetoric, organisers in Accra placed too
little emphasis on the actual needs of the farmers. Funds that were
officially earmarked to provide facilities for the farmers were diverted
to political purposes, principally to finance the Unigov campaign. As
one senior official reportedly claimed before a committee investigating
the operations of the SMU, 2 million cedis allocated to the Unit for its
operations was used for this campaign, while salaries of senior staff
38doubled over a period of months leading to the referendum.
The disillusionment of members over the failure of the regime to
provide even the minimum of assistance was such that by May, a mere two
months after the referendum, the Unit was forced to stop recruiting new
members. The Tamale District Officer put the problem into perspective:
By that time the farmers had lost so much interest ... that they 
were not coming to meetings any more, and they ceased paying 
their membership dues. We did not have anything left to offer 
them ••••59
Local officials were more or less unanimous in their opinion that the SMU 
could have survived jointly both as a farmers* organisation and as a
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political wing of the SMC, but, they claimed, the government was 
insufficiently committed to do anything about the problems affecting the 
small farmers. As one SMU official from Walewale put it, if the Unit 
were to succeed, the men at the top, including the Director, would have 
to be removed, but unfortunately "the government was not serious, and it
2f0
lacked the courage to deal with corrupt officials at the top level".
By the time that Acheampong was removed from office in July 1978, 
the Unit had ceased to function in any meaningful way. His removal, 
however, did not improve the effectiveness of the SMU as a small farmers* 
organisation, and within weeks of his dismissal there was a call by senior 
officials of the Ministry of Agriculture to restore it back to the 
Ministry. This was effected in August 1978. Of course there was no 
logical reason to suppose that the newly-installed (Akuffo) regime would 
be more sympathetic towards the cause of the small farmers, since that 
regime consisted by and large of the same men as its predecessor. 
Initially, it was merely a change of leadership and a reshuffle of 
commissioners and top bureaucrats. But the farmers* desperation was 
such that they conceived of such a change as indicative of a new approach 
which might *have led to more favourable agricultural policies as far as 
they were concerned. It turned out that the newly-constituted SMC 
was neither motivated by a concern to institute the changes which it had 
earlier visualised, nor characterised by a capacity to do so, with the 
consequence that it was not long before these farmers realised that their 
optimism was unfounded. The absence of a comprehensive farming policy 
had the ultimate effect of alienating the small farmers. Some of these, 
however, did not 'resign* to the situation, but adopted a certain degree 
of retaliatory measures against the system, as the example of a small 
group from Tamale will demonstrate.
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Case Study; The Gumbehene Action Group
A few weeks after the new SMC was installed in power, I interviewed
a group of about twenty small rice farmers (who were members of a larger
1group) in the Gumbehene ward of Tamale. This group did not seem to be 
formally organised, politically or otherwise, although they met quite 
frequently. Their main concern, inevitably, was with problems relating 
to rice farming activities.
Most of these farmers were forced to reduce their acreages (both of 
rice and other crops) during the 1978 season because of the acute shortage 
of farm inputs, more especially tractors, fertilizers and capital. One 
of these estimated that he needed about 600 cedis to weed his farm, which 
included about 30 acres of rice. He had already borrowed 250 cedis from 
one of his brothers, and had approached the ADB for an overdraft since, 
he said, he was aware of the supposed role of that Bank in helping small 
farmers. His application was turned down on the grounds that he applied
too late, but he was advised to try again the following year. That was 
the usual story. This farmer claimed that he had been given the same 
excuse for two years running and that he was no longer surprised at the 
Bank's decision. But what made him "very angry11 was the refusal of the 
authorities to help the poor farmers while at the same time increasing 
their assistance to some of the big farmers. To make matters worse, 
the Akuffo regime had failed to probe the ’’kalabule" farmers, contrary to
what the public had been led to expect. According to him, some big
farmers were rather receiving many new tractors from the government and 
were farming on a bigger scale than ever before, whilst the small farmers
i+2were contracting in size. The Gumbehene Group claimed that they
felt it was their duty to find out what plans the new regime had for 
helping small farmers, since all they had been given so far was "a sackful
of empty promises". Their case was therefore taken to the Regional
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Office by a delegation of three, headed by Alhassan (who assumed the role
43
of group leader), around the end of August 19?8.
44
There they met the Military Assistant (MA) to whom they explained
the object of their visit, and who advised them, wrongly, to take their
problems to their representative organisation, i.e. the RGA. As far
as the Regional Office was concerned, it could not explain details of
policy to individual groups of farmers. The delegation pointed out that
they were members of the SMU,but that this had so far been of no help to
them, except with the supply of some basic essential commodities.
According to these representatives, the MA grew impatient and ordered
soldiers who were nearby to throw them out and have them punished. They
were severely beaten up and had their heads shaven in humiliation by the 
45
soldiers.
Rather than act as a deterrent, such brutality strengthened the 
members1 resolve. They sought ways and means of 'retaliating1, though 
of course there was little that they could do to cause serious concern to 
the authorities. They decided to brief as many small farmers as possible 
within their vicinity about the treatment which their 'leaders' had 
received, and of the inflexibility of the authorities with regard to 
helping small farmers. Within a short time they were able to recruit 
about forty farmers to their group, most of whom were small rice growers. 
They called themselves the Gumbehene Action Group, and did not extend 
their activities to anyone outside Gumbehene, nor to anyone who seemed 
likely to betray them. They needed to be circumspect since any leak of 
their clandestine activities could have landed them into serious further 
difficulties with the authorities.
One of the specific courses of action agreed upon by these farmers 
was the holding back of the sale of paddy to the Government Rice Mills 
during the 1978 harvest and sell to private traders instead. Between
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them, the members of the Gumbehene Group cultivated nearly 600 acres of 
rice, and expected a total yield of between 3*000 and *f,000 bags of paddy 
that year. Their decision against selling to the Rice Mills was based 
on both moral and economic considerations. In the first place, they 
argued, since they had received no help from the government, they felt 
no obligation to sell to its Rice Mills at official prices. They further 
argued that since they had to fend for themselves to obtain tractor 
services and other inputs at exceedingly high market prices rather than 
at subsidised rates, then it was "fair and proper” (if they were to 
realise a small profit) for them to sell their produce at a higher price 
than the guaranteed minimum price offered by the government. As 
one of them explained: ”If they have left us on our own from the start,
then it is up to us to do what we want with our produce”.
The Gumbehene small farmers were not the only such group to express 
dissatisfaction with the performance of the regime. On the whole small 
farmers throughout the North were aware of the problems that faced them 
as small producers. But the difference between these and the Gumbehene 
Group was one of organised response. The latter went beyond a mere 
recognition of the situation: they translated their feelings into a
positive line of action - one of the few courses that was reasonably open 
to them under the circumstances.
Some small producers were known in the past to have withheld the 
sale of their paddy from the Rice Mills as a form of •protest1 against 
the governments lack of assistance to them. I was reliably informed 
that a number of small producers in the Savelugu sub-districts had not 
sold rice to the Government Mills for two successive seasons from 1977- 
These farmers were strong supporters of the Abudulai chieftaincy faction 
who claimed that they had been relentlessly victimised by the regime 
because of their opposition to it. My informant, who was a trader,
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estimated that between 1,000 and 1,500 bags of paddy were involved each
k7year and sold directly to market women or to traders like himself.
Of course such commonplace action by small rice farmers was bound to have 
some disruptive effect on the level of official purchases. Although 
these small farmers could be accused in a sense of acting against the 
interest of the State, such action could hardly be considered immoral 
racketeering in view of the conditions under which they were operating.
The main offenders were the big farmers whose smuggling activities could 
be regarded as •immoral1, in a way that those of the small farmers could 
not, since the former had received subsidised inputs.
The Gumbehene Action Group’s rebellious dissatisfaction with the 
military regime*s agricultural policies found expression in their attitude 
towards the government during the referendum. Their leaders, including 
Alhassan, ’campaigned1 against Unigov in the Gumbehene neighbourhood - 
"N0M stickers were still evident on the outside walls of their houses 
several months later - and they believed that the majority of Gumbehene 
farmers on the whole had followed their lead. All members of the group
voted against Unigov, according to their testimony. They had by then 
become so bitterly disillusioned with the government that they were left 
with no other choice than to oppose it. As one of them claimed, to 
have voted "Yes" would be to condone an evil system which could have only 
aggravated sin already hopeless situation, as well as "the growing misery 
of the poor farmers".
As already noted, the Gumbehene Group of small farmers was 
exceptional in its level of concerted action. The attitude of the group
was no doubt influenced by the presence among them of three militant 
•leaders*. Two of these, Alhassan and Sulemana, were former employees 
of the Ministry of Agriculture at the Fertilizer Depot,and both had been 
active (but unofficial) organisers of workers there; they were both
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mainly held responsible by the authorities for a demonstration in 1976 
by the Depot workers in protest over pay conditions. Both activists 
subsequently resigned from their jobs with the Ministry and took up 
full-time rice farming on a small-scale basis. The other •leader* of 
the group, Ibrahim, was formerly employed by the Regional Administration 
as a carpenter, but he too left to take up farming full-time because, he 
claimed, he hoped that it would prove more lucrative. The other members 
of the group were neither as militant nor as articulate as the •leaders*, 
but were quite outspoken on various issues affecting their farming, and 
as a group they were committed, in their own words, "to organise all the 
farmers in Gumbehene so that we can speak as a force and make them (the
ifQ
government) listen to us".
In this chapter we attempted an examination of the various levels of 
responses by small farmers to prevailing government policies as regards 
subsidised farm inputs. Organisations such ais the RGA and the SMU were 
set up supposedly to assist these farmers, but in practice functioned 
either to win political support for the regime locally or to provide 
benefits for its supporters among the large emd prominent rice farmers.
The unwillingness of the regime to introduce a comprehensive farming 
policy in the North led to these farmers forming self-help projects or 
co-operatives. The overeill shortage of resources amd their non-availability 
to small farmers meant that these projects* achievements were considerably 
limited and led, in the cause of the more militant groups, to ein adoption 
of ’retaliatory* measures, such as members* refusal to sell paddy to the 
Government Rice Mills.
How did such experiences influence these farmers* behaviour during 
the 1979 elections? Did they support parties on the bausis of their 
declared policies? What were those policies? These and other 
considerations form the subject of the next chapter.
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4*1. . This was more or less an informal interview with a group of farmers, 
two of whom had been formally interviewed earlier during fieldwork.
It was during the course of one of these early interviews that I 
was informed about the activities of this group. The discussion 
took place on 14 September 1978, at the pleasant Gumbehene Pito Bar 
in Tamale, where this group met regularly.
42. These views were expressed by Sule Nantiare, a member of the Group. 
The acquisition of about a dozen new tractors by Alhaji Sumani 
Zakaria earlier in the year was the subject of popular gossip among 
people who regarded it as a personal reward from Acheampong for his 
loyal support of the regime during the Unigov campaign. It 
naturally brought resentment from the small farmers who expected 
some at least to be retrieved and made available to them.
43. Interview with members of Gumbehene Action Group, 14 September 1978.
44. Major Nantogma, the MA, acted as Secretary to the Regional 
Commissioner. His account of the incident corresponded roughly 
to that of the members of the delegation, but it varied in 
interpretation.
45. Interview with Alhassan, Gumbehene, 14 September 1978.
46. Informal interview with Gumbehene Action Group, 14 September 1978.
47. My informant was a very strong supporter of the Abudulai gate, 
and a trader in Savelugu.
48. Sulemana, op. cit.
49. Ibid.
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CHAPTER 9
RICE FARMERS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR AFTER ACHEAMPONG
In this chapter we will examine the political behaviour of Dagomba 
rice farmers as far as the 1979 elections were concerned. The 
elections were of special significance to these rice farmers who were 
basically polarised into two 'interest* groups or factions. Through 
these elections the farmers would be given an opportunity to support 
the party which best represented their specific group interests, and 
through which they hoped to obtain economic assistance via patron-client 
networks based on local chieftaincy ties. As we shall see, gate 
loyalties rather than occupational class considerations, determined 
political behaviour among Dagomba rice farmers. But before we
examine such behaviour in detail, we will consider first what the fall 
of Acheampong meant to the rice farmers, especially those prominent 
rice farmers who owed their position of influence to his personal 
sponsorship and whose existence as a 'class' was initially threatened 
in the immediate aftermath of his removal.
Acheampong was removed as Head of State because of the deteriorating 
economic and political situation in the country under his rule, and the 
fears of his fellow officers that his system of personal rule would 
exclude them from important decision-making processes and the loss of 
influence within the government. Thus after six years, he was finally 
removed from the political scene in July 1978 and replaced by colleagues 
who claimed to be better equipped to lead the country.
The immediate effect of the removal of Acheampong upon the 
prominent rice farmers was that it made their position extremely 
vulnerable, especially as his successor, General Akuffo, gave the 
impression (falsely) of being determined to redress the evils of the
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society and punish all those who had contributed to the general malaise 
of the country through hoarding, profiteering, and general corruption.
The leading RGA farmers certainly came under this category, and were 
well-known for their activities in smuggling and hoarding, not to 
mention other crimes against the state, such as the receipt of large 
unrepaid bank loans.
Reaction of Abudulai Rice Farmers to the Removal of Acheampong
Those who stood to gain most from Acheampong,s dismissal were the
Abudulai supporters - the regime’s traditional opponents in Dagbon.
As far as the Abudulai contingent was concerned (and this consisted of
both farmers and non-farmers), the fall of Acheampong’s regime raised
clear possibilities of restoring their candidate back to the Yendi 
1
paramountcy. Indeed this faction had especially good reason to be
optimistic since one of its own princes, General Joshua Hamidu, had been
elevated from a relatively obscure post in the diplomatic service to
2
Chief of Defence Staff in the reconstituted SMC.
The Abudulai supporters among the rice farmers, for their part, 
believed that the fall of Acheampong would lead to the re-organisation 
of the RGA and would thereby introduce a more equitable system of 
resource allocation among the farmers. Their real hope was to displace 
the Andani farmers from the RGA leadership. - It was the contention of 
these farmers, and an accurate one too, that the main reason why the 
leaders of the Association were so successful with their farming was 
precisely because they used their position of influence to allocate 
among themselves resources that were intended for all members: bank
loans, mechanised farm services, fertilizers, etc. As an interviewee 
put it:
They (the prominent farmers) had the bank managers on their 
side, and they took all the big commissioners in Accra as
305
friends. In Tamale here, they are free (i.e. can relate very 
well) with the big men at Agric., Nasia Rice, DEMCO, NRDC ... 
everywhere. They received all their needs ... that's why 
they are so rich from farming: not because they are better
farmers, but because they received more help than others ...
So that is why I would say there must be a change in the 
Association to make things more equal.^
These farmers were therefore waiting for an opportune moment to 
call for the re-organisation of the RGA and for a change in the executive 
- as they had unsuccessfully attempted before. However, they were 
also cautious in their assessment of the new government. They did not 
expect immediate and wholesale changes, but they expected a change of 
direction and emphasis as fair as the conduct of RGA business was 
concerned. According to them, the pro-Unigov (Andani) farmers had 
dominated the Association and abused their position for too long, now 
they should be made to toe the line.
Reaction from Prominent Andani Rice Farmers
But what did the downfall of Acheampong really mean to the big 
Andani, pro-Acheampong, rice farmers? The answer lay in an under­
standing of the relationship between these farmers and senior government 
officials with whom they were closely associated. In an effort 
seemingly designed to break its continuity with Acheampong, the new 
regime decided on a policy of 'retiring1 or posting to less important 
offices those officers who were closely identified with that regime's 
policies.
The dismissals which most shattered the confidence of the big 
farmers were those of their closest allies with important business and 
farming interests throughout the North. The first of these, Major- 
General R.E.A. Kotei, former Chief of Defence Staff, was a property and 
transport owner. He was also a very big rice farmer with at least two 
farms in the North, and a large supply of farm machinery and equipment.
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While Kotei was on duty in Accra, one of his farms was managed by a 
senior military officer serving in Tamalefand the other by the Director 
of the Cotton Development Board, Kotei, who was instrumental in 
getting import licences for at least two of his rice-farming colleagues 
in the North, was replaced as Chief of Defence Staff by Major-General 
Joshua Hamidu, a long-time critic of the Acheampong style of 
administration and, as we have seen, a prominent member of the Abudulai 
gate.
If the resignation of Major-General Kotei had a shattering effect 
on the morale and confidence of the big farmers, their dismay was 
further intensified by the sacking of another of their chief allies, 
Major-General E.K, Utuka, former Border Guard Commander, It could 
not be confirmed whether Utuka had any rice farms in the North - though, 
if he did not, he would have been one of the very few top military 
officers not to have done so - but in any case his close ties with the 
top men of the EGA, who often boasted unashamedly of going to Accra 
to "discuss business" with him, suggests that his removal from office 
was a major blow to such farmers* already precarious position, Utuka
was known to have assisted some of these farmers in getting their
5
consignment of smuggled rice across border check-points, A Border 
Guard officer from Tamale, who was posted to the Ghana/frpper Volta 
check-point at Paga, confirmed that senior officers often violated the 
law by using their authority to let their friends across the border with 
smuggled goods. In such matters the guards could hardly challenge the 
authority of a top-ranking officer from Accra or Tamale; they were 
merely 'small boys* carrying out orders.^ Utuka himself was later 
accused and found guilty by an AFRC tribunal of using his position as 
Border Guard Commander to smuggle several tons of timber from Ghana, 
an act which, along with other alleged corrupt practices, led to his
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execution by firing squad during the early reign of that regime.
Among those commissioners to be 'retired1, the one who was perhaps
closest to the big farmers was Colonel Roger Felli, former Commissioner
for Foreign Affairs, who was regarded as a local 'hero' because of his
contribution to the development of the North, especially the Upper
Region. Like many of his colleagues, Felli had several farms situated
both in the Northern and Upper Regions, with a large fleet of tractors
and several combine harvesters. There cam be no question whatsoever
about the extent to which Felli helped his local friends. As a
Northerner he wanted to see the region develop, and regarded his
assistance to these rice farmers as a personal contribution towards this
end. By personal intervention he was able to arrange several loans
for Alhaji Zakaria in Accra, and was personally responsible for taking
7
m  from Germany in 1977 two Mercedes Benz cars for this farmer.
Felli also assisted Alhaji Ibrahim Mahama "in several very important
g
ways" with his business enterprises. Several of the RGA leaders had 
regular audiences with him, and he was always willing to meet these 
farmers. With the possible exception of Acheampong, Felli was no 
doubt the most popular of the Commissioners among the big rice farmers.
The fears of these prominent rice farmers were further heightened 
by the new regime's proposals for rejecting Acheampong*s concept of 
Union Government and replacing it instead with its proposed National 
Government formula. The main difference between the Union Government 
of Acheampong and the Transitional (Interim) National Government of 
Akuffo was this: whereas the first type would embrace all strata of
society including, of course, the Armed Forces and Police, the second 
would exclude the latter institutions altogether. Furthermore, while 
the Acheampong model was to be a permanent one, the Akuffo version was 
to be an "interim" solution recommended for a period of "not less than
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four years" duration, after which the people would decide on a
9
permanent constitution. This compromise, if indeed it was a
compromise, had, according to the Daily Graphic, reconciled several
factions of Ghanaian society - the political aspirants, the proponents
of no party politics, and the vast majority of people "who became
totally confused when the cross-talk on what form of government Ghana
10should choose was going on at full steam".
There is no room in this thesis to go into the implications of 
the debate on these proposed concepts of government - that belongs 
entirely to a different area of study - but it might be mentioned in 
passing that there was less consensus among Ghanaians on the ‘National 
Government* proposed by Akuffo than there was on Acheampong*s Unigov.
The National Government proposal met with opposition from various groups 
in the country, although the intellectuals - academics, students, 
teachers, and other professionals, notably the lawyers - were in the 
vanguard of opposition. At its 1978 Annual Conference held in Kumasi,
the Ghana Bar Association declared its total rejection of the National 
Government concept on the grounds that, first, the military regime was 
given no mandate by the country to determine its form of government and 
secondly, that it was the fundamental right of the people themselves 
to decide what form of constitution they would choose. The 
Association came out in favour of a multi-party system of government, 
such as the one operating under the 19&9 Constitution (until it was 
suspended by the 1972 coup) with its "inbuilt corrective mechanism"
11by which the people could return or remove a particular government.
As far as the pro-Acheampong rice farmers were concerned, the 
National Government formula did not provide any safety mechanisms for 
protecting their particular interests. Under Unigov they were at least 
offered "protection" through their alliance with the regime in general,
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and by personal contacts with Acheampong and other military leaders in 
12particular. It was not a military regime as such that they supported, 
but rather one that patronised them. They felt that their personal 
aspirations would have been fulfilled under Unigov precisely because it 
would have been headed by Acheampong. According to one of the RGA 
leaders, the removal of General Acheampong and the abrogation of the 
Unigov proposed was bound to have a disastrous effect on the big rice 
feurmers or rather, those among the big rice farmers who supported 
Acheampong. Acheampong promoted their welfare, and weis regarded els one 
of their championsv not least because he owned rice farms in the North.
He encouraged all the Commissioners to participate in the agrarian 
progretmme which resulted in most of them owning rice farms in the North. 
According to this RGA leader, the interest taken in rice farmers (or 
more precisely the prominent rice farmers), represented an important 
contribution to the general development of the North, and the . 
continuation of Acheampong in office would have further improved that 
situation.^
The apparent intensification of the government's efforts to clamp 
down on corruption, hoarding and profiteering, together with the 
circulating rumours, whether factual or speculative, that certain people 
associated with the former regime would be probed, did not, to say the 
leeist, help the self-confidence of the big farmers. One of the prime 
subjects of this type of rumour-mongering in Tamale was Alhaji Sumani 
Zakaria. It was often heard that he was weuited for questioning in 
connection with loans received from Acheampong for the construction of 
his large terraced building in Tamale, as well as for other purposes.
The legitimacy of the inordinately large quantity of tractors emd farm 
machinery that he owned, together with a large fleet of taxis and
:L?r:r:*:es property in general, was being questioned by opponents
310
the old regime, and in particular by people who had witnessed the
unusually rapid accumulation of wealth (and power) by this farmer over
a comparatively short time. In other words, the legitimacy of the
wealth and property of one of the most successful rice farmers in the
14North had been put to question. His critics could not come to believe
that his vast riches were accumulated as a result of his successful rice
farming enterprise, or his other business activities. It was too
fantastic a story to be believed. During the period of the intensification
15of the emergency operations Alhaji Zakaria was safely away in Upper Volta,
and was to return to Tamale only when the operations had ceased, and
his personal safety was assured.
The fears of these farmers about their position as a privileged
rural elite did not in fact materialise. The Akuffo regime which
assumed power on the basis of its fundamental differences with its
predecessor, and gave the early impression of carrying out reforms that
would justify its removal of the blatantly corrupt Acheampong, failed to
achieve this objective. Akuffo soon revealed a "typical” weakness in
dealing with the country’s increasing economic and political problems,
and proved to be no better than its predecessor in dealing with
corruption, whether among government officials or the public in general.
Neither the State of Emergency nor any other measures employed by
the new regime had the desired effect of effectively checking or
eradicating the general level of corruption and profiteering in the
country. The performance of the SMC-Akuffo government was increasingly
being evaluated by civilians (and by a number of junior military officers
as it later transpired) in terms of its "protectionist" attitude and
interest. Rather than giving priority to policies effectively aimed
/
at solving the economic and political problems that had been so damaging 
to the country, it was seen an protecting the interests of the officer
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corps which had been 'pillaging' that same country for several years,
16and of which, the regime was a part. As the tempo of the operations
slowed down, and the country began to pick itself up in terms of its 
accustomed way of life, 'kalabule* continued to flourish unabated.
Akuffo had proved to be a perfect cover-up for Acheampong.
As far as the privileged rice farmers were concerned, the Akuffo 
regime failed to dislodge their powerful position. In the first place 
it did not alter the balance of power between the two chieftaincy gates 
in Dagbon, and these farmers' relationship with local political 
structures did not alter. The overall influence of the Andani faction 
remained intact, despite early fears that this regime might prove 
sympathetic to the rival Abudulai gate. More crucial however, was the 
failure of the regime to alter the power structure of the EGA. Even 
the more optimistic of its leaders had entertained fears of an 
administrative shake-up within the Association. It was not long 
before any such fears were dispelled, and the same farmers' dominance 
of the EGA was marked by their resumption of activities on the same 
scale as before. Their relationship with banks and local agencies had 
not changed, but above all they continued their top-level meetings with 
government officials.
The lifting of the ban on political parties in January 1979 gave 
the big farmers the opportunity to group themselves into parties or to 
form alliances with other groups that were likely to represent their 
interests. A period which these farmers feared might have destroyed 
their privileged position in Dagbon was therefore safely negotiated, 
and they were preparing themselves to participate in the party political 
process. No one had believed it possible, least of all the farmers 
themselves, when six months earlier their world had seemingly turned 
upside down. As one leading farmer explained:
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fl ... Many people turned against us when General Acheampong fell 
from power. Several of us, as you would know, had to run away 
for our lives because we were very concerned about the policies 
of the new generals. But when you look back to the past few 
months, we have not come out as bad as we had originally feared 
... Although they impounded some of our rice and other crops 
during the State of Emergency, it was not so bad because they did 
not maltreat us. They have now given us the chance to form 
parties, and as far as I cam see we the farmers will have to be 
very careful with whom we join. Most people are talking about 
a party based on the north •
Thus the elections gave the opportunity to supporters of both 
Dagomba factions among the farmers to seek party affiliations that would 
best serve their particular interests. As we noted earlier in this 
Chapter, Dagomba rice farmers did not behave politically as a specific 
occupational group, but rather as members of rival 'traditional* 
political factions. Rice farming interests did not count for much as 
a distinctive interest.
Background to the Formation of Political Parties
It must be emphasised at this point that this is not a study of the 
general elections in the North, since such a task is clearly outside the 
scope of this dissertation. It is rather an account demonstrating the 
importance to political behaviour of a specific group identified on the 
basis of their connections with local chieftaincy.
The ban on political parties, which had been enforced since the 
military take-over by Acheampong in 1972, was lifted seven years later 
on 1st January 1979* Elections were scheduled to take place in June 
that year. The suppression of political activity during that period 
of the ban, except of course, of organisations sanctioned by the 
military, led to increasing frustration on the part of the more 
politically aware Ghanaians who had been witnessing a rapid decline of 
the economy and of social values under the magistrature of the military. 
Such frustration was manifest in the extra-ordinary number of political 
parties, pseudo-parties, and groups which started to spring up as soon as
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the ban was lifted.
By the middle of January no less than sixteen political parties had
been formed, though none had as yet been officially registered. Most
of these were limited in scope and vision, none so obviously as the
Vanguard Party of Dr. John Ackay Blay-Miezah, whose personal objective
was (apparently) to achieve political and diplomatic influence to help
him repatriate an alleged personal fortune lodged in the United States,
and which he claimed would be used for the economic development of Ghana.
Most of these parties, however, failed to meet the general requirements
laid down by the government and failed as a result to be officially 
18registered. Only six parties finally complied with the conditions
laid down by the Electoral Commissioner and were therefore eligible to 
contest the elections. These were:- the Popular Front Party (PFP), 
People’s National Party (PNP), Action Congress Party (ACP), United 
National Convention (UNC), Social Democratic Front (SDF), and Third 
Force Party (TFP).
Rice Farmers and Party Political Formations
According to its founders, the SDF was not influenced by any partisan
considerations, but with a view to offering the people of the North an
19alternative to either the PNP or the PFP. At a meeting of the
Northern Youth Association (NYA) in January 1978, a recommendation that 
the North should form an alternative party to the two major ones, the PNP 
and the PFP, was acceptedj and, as a result, a new party, the SDF, 
dedicated to "sincerity, honesty and pragmatic policy" was created with 
the motto "Unity for power" to give leadership to the Northerners.
Alhaji Abubakar Alhassan, a lecturer from the University of Science and 
Technology at Kuraasi, was elected General Secretary of the party while 
Alhaji Ibrahim Mahama was made leader and Presidential nominee.
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Alhassan was also selected as the party's parliamentary candidate for the 
Tamale constituency which he won. Colonel Felli was elected a member 
of the interim executive of the party. The SDF was financed mainly 
by prominent Andani supporters who were among the biggest and most 
successful rice farmers in the North. The party also benefitted from 
its alliance with the TUC. This alliance was made possible as a result 
of the relationship between the TUC General Secretary, Alhaji Issifu, 
and the SDF leader, Ibrahim Mahama, who were both blood members of the 
Andani royal family. Furthermore, Issifu was known to be a close 
business associate of Mahama and was instrumental in helping the SDF 
leader set up his travel business in Accra.
Among the leading rice farmers who joined the SDF were Alhaji Suraani 
Zakaria, Alhaji Yahaya (the Kukuo Na who was also a transport owner and 
businessman), E.D. Mahama (businessman), Alhaji Abdul-Rahamani (transport 
owner and businessman), Alhaji Yakubu (RGA Chairman), O.S. Mahamadu 
(who was elected M.P. for Mion-Nanton), Ziblim Andan (Director of the 
Cotton Development Board), Alidu (RGA Organiser) and Alhaji Kpabia 
(businessman). These farmers constituted the founding members, but 
the party drew support from the entire leadership of the RGA as well as 
all other big rice farmers connected to the Andani gate.
The overwhelming support which the party received from the most 
influential rice farmers did not necessarily, however, make it a party 
generally representative of farmers' interests. The RGA leaders, 
together with other big and well-connected farmers, joined because the 
SDF was first and foremost a 'family* party, one set up by prominent 
members of the Andani chieftaincy gate. A successful SDF party would 
enhance Andani prestige locally through which members of this gate would 
benefit by consolidating already existing patron client networks. On 
the national level the party would give reliable representation to this
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faction and would, as a consequence, reinforce the Andani position 
locally.
The SDF had the support also of small rice farmers who were
traditional supporters df the Andani gate. Despite these farmers*
failure to obtain adequate farming inputs under the prevailing system
of allocation, they were still not prepared to abandon tradition and
support a party on the basis of its ability to help small farmers. As
far as these were concerned, gate loyalties meant much more to them than
20policies that were "glossed in party propaganda outfit". Dagomba
farmers (like all supporters of local chieftaincy) were far more
concerned with preserving the 1prestige* which they associated with
their respective gates than with * issues* of national significance. As
expressed by a member of a small group of Andani supporters:
We the small farmers in this group here voted for Alhaji Ibrahim 
Mahama (SDF) because he is from the same family (i.e. from the 
same chieftaincy gate). As far as we are concerned, he came to 
represent our side. Politicians in Accra do not care about the 
way and manner we respect our chiefs. Our life here in Dagbon 
is all about Andani and Abudulai. Not about the economy, cost 
of living, or all the big talk with which they try to confuse us. 
They have been talking about these things (issues) since the 
days of Nkrumah, and look at usI ... We axe for Andani, and 
when Andani is in power in Dagbon we are proud, just like our 
ancestors before us. So that was why we voted SDF.^
This account by Ibrahim Iddi summed up fairly accurately Dagomba
attitudes towards national parties and issues. National issues were of
secondary importance to these people.
The PFP, unlike the SDF, its main rival in Dagbon, was not formed
with the specific purpose of representing factional interests there.
It was a national party in the true sense, having been supported
throughout Ghana, though of course it was stronger in some regions (for
example, the Ashanti Region where its main leadership originated) than
in others. Indeed Jeffries has argued that the PFP was considered
to be fairly well-placed to win the 1979 elections but for the (untimely)
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intervention of Jerry Rawlings' AFRC which, he claimed, ’’dented” this
party's image by the regime's condemnation of the country's reliance
on western assistance - a policy to which the PFP leadership was
22clearly committed.
The PFP's national outlook was also enhanced as a result of its 
links with the former PP. It was the PFP's historical links with the 
PP, a party which had previously given strong support to the Abudulai 
cause, that led to its adoption by this faction as the "natural1* 
representative of its particular "interests”. The "alliance" between 
the Abudulais and the PFP was further reinforced by the appointment of 
Tolon Na Yakubu Tali as the General Secretary of the party and its 
presidential running mate. The Tolon Na, we have already seen, was 
one of the most prominent (Abudulai) chiefs in Dagbon. Thus the 
position of this dignitary on the PFP hierarchy was of mutual interest 
to both sides. From the Abudulai's point of view it strengthened 
their identity with the PFP, while on the other hand it provided this 
party with a strong base in Dagbon.
It must not be assumed that the majority of rice farmers in the 
North as a whole voted for one or the other of the two aforementioned 
parties on the basis of their representing factional interests there.
Our analysis is concerned specifically with the political behaviour of 
Dagomba farmers. As far as the Northern Region itself was concerned, 
it was the PNP, and not the SDF or PFP, which made the greatest impact.
The PNP had some initial support among the Dagomba rice farmers and 
Dagombas generally, but this was very limited; as we shall see, however, 
its greatest impact upon Dagombas came during the second round 
presidential elections when the majority of SDF supporters switched to 
the PNP candidate in an effort to keep the PFP candidate out.
The PNP's popularity in the North generally was based upon two principal
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figures: Irooru Egala and Hilla Limann. Egala was a politician of
considerable experience and achievement, having served as a minister in 
the first all-African Cabinet of the Gold Coast, followed by important 
offices in the Nkrumah cabinet as Minister of Health (1959)» and 
Minister of Industries (1962), He was a very influential personality, 
both at the local and national level. Egala was not a Dagomba, and 
therefore did not have any important connections with Dagomba chieftaincy 
factions which, inevitably, would have restricted his political 
manoeuvrability at least in one politically significant area in the 
North. At the national level he had created important and effective 
political networks which were fully exploited to the benefit of the 
party. Egala held the position of PNP party chairman, and was the 
party's presidential candidate until he was banned from holding public 
office under the Elections and Public Offices Disqualification 
(Disqualified Persons) Decree of 1976.^
Egala was replaced as presidential candidate by another Northerner, 
Hilla Limann. Limann had not played any significant role in the CPP 
regime and was therefore presented as a 'new* face to party politics. 
While the image which he presented in the South was one of dissociation 
from the 'old guard*, as far as Northerners were concerned - Limann was 
actually from the Upper Region - he was a leader with whom they could 
be identified.
Party Support among Dagomba Rice Farmers
The analysis which follows is based upon the results of a survey 
conducted by the author as to the distribution of support for the various 
parties among farmers in four Dagomba constituencies in the Northern 
Region with which this dissertation is specifically concerned. The 
limited size of the sample which consisted of 128 large-scale and
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16Q small-scale rice farmers spread over the four constituencies 
(Tamale, Yendi, Tolon, and Savelugu) was influenced by the fact that we 
are particularly concerned with one section of the population - the 
rice farmers - and not the entire electorate. Before going further, 
we must clarify one or two points. In the first place, the survey 
consisted of •unknown* farmers, i.e. farmers whose voting intentions 
or party affiliations were not previously known to the author, A small 
number of these farmers (1*f in all) had been interviewed on my previous 
field trip (1978), but their voting attitudes could not have been known, 
since political parties were not yet formed, and party political 
activity was then banned. The majority of the sample, however, were 
•new* interviewees. It must not be forgotten, however, that the 
subject here is factional politics, and the two contending parties, 
as far as this issue is concerned, were the PFP and the SDF, The 
constituencies covered, therefore, provide adequate representation of 
the interplay between factions and paxties that represent those factions. 
Nothing beyond that was attempted.
As far as the results of the first round parliamentary elections 
were concerned, they confirmed an important observation about voting 
behaviour in Dagbon: that local issues rather than national issues
influence such behaviour. A brief examination of Table 9*1 will 
illustrate this point. The two parties representing chieftaincy 
•interests* in Dagbon, the SDF and the PFP, won all the Dagomba seats 
between them, sharing 82 .2 per cent of all the votes cast in the 
Dagomba constituencies. The PNP, on the other hand, won only 7*5 
per cent of the Dagomba vote.
As far as the rest of the Northern Region was concerned, the PNP 
won in seven constituencies, including the three Gonja constituencies, 
while the PFP won in Chereponi-Saboba. The SDF on the other hand was
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TABLE 9.1s 1979 Parliamentary General Election Results
Northern Region
Constituency Party Votes Winner Total Votes 
Cast
Tamale (D) TEP 387
SDF ’ 11,893 SDF 23,399
ACP 51*+
UNC 1,285
PNP 1,967
PFP 7,393
Tolon (D) TF? 171
*
\
SDF 4,475
ACP 123
UNC 132
PNP 2 b6
PFP 5,801 PFP 10,948
Walewale TFP 127
SDF 389
ACP 209
UNC 223
PNP 6,405 PNP 8,832
PFP 1,^79
Nalerigu TFP 251
SDF 357
ACP 80
UNC 724
PNP 4,948 PNP 7,785
PFP 1,425
Bunkpurugu TFP 167
SDF 362
ACP 431
UNC 249
PNP 2,847 PNP 5,790
PFP 1,734
Nanumba TFP 210
SDF 2,912
ACP 286
UNC 843
PNP 4,063 PNP 10,695
PFP 2,381
Gushiegu (D) TFP 398
SDF 2,343
ACP N/C
UNC 239
PNP 1,348
PFP 2,757 PFP 7,085
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Constituency Party Votes Winner Total Votes 
Cast
Savelugu (D) TFP 269
SDF 4,1 46 SDF 7,832
ACP • N/C
UNC 264 .
PNP 384
PFP * 2,769
Mion-Nanton (D) TFP 449
SDF 4,761 SDF 7,845
ACP N/C
UNC 288
PNP 353
PFP 1,99^
Chereponi-Saboba TFP N/C
SDF 1,160
ACP 154
UNC 825
'PNP 2,387
PIP 2,627 PFP 7,153
Yendi (D) TFP 366
SDF 3,787
ACP 271 *
UNC 570
PNP 856
PFP 6,103 PFP 11,953
Gonja West TFP 233
SDF 556
ACP 429
UNC 2,366
PNP 4,840 PNP 11,802
PFP 3,178
Gonja Central TFP 582
SDF 1,629
ACP N/C
UNC 2,026
PNP 4,856 PNP 12,224
PFP 3,131
Gonja East TFP 269
SDF 254
• ACP 1,071
UNC 1,315
PNP 4,140 PNP 9,420
PFP 2,371
Notes: (i) N/C = Not Contested
(ii) (D) = Dagomba
Source: Adapted from Legon Observer, Vol* XI, No* 11, 27 July 1979*
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comprehensively beaten in every non-Dagomba constituency. In some cases 
it came last or virtually last of all the contending parties. For 
example, it was defeated in Gonja East by every party, and polled only 
2.7 per cent of the total votes cast. These results suggest that the 
SDF did not have a sound base ip the Northern Region as a whole, but was 
strong instead only in areas where Yendi 'skin' politics was predominant: 
it won only in traditionally strong Andani areas. The PFP's success in 
three predominantly strong Abudulai constituencies while losing in 
Andani dominated ones, suggests also that this party was supported in 
Dagbon by people who looked upon it to protect their particular gate 
interests. The PFP's victory in Chereponi-Saboba (a non-Dagomba area) 
together with its overall good performance in other (i.e. non-Dagomba) 
parts of the region where it came second to the PNP, suggests further 
that its appeal in the North went beyond gate considerations.
How did the rice farmers* support for the individual parties compare 
with that of the electorate as a whole? According to Table 9,2 (a-d), 
during the first round parliamentary elections party preferences of 
large and small rice farmers were distributed very similarly to those 
of the electorate as a whole. In other words, the *interests' of Dagomba 
farmers corresponded with those of other groups within the community.
In Tamale, for example, the PFP was supported by 31*6 per cent of the 
electorate, while our sample showed that it won the support of 35*3 per 
cent of the big rice farmers and 32.5 per cent of the small ones. 
Similarly, the SDF won 50.7 per cent of the votes cast in Tamale, 
compared with A4.1 per cent of the big farmers and A-5 per cent of the 
small rice farmers in our sample. The PNP on the other hand, won only 
8.A- per cent of the votes cast in this constituency, while, according to 
our survey, it gained the support of 11.8 per cent of the big rice 
farmers and 12.5 per cent of the small rice farmers.
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TABLE 9*2: Comparison of Rice Farmers* and Electorate Party Preferences
during the 1979 Parliamentary Elections
(a) Tamale
Party Electorate % Big Rice Farmers % Small Rice Farmers %
SDF 11,853 50.7 15 44.1 18 45.0
PFP 7,393 31.6 12 35.3 13 32.5
ACP 514 2 .2 - 2 5.0
UNC 1,285 5.5 3 8 .8 2 5.0
TIP 387 1.6 - - - -
PNP 1,967 8.4 4 11.8 5 12.5
Total 23,399 100.0 34 100.0 40 100.0
(b) Yendi
Party Electorate % Big Rice Farmers % Small Rice Farmers %
SDF 3,787 31.7 13 43.3 12 30 .0
PFP 6,105 51 .0 16 53.3 23 57.5
ACP 271 2.3 - - - -
UNC 570 4.8 1 3.3 2 5.0
TFP 366 3.0 - - - -
PNP 856 7.2 - - 3 7.5
Total 11,953 100.0 30 100.0 40 100.0
(c) Tolon
Party Electorate % Big Rice Farmers % Small Rice Farmers %
SDF 4,4 75 40.9 7 29.2 11 3 6.7
. PFP 5,801 53-0 t 15 62.5 15 50 .0
ACP 123 1.1 - - - -
UNC 132 1.2 - - 1 3.3
TFP 171 1 .6
4
- * - -
PNP 246 2 .2 2 8.3 3 10.0
Total 10,948 100.0 24 100.0 30 100.0
(d) Savelugu
Party Electorate % Big Rice Farmers % Small Rice Farmers %
SDF 4,146 52.9 22 55.0 26 52 .0
PFP 2,769 35.4 16 40.0 21 42.0
ACP N/C - - - - -
UNC 264 3.4 - - 1 2 .0
TFP 269 3.4 - - - -
PNP 384 4.9 2 5.0 2 4.0
Total 7,832 100.0 40 100.0 50 100.0
Source: Electoral Survey of Rice Farmers, Northern Ghana, 1979
and Legon Observer, op. cit.
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These findings are all the more interesting since the PNP was one 
of the few contending parties which claimed to have had a policy for the 
development of agriculture in the country, including the North.
According to the party’s manifesto, its policy was "to promote the 
agricultural revolution which shall be the bedrock of Ghana’s
2kscientifical (sic), technological, and industrial advancement". The 
other parties were no more explicit in their formulation of agricultural
policies. The UNC simply recognised the need to "pay particular
25
attention to the development of the rural areas". As far as the ACP 
was concerned, agriculture was simply the basis of its promised policies. 
The SDF, comprising in its leadership the largest and most influential 
rice farmers in the North-, was perhaps the most disappointing as far as 
the formulation of an agricultural policy was concerned. The party 
made hardly any references to agricultural policy beyond simply 
recognising agriculture as one of its highest priorities. The only 
sense in which the party can be said to have represented farmers* 
interests was that farmers constituted most of its supporters.
The excessively vague and imprecise nature of the agricultural 
’policies’ proposed by the various parties was not acceptable to the 
rice farmers in the North, and made no impression upon them. Such 
policies could not, therefore, have influenced their support for one 
party over another. Our findings suggest that as far as Dagomba rice 
farmers were concerned, they did not consider occupational class as 
taking precedence over gate issues.
The continuing significance of traditional political and factional 
allegiances in elections in Northern Ghana has been noted by several 
scholars. Dennis Austin, writing about the impact of the 195& elections 
in the North, observed that these constituencies were split along 
chieftaincy lines. He wrote thus:
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The great national issues of Federation or unitary government, 
the reform of the Cocoa Purchasing Company, the cocoa price and 
the moral issues raised by Busia and Gbedemah, were reduced to 
a simple struggle between rival chiefdoms for control of their 
own area. This did not mean, however, that the election was 
meaningless in local terms, or that it was any the less strongly 
fought. On the contrary the struggle raged furiously throughout 
the constituency.^
Nor was the influence of chieftaincy politics on elections confined
to the North. More generally, parties have in the past tended to
exploit the relative weakness or insecurity of certain chieftaincy
factions by promising support and protection if they accede to power.
As Dunn and Robertson have observed in Ahafo, the CPP interfered in
local chieftaincy by installing or reinstating certain chiefs in return
27
for their electoral support. But the supremacy of this issue in
Northern Ghana, and Dagbon especially, is somewhat exceptional. 
Chieftaincy is the axis upon which Dagomba society is structured, and 
social mobility is influenced by one’s relationship to the ruling gate.
As one Abudulai supporter explained, he voted PFP on the grounds that if 
this party was returned to power it would have reinstated Mahamadu 
Abudulai and restored a sense of pride nin the hearts of Abudulais”. 
Furthermore, he argued, ’’tradition has to be respected, and Dagbon has
to be governed according to Dagomba constitution. This means more to us
23
Dagombas than all party manifestos put together.” These views
suggest a strong sense of commitment to the Dagomba as a whole (or at 
least to talking in such terms) despite the intense competition between 
the two gates.
The Presidential Elections, Rice Farmers, and Support for Candidates 
The predominance of local chieftaincy as an important election 
issue was never demonstrated better than in the second round presidential 
elections. During the first round of the elections, supporters of the 
two leading parties in Dagbon, the SDF and PFP, voted for candidates
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whose parties represented their side’s particular interests. Thus 
Abudulai supporters voted for Victor Owusu of the PFP, while Andani 
followers voted for Ibrahim Maharaa of the SDF. Since, however, there 
was no outright winner in the first round, a re-run was necessary as 
stipulated by the Constitution, and was contested by the two national 
front-runners, Hilla Limann and Victor Owusu.
As far as the finalists were concerned, Limann made important gains 
in several constituencies during the second round, even in areas that 
were previously considered ’safe* by SDF or PFP standards. On the 
other hand, Owusufs gains were mainly marginal. Table9 .3 below gives 
comparative figures for the first and second round presidential elections. 
It indicates quite clearly that the PNP candidate made significant (and 
in the end decisive) gains in all constituencies, while PFP gains were 
simply moderate. During the first round (which was of course contested 
by the SDF) Owusu had beaten Limann in seven of the Northern Regional 
constituencies (even though his party won only k seats), all of them in 
areas where Dagomba traditional politics played an important role in the 
every day lives of the people. In nearly all of these,' Owusu*s victory 
was conclusive. Those constituencies that were won by Limann during 
the first round were in areas where Dagomba chieftaincy politics was 
of no consequence, such as the Gonja and Mamprusi.
The second round elections, however, saw a complete reversal of the 
pattern of support for the candidates as the scales were turned completely 
against the PFP. Limann won 12 of the 1*f constituencies, including some 
relatively strong SDF areas like Savelugu, Mion-Nanton, and Tamale.
The only two constituencies won by Owusu during this round were Tolon and 
Yendi - two exceptionally strong Abudulai seats. V/hile Limann nearly 
trebled his support in the Northern Region during the second round (from 
39i6^0 votes in the first round to 105,881 in the second), Owusu on the
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other hand, increased his only marginally (from 45,1^3 in the first to 
5^*033 in the second). Indications are that Limann made important 
gains right across the board, and it would appear that most voters who 
had earlier supported other parties switched over to the PNP candidate 
in the crucial second round.
Our electoral survey of rice farmers in Dagbon also indicated a 
large swing towards Limann among these farmers. Most of the gains 
achieved by Limann were the result of a mass sy/ing of SDF votes to this 
candidate. As we have already seen from the results of our survey of 
rice farmers during the parliamentary elections, the contest between the 
SDF and PFP had been very close, with the PNP running well behind in
i
third place. In the final contest, however, the PFP candidate failed 
to make any impact upon farmers who were not supporters of the Abudulai 
faction as indicated by our survey. Limann won every constituency 
in Dagbon. But Limann could not conceivably have won any of the 
Dagbon constituencies without the full backing of SDF supporters. The 
swing to the PNP candidate from SDF supporters among the rice farmers 
v/as decisive, as we shall see from Table, 9 , (a«=d). As far as Limann 
was concerned, 68 per cent of his support among big rice farmers in 
Tamale originated from SDF/Andani supporters, while 65 per cent of such 
support came from small rice farmers of the same source. The swing 
of SDF/Andani votes towards Limann among the rice farmers assumed 
relatively high proportions in all constituencies covered by our survey, 
and was probably similar to the general pattern in Dagbon.
What then were the reasons determining the level of SDF support 
for Limann of the PNP in the final rounds of the presidential elections? 
The reasons that determined the level of political support for Limann 
were basically the same for both big and small rice farmers, as indeed 
for other sections of the population. SDF supporters had never
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TABLE 9A: Shift in Large/Small Rice Farmers* Support for Finalist
Candidates in Second Round Presidential Elections, 1979*
(a) Tamale
Big Rice Farmers Small Rice Farmers
Source Limann Owusu N/V ’ Total Limann Owusu N/V Total
SDF 13 _ 2 15 13 — 5 18
PFP - 12 12 * 11 2 13
ACP - - - 1 - 1 2
UNC 2 - 1 3 1 - 1 2
TFP - - - - - -
PNP k - - k 5 - - 5
Total 19 12 3 3^ 20 11 9 to
(b) Yendi
. Big Rice Farmers Small Rice Farmers
Source Limann Owusu N/V Total Limann Owusu nA Total
SDF 11 — 2 13 10 - 2 12
PFP - 16 - 16 - 22 1 23
ACP - - - - - - - -
UNC 1 - - 1 1 - 1 2
TFP - - - - - - - -
PNP _ M 3 — 3
Total 12 16 2 30 1*t 22 k hO
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(c) Tolon
Big Rice Farmers Small Rice Farmers
Source Limann Owusu N/V Total Limann Owusu N/V Total
SDF 6 - 1
1
7 9 - 2 11
PFP - 15 - 15 - 15 - 15
ACP - - - - - - - -
UNC - 1 - 1* 1 - - 1
TFP - - - - - - - -
PNP 2 - - 2 3 - - 3
Total 8 16 " 1 25 13 15 2 30
(d) Savelugu
Big Rice Farmers Small Rice Farmers
Source Limann Owusu nA Total Limann Owusu N/V Total
SDF 17 - 5 22 21 - 5 26
PFP - 15 1 16 - 21 - 21
ACP - - - - - - - -
UNC - - - - 1 - - 1
TFP - - - - - - - -
■ PNP 2 - - 2 2 - - 2
Total 19 15 6 *f0 2h 21 5 50
Note: N/V = Non-voters*
Source: Electoral Survey of Rice Farmers, N/G, 1979*
considered their position as one against the PNP, at least as far as
gate issues were concerned. The PNP was expected to take a neutral
stand on this matter which, basically, was the position it adopted, so
that when the SDF ceased to be in the running its supporters (or most of
them anyway) gave their support to the PNP candidate. On the other
hand, the PFP, as champions of the Abudulais, had indeed posed a serious
threat to SDF/Andani interests. As one SDF supporter and rice farmer
from Savelugu bluntly stated, when their party lost the presidential
race in the first round, the issue became a straightforward fight
between two parties:
All of us SDF supporters knew where the PFP stood. Our people 
were told to vote Limajin because we wanted Victor Owusu out at 
all cost. Furthermore, Limann was a northerner, and he would 
be in a better position to understand the problems confronting 
our people up here.
<-7
It was evident from the several interviev/s and informal discussions 
held with SDF supporters that chieftaincy was the crucial determinant 
in their final decision to rally behind Limann. Even the SDF leader 
himself conceded that the majority of Andani supporters voted for 
Limann because they were absolutely clear about the “issues” involved* 
According to him, no directive was issued to supporters ordering them 
to vote one way or another; it was a ’’natural inclination guided by 
their concern to preserve the customs” which encouraged most SDF 
supporters to vote for Limann rather than Owusu in the crucial second 
round.^ Furthermore, the PNP had been regarded by Andani supporters 
as being somewhat compatible (ideologically) with the former CPP which 
had apparently tried to bring some order into the selection of the Ya-Na, 
so that it was very likely that SDF/Andani followers would back Limann 
in an attempt to keep out the candidate whose party was considered as 
being representative of rival interests.. From the Andanis* point of
u
view Limann at least represented a neutral position. In any case,
the PNP had reinforced its position on the issue by pledging its respect
32for tradition and for non-interference in local chieftaincy matters.
In the light of such evidence the Andanis regarded the PNP (and Limann) 
as the party better suited to preserve the status quo, i.e. Andani 
interests in Dagbon.
>
The support for Limann among Andani followers was further influenced 
by circulating rumours within Andani circles that the Akuffo regime had
been secretly planning the removal of Ya Na Yakubu Andani from the Yendi
\
paramountcy some time in June, but the plot failed as a result of
33Rawlings* June 4th ’revolution*. If these rumours had any political
effect it was to consolidate SDF support for Limann. As one SDF
i
supporter put it,
... we knew that the Abudulai people had petitioned the 
government and that they were planning to sack Na Yakubu from 
the palace (Yendi). But Rawlings came at the right time, so 
that spoilt everything ... If PFP had won', there is no doubt 
that they (the Abudulais) would have petitioned the government 
again, and this time for sure they would remove the chief.
Our people would not agree, so that’s why we voted Limann.^
To sum up, therefore, the initial uncertainties caused among the
prominent rice farmers by the fall of the Acheampong regime did not lead,
as one might have expected, to these farmers forming a political party
or joining in alliance with some such party on the basis of their rice
farming interests, and with a view to consolidating their class
position. Rice farming did not count as a special interest, and
Dagomba rice farmers* support for one party or another corresponded to
that of the rest of the community.
There were rio parties formed with the specific purpose of giving
representation to the interests of farmers either in the North or in the
country generally. Any such statements on agricultural policy as
formulated by some parties were vague and imprecise, and could not hope
to win support among farmers on the basis of such formulations. Even
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if, however, there was a party representative of the farming interest, 
it was extremely unlikely that any such party would have made a 
significant impact upon these farmers, since political behaviour among 
the Dagomba was influenced by gate loyalties which counted for much 
more than occupational class based, for example, upon rice farming*
t
Chieftaincy in Dagbon cut across all class barriers, and was the axis 
upon which Dagomba society was structured*
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NOTES TO CHAPTER.9
1. Such views were expressed by several prominent Abudulai supporters 
in Dagbon such as chiefs and politicians, including the optimistic 
B.A. Yakubu who saw Ma real possibility of ending the injustices 
perpetrated by soldiers and Acheampong in particular here in our 
traditional state”•
Interview with B.A. Yakubu, Tamale, 2 August 1978.
y
2. Lt. General Hamidu is the son of the Sunson Na, a senior chief in 
Dagbon. Hamidu was known for his ideological differences with 
Acheampong and for which he was (conveniently) posted on diplomatic 
service to Zambia.
3# Interview with Alhaji Ibrahim Abudulai, Tamale, 10 July 1978.
4. Ibid.
3# I was given access to a personal letter signed by the Border Guard
Commander and addressed to an influential Upper Regional farmer and 
businessman in February 1978, which explained that he (the Border 
Guard Commander) had done all in his power to assist this farmer 
in the transfer of certain ’’food items” to Upper Volta.
The "food items” involved were about 280 bags of rice, *f0 bags of 
corn, and a ’’small quantity” of millet, all of which were despatched, 
according to my informant, without any problems.
Personal files and interview with prominent, Bolgatanga farmer,
11 October 1978.
6. Discussion with Border Guard Officer, Border Guard Office, Kanvilli
(Tamale), 31 August 1979*
7# Interview with Alhaji Suraani Zakaria, Tamale, 30 April 1978.
8. Interview with Alhaji Ibrahim Mahama, Tamale, 21 September 1978.
9* Daily Graphic, 1 August 1978.
10. Ibid.
11. The Ghana Bar Association: ’’The Kumasi Declaration of 1978 on
Political and Constitutional Affairs”, Kumasi, 23 September 1978.
12. It was widely believed that under Unigov General Acheampong would 
be appointed President, through which continuity with the former 
regime would be maintained. Under such a system the relationship 
between the prominent rice farmers and the government would 
therefore remain intact.
13. Interview with S.Y. Imoru, RGA Executive member, Tamale, 10 August
1978.
1^. It is a well known story in Tamale that Zakaria, who was only a
driver at the Regional Office, developed a close relationship with 
his boss, Colonel Zumah, the Regional Commissioner. According to 
that story, the RC used his office and influence to obtain 
resources, especially farm machinery, which he left in the care of
Zakaria who was farming for him. V/hen Zumah left the region 
he tried to retrieve his "property” but as the story goes, he was 
threatened with blackmail by Zakaria. Despite its popularity 
in local circles, this story does not appear to be any more 
plausible than Zakaria*s own account that he started small and 
gradually built his way up with the help of a "friendly" Bank 
Manager.
In November 1978 the government declared a State of Emergency 
for the purpose of ensuring the maintenance of essential services. 
Its main objective was to force profiteers and traders to release 
hoarded commodities to members of the public at government 
"controlled" prices. The military and police were given special 
powers to search property and seize all hoarded goods which were 
subsequently sold to the public, and the proceeds paid into 
government coffers. The State of Emergency was revoked on 
31 December 1978.
Akuffo*s reluctance to bring the former Head of State, Acheampong, 
to trial after he was officially pronounced guilty of corruption 
and general maladministration, was interpreted in many circles 
as a deliberate act to conceal the corruption of senior officers, 
including several members of the Akuffo regime.
Personal correspondence from Alhaji Abudulai Tanko, Tamale, 
dated 9 February 1979*
The governing clause in the Political Parties Decree (1978) 
stated that no political party would be registered unless at least 
one founding member of this party was ordinarily resident or 
registered as a voter in each District Council area. Furthermore, 
the Decree required that no more than nine of the founding 
members of a political party shall belong to any one particular 
tribe.
Interview with Ibrahim Mahama, Tamale, 10 July 1979*
Interview with Abudulai Yakubu, Secretary to Gulkpe Na, Tamale,
3 August 1979*
Informal interview with a small group (7) of Andani supporters 
in Yendi, 8 July 1978.
R. Jeffries, "The Ghanaian Elections of 1979", African Affairs,
Vol. 79, No. 316, July 1980.
Under the Elections and Public Offices Disqualifications 
(Disqualified Persons) Decree 1976, 105 people were disqualified 
from holding office, based on the findings of various enquiries: 
Taylor and Aidoo Assets Committee, the KOM Commission of Enquiry 
into the Builders Brigade, the Jiagge Manyo-Plange ajid Sowah 
Assets Commissions, and the Kwame Nkrumah Properties Commission. 
According to the Sowah Assets Commission, Egala was found to 
have "excess expenditures" of £ 15,^18.
PNP Manifesto, published in Daily Graphic, 17 January 1979*
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UNC Chairman and leader, W. Offori-Attah; quoted in the 
Ghanaian Times, 12 February 1979*
Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960, (Oxford 1970) 
pp. 359-360.
J. Dunn and A.F. Robertson, Dependence and Opportunity; Political 
Change in Ahafo, Cambridge 19731 pp. 251-256V
Interview with Alhassarf Yahaya, rice farmer and teacher, Yendi,
8 July 1978.
Interview with Iddrissu Osuman, Savelugu, 11 July 1979*
Interview with Alhaji Ibrahim Mahama, Tamale, 22 August 1979*
The Legislative Instrument (L.1.59) introduced by Nkrumah to 
regulate the s^Jection of the Ya Na was accepted initially by 
the Andanis and v/as regarded as a compromise as far as the 
selection of the Ya Na was concerned.
Interview with Iddrisu Abu, PNP parliamentary candidate for 
Tamale, 12 August 1979* Abu believed that the party would have 
to resist any temptation to favour any one group if it were to 
gain the confidence of Dagombas. The old biases, he claimed, 
had to be buried once and for all. A measure of PNP tolerance 
by supporters of the SDF was indicated by the "crossing over" 
of several former SDF members to the PNP ranks, including a 
leading SDF member, Alhaji Ibrahim Yahaya (Kukuo Na) in 
January 1980. Yahaya justified his move by claiming that they 
(the SDF leadership) were all members of the CPP, and therefore 
their place was with the PNP. Reported in West Africa,
21 January 1980.
Such rumours were never confirmed, and every attempt which I 
made to get "reliable" information from the Northern Regional 
House of Chiefs proved futile. The ex-Sang-lana, however, 
admitted afterwards that "certain forces" had been at work which 
"might" have reversed certain decisions taken against them (the 
Abudulais), but the events of 4th June had time to intervene.
Informal discussion, Baba Abudulai Yakubu, Tamale, 27 August 1979*
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CONCLUSION
By 1979 rice production in Ghana had failed to make the desired 
impact upon the economy. Ghana was not only failing to earn the 
expected foreign exchange as originally envisaged by the planners of 
the OFY programme; she was not even able to meet the needs of the 
domestic market. A large proportion of the rice produced was 
smuggled because of the low official prices paid to producers in 
comparison with the •real* market price. Farmers preferred to sell 
their rice in neighbouring states for prices several times above the 
official government price, while at the same time earning valuable 
foreign currency.
By the end of the 1979/80 farming season only 21,000 metric tons
were (officially) produced, and the gap between production and
consumption was a staggering 79*000 metric tons. The shortages were
met by imports or food *aid* grants. In 1980 Ghana borrowed £ 12.7
million from the United States to buy food, including rice, maize and
wheat, while Japan was making vast contributions towards the country’s 
1
food needs. It was apparent that Ghana was depending more and
more upon foreign aid to solve its food problem, and that the 
agricultural programme initiated in 1972 had failed in its major 
objective of making the country self-sufficient in food.
The SMC's agricultural programme, especially rice production, 
failed because the government did not provide high enough incentives 
in the form of better minimum guaranteed prices for these farmers* 
produce. It was only those farmers who smuggled rice or sold it on 
the black market who gained financially from its production. Small 
farmers on the other hand were systematically denied access to 
subsidised capital (loans) and other farming inputs. The government*s
policies encouraged the well-connected farmers to expand farm size by
using subsidised, capital intensive and labour-saving production
practices. The resulting artificially high incomes provided
incentives for those privileged farmers to adopt production practices
which were financially profitable but uneconomic from the national point
♦
of view. Furthermore, most of those participating in large-scale rice
production were relatively inexperienced farmers who nevertheless gained
access to important inputs which might otherwise have been better
*
utilised by the smaller, moire experienced, and generally more 
efficient, small farmers.
Winch has argued that, in view of its high economic cost, large-
i
scale rice production should be drastically curtailed to about two 
hundred such farms, while the bulk of production should be entrusted to 
the smaller and more economical enterprises. According to Winch, small- 
scale production would generate more employment, improve income 
distribution and require less foreign exchange and input subsidy support.'
While such arguments made economic sense, they did not appeal 
politically to the Acheampong regime, which had a vested interest in 
large-scale rice production in the North. In the first place, the 
prominent rice farmers in the North formed a powerful and influential 
class which was instrumental in winning political support for the regime 
locally. Secondly, many high-level government officials, including 
commissioners and the Head of State himself, engaged in large-scale rice 
farming in the North. And finally, the administration of agricultural 
aid projects by government appointees was a further means by which 
these officials accumulated financial benefits through diverting funds 
which were intended for the region to themselves and their allies.
Through such a system of patronage the government was able to support 
indirectly its most important local allies.
Thus a regime committed to keeping itself in power at any cost 
could not hope to alter its strategy for agricultural development in 
in the North without drastically altering the structure of its local 
political base. The Acheampong regime did not choose to appeal 
directly to the local masses but rather through their appointed leaders. 
Appealing to the masses directly would have cost the government 
comparatively large sums in the form of economic assistance, and what 
was available would not have been enough to go round. It was therefore
much more convenient and cheaper to appeal for local support via big 
farmers representing the ruling chiefly dynasty with whom the regime 
had already established a patron/client relationship. Moreover, the
structure of local traditional society made it easier for the regime to 
appeal for the support of the ordinary people via influential clients.
The Acheampong government was not the first to recruit political support 
through its 'alliance* with a local chieftaincy faction; every regime 
before this, including the earliest colonial ones, appealed to the 
Northern people through their chiefs.
The Acheampong/Andani alliance in the North gave rise to the 
development of a class*of•*rich and politically very influential rice
• ’■-fe
farmers there. These farmers were nearly all either members or 
prominent supporters of the ruling Andani faction. They had access to 
all local institutions, whether or not these were connected with 
farming, but their real power base was the rice farmers' association, 
the RGA. Their influence extended well beyond the boundaries of the 
North. They depended heavily upon their connections with high level 
officials in Accra as well as the regional centres to obtain 
facilities such as cheap loans, machinery and even import licences.
In return for such privileges the farmers acted as agents for recruiting 
political support for the regime, especially during the referendum on
f ’ I
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Union Government. By 1978, these rice farmers had come to be regarded
J
as local ambassadors of the regime in Accra, while the EGA was officially
regarded as an organ or instrument of government policy.
Despite being relatively underprivileged, the rival Abudulai 
faction possessed its own group of large-scale rice farmers and its
t
own patronage networks through which members or supporters received 
assistance. Of course there was an important difference in the level
of assistance received by members. • The amount of assistance available
t v
to Abudulai supporters via Abudulai patron-client networks was strictly
limited, since these did not have the necessary connections, to exploit
resources. They were institutionally opposed to the Acheampong regime
i
and as such were denied access to sources of economic aid. Nevertheless, 
there still remained,a clearly defined pattern of relationships within 
this group of big rice farmers, and between these and their smaller 
followers.
Such a parallel development of group relationships might at first 
give the impression of the existence of two parallel sections of a 
single class of large-scale rice farmers in Dagbon. This, in effect, 
was not the case. Each group rather sought to develop its broad gate 
interests rather than its occupational class interests, i.e. as large- 
scale, •capitalist* rice farmers. As far as these Dagomba farmers 
were concerned, class interests were synonymous with gate interests.
The concepts of class consciousness and class conflict become 
problematic when applied in the context of African societies with their 
vastly complicated social systems. Objectively, Africans belong to 
one social class or another; but as we have seen with the example of 
the Dagombas of Northern Ghana, social change was not likely to be 
initiated as a result of conflict between two objective social classes 
based on their relationship to the means of production, in this case
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between deprived,small farmers on the one hand, and the big, eminently 
privileged ones on the other. While small farmers expressed genuine 
discontent about the way their prominent counterparts appropriated 
government aid which was earmarked for farmers as a whole, they were 
not prepared to take a ’position' against such farmers if these were 
members or supporters of their own gate. As we have seen during the 
elections of 1979i Dagomba farmers did not vote according to 
occupational class interest, but rather according to chieftaincy 
allegiance. Again, as we observed, such voting behaviour was similar 
to that of the Dagomba electorate as a whole, thus reinforcing our 
claim that chieftaincy in Dagomba society is the axis upon which this 
society is structured, and therefore predominates over all other issues.
As far as the Abudulai farmers (large and small) were concerned, 
change in Dagbon would come only when the Andani-dominated power 
structure was destroyed. Through this process their own gate would 
be restored to power, and all Abudulai farmers would benefit through 
this gate's newly found status.
One of the most distinctive features of the class of large-scale 
rice farmers that developed in the North during the 1970s was its 
decided lack of 'permanence'. It did not emerge out of capitalism 
based on accumulation, but owed its existence instead to its sponsorship 
by the Acheampong regime. Once this regime was overthrown, the 
position of the big rice farmers became vulnerable and uncertain.
Their vulnerability became even more perilous under Rawlings* AFRO 
which overthrew the remaining vestiges of the SMC regime on *fth June 
1979* Severail of the big farmers fled the country in the wake of 
this regime's violently aggressive policies towards all those which it 
considered to have contributed to the devastation of the economy through 
profiteering and other malpractices. The big rice farmers were
1l
considered among the main transgressors*
I
The sponsorship by the State of a class of large-scale rice farmers
in Northern Ghana did not produce any significant benefits to the
Ghanaian economy as a whole, nor to the Northern rural economy* The
government’s agricultural development programme did not succeed in
generating employment or improving income as far as small rice farmers
were concerned* It rather structured the local economy in such a
fashion that the only beneficiaries were the regime’s own leading
*
members and their local clients* '
Alternative Strategies
V/hat alternative policies or approaches were required in order to
improve economic development, more specifically agricultural production,
in Dagbon? Most authors have pointed to the need for alternative
economic policies rather than changes in local political structures.
Bates, for example, suggests that a positive pricing policy is the basis
for a solution to the problems facing agricultural development not only
in Ghana, but in Africa as a whole. He argues that in Africa prices
are set in a way which favours the interests of industry but which at the
3
same time is harmful to those of agriculture. The reasons, according 
to Bates, for the pursuit of such policy are both economic and political. 
Because of the size distribution of their industry, i.e. a small number 
of firms with a large output and consequently a propensity to lobby for 
higher prices, producers tend to exert greater pressure on the government 
than does agriculture with a very large number of small producers who 
each contribute only a small amount to total output. Bates notes that 
governments in African states also tend to regard industrialisation as 
being synonymous with development, with the result that this sector is
if
generally financed with appropriated resources from export agriculture.
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He claims furthermore that the use of subsidies rather than market prices
tends to favour large farmers*• The large farmers, as the rice
industry in Ghana illustrates, also had the ability to act collectively
5
in defence of their interests. Small farmers, by contrast, are
numerous and scattered, and produce only a small volume of total output.
Thus, efforts to organise in support of higher prices tend to be more
costly in the small farm community and to offer fewer private advantages.^
This leads Bates to the conclusion that the interests of large and small
farmers are often in conflict, especially in situations where the
government resorts to subsidies rather than market prices: the gains
7
secured by one are often at the expense of the other.
Shepherd argues that the problem of agricultural development in
Ghana rests on the misguided investment policies of the government.
According to him, emphasis was placed on urban development rather than
peasant agriculture: a policy that was largely responsible for the
extreme food shortages in the north of Ghana, but more especially the
8North-East, during 1977* This approach did not only reflect a regional
policy, but was part of the governments national development policy which
in turn reflected state bias in urban and industrial spending as well as
9"the distribution of power in Ghanaian society". The growing emphasis
on urban and industrial development at the expense of small-scale agricultur
is not a characteristic feature of development strategy in Ghana only.
The tendency of African governments to adopt national economic policies
which favour urban groups on the whole has been noted by several other 
10
authors including Bates, who concludes that agricultural policy has
become a "by-product of political relations between governments and their
11
urban constituents".
The poor state of agriculture as regards the north of Ghana in 
particular is attributed by Shepherd to the historical factor. The area 
has been neglected partly because of the colonial governments policy of
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"separate development" and its administration of the North as a labour
reserve, and "partly because the northern economy has been developed since
12
the war to suit the interests of dominant urban groups in Ghana". The 
failure of the colonial regime to introduce economic development in the 
North was highlighted in Chapter Two. The North was never incorporated 
in a constructive national development plan despite official statements 
to the contrary. During the colonial period, as we have already 
demonstrated, it was assigned the role of supplier of foodstuffs to the 
South, in addition to that of labour reserve as a whole. The post­
colonial period brought no significant changes in policy or approach, and 
no serious consideration was given to the need to provide the area with a 
viable export economy, nor an infrastructure upon which such an economy 
could be later built. Economic development in the North has been 
organised around piecemeal or uncoordinating projects which, because of 
their nature, succeeded only in alienating the small farmers for whom 
they were designed.
The development of commercial rice farming in Dagbon was not really 
part of a comprehensive regional economic programme. It was simply a 
policy designed to enrich local supporters of the regime, i.e. those with 
political connections which made it possible to obtain cheap (subsidised) 
inputs and to smuggle most of their produce. All of the smuggled rice 
was of course sold for convertible foreign exchange.
The setting up of a rice industry did not coincide with a programme 
of infrastructural development, such as the construction of feeder roads, 
irrigation schemes, road transport, or a repair and maintenance service 
which would serve both the needs of farmers and those of the people more 
generally. Although it would have benefited the Dagomba people in the 
long-run, such an investment programme did not appeal to the Acheampong 
regime, since it did not meet its instrumental and more immediate needs.
Whatever'funds were available were used to finance short-term policies
\
such as obtaining subsidised inputs - farm machinery, fertilizers, loans 
- for use by the big-farmer allies of the regime. The huge profits 
which these farmers realised as a result of such privileges were from 
their personal point of view far more important than any long-term 
capital investment in the area* These farmers also placed much more 
emphasis on rice farming as an instrumental activity, i.e. as a means 
of making quick money, rather than as investment. As far as they were 
concerned, once rice farming ceased to be profitable they would return
t 1
to their ‘normal* (previous) business or occupation, leaving behind them 
in the process large tracks of barren land. By 1978/79» there was already 
widespread indication of this happening as several big farmers expressed 
their intention to quit rice farming altogether after a few "good harvests", 
while a few others had actually "retired" by 1979- It should be noted 
that while such attitudes were prevalent among "stranger" farmers, it was 
also common among several Dagomba farmers who expressed the opinion that 
they did not wish to spend all their lives on the farm.
The participation of big rice farmers in agricultural development in 
Dagbon yas, generally speaking, a temporary phenomenon, and can only have 
helped to illustrate the misconceived role which large farmers as a group 
were supposed to have played in economic development in the North as a 
whole. By 1982, when the majority of the big rice farmers in Dagbon (and 
in other parts of the North) started to abandon their farms ostensibly 
because of operational problems, such as the shortage of farming inputs, 
but in practice because of political pressure from local PNDC activists, 
the people did not inherit from these an infrastructure or foundation on 
which they could develop further. What they appeared to have inherited 
was a disorganised, uncoordinated framework of a mismanaged rural economy.
As my correspondent explained:
346
’’Nearly all the big farmers from Tamale have run away since 
December 31st,13 The pressure was too much on them. Their 
farms have been abandoned, and some of them even did not have 
time to harvest their rice. The local WDCs (Worker^ Defence 
Councils)^ have even tried to cultivate some of these farms 
but have been defeated by the usual problems of roads, transport 
and fuel, not to mention the shortage of food ••• These days 
one cannot find rice in the market, only from the (market) 
women. It would be hard for a newcomer to this town to accept 
that the North here was once a prosperous rice farming 
community ,,.
The phenomenon of commercial rice farming in Dagbon certainly gave an
illusion of prosperity, but it was a prosperity shared only by the few
and privileged big rice farmers with political connections. It did
not reflect any tangible improvement in the socio-economic position of
small farmers or of the Dagomba as a whole. Thus Acheampong*s OFY
policy cannot be conceived of as a comprehensive programme of economic
development, at least as far as Dagbon was concerned.
The need to. invest in capital intensive projects in West Africa as
a means of increasing agricultural productivity has been advanced by some.
Hart, for example, argues that the reason why such projects have failed
in V/est Africa is mainly because of these governments* lack of concern
about technical efficiency. Such projects are regarded mainly as
prestigious or instrumental: a means of personal enrichment and of
16- keeping "a loyal cadre of followers employed”. According to Hart,
this sector has been able to generate some wealth partly because of the
’’massive commitment’.’ of agricultural labour to export agriculture, and
partly because of the fertility of an. abundant virgin land area, rather
17than the improved productivity of labour. The state, he correctly
*  '
argues, has appropriated most of the surplus for its own unproductive 
expenditures, such as industrial financing, and which represents a wrong 
order of priorities.
Development policy must be geared towards raising agricultural 
productivity as opposed to industrial output. This leads to the
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conclusion by Hart that only ’’when an agrarian revolution has .set resources
free for industrial development will it then be necessary to talk about
19
an industrial revolution". One of Hart*s main recommendations for
achieving economic development, and more especially agricultural output,
is for West African states to "recapitulate" the stages of economic
20development which all industrialised countries have so far passed.
While such arguments on the need to give priority to agricultural 
development are basically sound, Hart*s assertions as regards the need 
for West African states to adopt capitalist strategies as a means of 
improving agricultural productivity are somewhat more debatable. The 
introduction of large-scale capitalist rice farming in Northern Ghana 
in general and in Dagbon more especially, which utilised a generous 
system of input-subsidy, demonstrated quite clearly that without 
constructive government economic p>olicies such enterprises could be 
established only at a great cost to the state. Furthermore, as we have 
seen, only farmers with connections can hop>e to benefit from such policies. 
The majority of the rural populace, including small farmers, did not 
benefit from such policies. Thus, rather than restructuring the local 
economy for the benefit of the p>eople as a whole, state-subsidised 
capitalist rice farming succeeded only in enriching a rural elite and, as 
such, cannot be considered as an effective strategy or model for economic 
development, at least as far as Ghana is concerned.
More generally, the call for capitalist strategies in agricultural 
development also represents a lack of confidence in small-scale 
agricultural systems such as farmers* co-op>eratives, and in the ability 
of peasants to increase agricultural output. Given constructive economic 
psolicies which include sufficient price incentives, it is of course 
possible to inspire small farmers and to increase productivity. Prior 
to the expansion of commercial rice farming in Dagbon and its domination
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by large-scale farmers, most of the rice there was produced by small 
farmers* co-operatives. These small enterprises were effectively phased 
out only when Acheampong*s biased agricultural policies took effect about 
1972/73. The policies of Rawling6 * PNDC regime have also demonstrated, 
though admittedly to a limited extent, that small-scale agriculture can 
increase productivity (and profitability) if dictated by sound economic 
policies such as price incentives, a realistic rate of exchange, and a 
system of price control.
Bureaucracy and Agricultural Development in Dagbon
Acheampong*s approach to development in the North as a whole was 
to set up an elaborate bureaucratic machinery for administering local 
projects, but which was used in effect to further the interests of the 
regime locally. The bureaucracy was part of a network system through 
which he provided his local followers with substantial economic benefits 
and a local political platform. We have already seen that a number of 
development projects were set up in the North including Dagbon, and most 
of which were concerned with the improvement of commercial cash-cropping, 
especially rice. The two main projects in the North were the GGADP in 
the Northern Region and URABEP in the Upper Region. Most of these
projects failed to make any impact upon agricultural production, with 
the single exception of the GGADP. They were manned by administrators 
who did not only fail to take into account the needs of small farmers 
for whom these projects were originally set up, but who used their 
position instead to direct funds and resources for their own private use 
or for those of their allies.
The implementation during the seventies of the government’s 
agricultural policies in Dagbon raises a very important issue as regards 
the administration of aid programmes and of agricultural projects more 
particularly. For example, should the running of such programmes be
349
entrusted to Ghanaian officials who, because of their political 
relationship to the regime, were not made accountable for the performance 
of projects? The insensitive and generally irresponsible attitude of 
project administrators in regard to the needs of small farmers suggests 
the need in future for an alternative system of project management, if 
such projects are to make any useful impact upon economic development 
locally. Their management must be restructured to include small farmers 
or their nominees.
The involvement of small farmers or their representatives with the
management of projects does not necessarily constitute an attempt to
eliminate bureaucracy, but rather a means of democratising it through
their participation in the day-to-day running of such programmes. In
Dagbon, as with African societies more generally, there was a tendency to
disparage at the leadership abilities of the small farmer. Such bias
was expressed not only by project managers and those other officials
involved with agricultural development in Dagbon, but also by most big
farmers who perceived of these people as being ’'backward” and unadaptable
to change. For example, the RGA secretary maintained that small farmers
in the Northern Region were not sufficiently responsible to be entrusted
21with the running of "important organisations", such as the RGA.
Another prominent rice farmer, Alhaji Abdul-Rahamani, regretted that "the 
time had not yet come to put small farmers in responsible positions in
the Association (RGA), because many of them were still very backward and
22illiterate, and cannot take their responsibilities seriously". Such
remarks are typical of the prejudice held against small farmers by those 
privileged ones who sought to make the RGA a bastion of their power and 
authority. They ignored the fact that in Dagbon, as in other parts of
the North, small farmers did not constitute only the traditional 
"backward peasantry", but also teachers, junior civil servants, public 
employees and various other groups who were among the most educated
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members of the community.
This misconceived opinion of small farmers was one of the main reasons 
why they were excluded from running of the SMU, an organisation which we 
have already seen was supposedly established to provide for their needs.
The frustrations experienced by these small farmers as a result, and which 
were exacerbated by the blatant corruption of their appointed leaders, 
led in the end to their total disillusionment with the SMU and to its 
eventual demise.
The AFRC under Rawlings attempted to improve on the performance of 
those officials concerned with rural development projects, especially 
those concerned directly with agricultural production. It also sought 
to make such projects more accessible to small farmers. Despite 
Rawlings* personal commitment to reducing social inequalities in Ghanaian 
society, the AFRC did not succeed to any significant extent in achieving 
its objectives as regards these farmers. Its leaders were not 
sufficiently equipped ideologically or professionally to tackle Ghana's 
serious problems. By their own admission, this regime was engaged on 
a moral crusade, a kind of "house-cleaning exercise'1. Their main 
concern was with punishing of all those found guilty of economic and 
political corruption against the state. The absence, therefore, of a 
comprehensive economic and political programme on its part meant that the 
AFRC was not in a position to introduce major reforms which might have 
shifted the balance of economic power in favour of the Ghanaian masses, 
including small farmers. As such, the June k revolution made no 
conceivable impact upon agricultural development in Dagbon. The 
'cleansing* of local projects of corrupt officials did not increase the 
efficiency of these projects, since these were managed by AFRC 
representatives who did not really take an interest in small farmers, but 
who seized the opportunity instead to reap some benefits in areas hitherto 
dominated by their senior colleagues.
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Chieftaincy and Economic Development in Dagbon
In general economic development in the North under Acheampong was 
frustrated by the failure of the government to introduce a comprehensive 
package of economic policies, and by its inability or unwillingness to 
exercise effective control over local bureaucrats who were both politically 
corrupt and administratively inefficient. As far as Dagbon was 
concerned, there was a further factor which contributed to its general 
malaise: chieftaincy factionalism. The significance of chieftaincy in
Dagbon was that it exerted its influence at all levels of political 
decision-making and that only those who supported the ruling gate were 
officially recognised. As a result, most of the aid administered to 
farmers went to those supporting the Andani gate, rather than to those 
best qualified to utilise resources.
The distribution of economic aid in Dagbon was also determined
geographically on the basis of gate support. Areas which were under the
jurisdiction of Abudulai chiefs were often neglected. No development
projects of any consequence were inaugurated during the Acheampong period
in areas such as Tolon, Gushiegu, Nanton or the Savelugu out-districts.
On the contrary, projects which were earmarked for these areas prior to
Acheampong were discontinued within months of his assuming office.
Fertilizer stores built by the GGADP in Tolon during 1969 and 1970 were
completely abandoned by 197W5* No fertilizer had been officially
distributed to small farmers there since 1973» whereas in the previous four
23years or so, the area received regular supplies from the GGADP m  Tamale. 
Similarly, projects which had been initiated in Savelugu, Nanton and 
Gushiegu by the former Busia government (a government largely sympathetic 
to the Abudulais) in 1970 - feeder roads, wells, dug-outs, small dams - 
were also abandoned under Acheampong because of an alleged shortage of 
funds. At the same time, however, similar projects were sprouting up 
in various Andani-controlled areas such as Tamale, Yendi, Karaga, Mion and
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Kumbungu. As the DCE for Yendi pointed out, there were no sound economic
reasons for discontinuing projects which were already under construction
and in some cases nearing completion other than the fact that they were
intended to serve areas which were notoriously anti-Acheampong, or 
2kpro-Abudulai• The closure of such projects also meant that funds which 
had been allocated to them were now being diverted to officials for their 
personal use and for distributing patronage among their own followers.
There is no doubt that in Dagbon economic development was sacrificed 
for personal political gains by Acheampong, a consolidation of power by 
the ruling chieftaincy gate, and for the personal enrichment of a farming 
elite. Those small farmers who derived any benefits at all from the 
agricultural development programme were the personal followers or clients 
of the prominent farmers. The mass of the small farmers in Dagbon, like 
the rural populace in general, did not benefit directly or indirectly 
from the policies of the regime as regards agriculture.
If small fanners as a socio-economic group are to benefit from any 
such programme in the future it will be necessary for structural changes 
to be made in the administration of aid projects in Dagbon. Furthermore, 
the importance given to chieftaincy in the day-to-day lives of the people 
suggests that if economic development in general is to be tackled on a 
realistic level, no group should be excluded simply on the basis of gate 
allegiance. A programme of agricultural development must have as its 
pivot small farmers organised within the framework of a democratic 
organi sat i on.
A solution to the problem of agricultural development in Dagbon could 
be provided by the establishment of a Small Farmers' Board or some similar 
body whose main objective would be to develop small-farmer agriculture by 
providing all inputs including fertilizer, tractor services and, of course, 
capital. While such an organisation would be required to operate within
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the framework of national government policy, especially as all its funds 
would be provided by the government, it is also crucially important that 
it is allowed full control of its most important functions, especially 
those regarding the allocation and distribution of resources.
An organisation of this nature would be run ideally by a board of 
representatives elected by Dagomba small farmers for a specific term of 
office. Furthermore, these representatives would be elected from 
amongst supporters of both gates on an equal numerical basis. A board 
so constituted could at least in theory protect the interests of all small 
farmers irrespective of gate or other allegiances.
While a small farmers1 board would be the main body responsible for 
the administration of aid on behalf of these farmers, private agencies such 
as those already existing in Dagbon - Demco, Nasia Rice Company, and the 
various technical services provided by the commercial banks - should of 
course be encouraged. The services provided by these would not 
necessarily constitute a duplication of farm services to small farmers , 
since the private farming agencies never really addressed' themselves to 
the needs of these farmers. Throughout the 1970s they continued to 
supply services almost exclusively to those big and privileged rice farmers. 
The banks should also be encouraged to continue with their policy of 
sponsoring private farmers since their commercial policy would be conducive 
to the development of rice farming on a competitive basis. As an 
organisation with responsibility for implementing government agricultural 
policy among small producers, a small farmers* board would be required to 
collaborate with other decentralised government bodies, such as the 
Ministry of Economic Planning and the Ministry of Agriculture, while 
cooperating closely with other development projects in the area.
In what respects would such a smell farmers* organisation differ from 
others previously set up in the region? The main differences acre in 
respect of structure euid orientation. Smell farmers were not allowed
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to run their own organisations, or even to have a say on matters of 
general policy, as demonstrated by the SMU. Some organisations, such 
as the RGA, excluded these altogether from their general membership.
But the crucial point is this: farmers* organisations, like most other
bodies in Dagbon were influenced by gate considerations to the effect that 
these conferred grossly unfair advantages upon supporters of the ruling 
gate among their members. A proposal for a broad-based farmers* 
organisation would therefore have the advantage of making such cm 
organisation more democratic from the point of view of giving 
representation to all small farmers, irrespective of gate politics or 
other identifications.
While these recommendations are not intended as a blueprint for 
economic development in Dagbon, they do provide a framework within which 
small farmers as a socio-economic group could be realistically incorporated 
in a broader programme of rural development. The success or otherwise 
of such a strategy would depend upon the government's commitment to 
economic development in Dagbon. It would also depend upon the confidence 
which the authorities have in the ability of 6raall farmers to run their 
own show. After all, the problem with small farmers was not their 
inability to produce, but that they were not trusted with the management 
of resources. The policy of governments as regards the role of small 
farmers in agricultural development in Dagbon has been to ’manage* them 
under the auspices of some organisation or other.
The resources provided by the Acheampong regime for the purpose of 
agricultural development in Dagbon (and the North in general) were 
skilfully manipulated to benefit the regime’s cronies. At the same time 
it gave the impression mainly through public declarations and its 
propaganda machinery that small farmers were central to the success of 
its agricultural programme. But this was clearly a facade behind which
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it took cover. The regimefs real intentions were not to develop 
agriculture by means of small-farmer participation, but rather to 
introduce a programme of large-scale commercial rice farming which would 
benefit only those farmers with adequate resources or with access to these. 
In other words, it was a policy designed specifically to meet the needs 
of a powerful group of the regime*s local allies. The process by which 
this took place did not only demonstrate the ruthless nature of rice 
politics, but also emphasised the intricate and complex nature of gate 
politics, as indeed the interrelationship between chieftaincy, national 
politics and economic development in Dagbon.
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APPENDIX 1
Northern Regional Agricultural Projects (1976-1980)
Project Description Amount in 0
1. Bontanga Irrigation 
Project
1,700 acres for crops 
and water supply 3 ,000,000
2. Passam Irrigation 
Project
5,000 acres for rice and 
vegetables 7,000,000
3» State Farms Rice Project 1,750 acres at Demon 1,540,000
4. State Farms Groundnut 
Project
500 acres at Prang 83,000
5» State Farms Cattle 
Project
At Demon 169,000
6. Kenaf Project
(Bast Fibre Board)
9,500 acres in Bawku 
District
396,000
7» Ghana Community Farms 
Kenaf Project
700 acres 102,900
8. Ghana Community Farms 
Mango Project
20,000 acres 4,140,000
9* Ghana Community Farms 
Yam Project
3,500 acres 1,235,500
10. Ghana Community Farms 
Maize Project
15,000 acres 2,295,000
11. Ghana Community Farms 
Rice Project
8,000 acres 1,792,000
12. Ghana Community Farms 
Groundnut Project
650 acres 107,900
13 • Ghana Community Farms 
Cotton Project
10,000 acres 2 ,050,000
14. Cotton Development 
Board Project
20,000 acres 4,400,000
13. Fisheries Repair Depots - 55,000
16. Fish Culture Project At Nasia 100,000
17* Inland Fisheries Complex At Yapei & Yeji 262,000
18. Mobile Landing 
Facilities
Vehicles 92,000
19* Farm Machinery Project Vehicles, spare parts, 
machinery
2 ,000,000
20. Workshops & Tools 
Project
Tamale & Yendi 618,000
21. Land Clearing Equipment Savannah Are els 1,450,000
Total 32,868,300
Source: Five Year Development Plan, 1975/76-1979/80.
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APPENDIX 2
Upper Regional Agricultural Projects (1976-19&0)
Pro.iect Description Amount in 0
1. Vea Irrigation Project 3*500 acres for vegetables 3,000,000
2. Tono Irrigation Project 5*150 acres for rice and 
vegetables
21,000,000
3* Tamne Irrigation 
Project
3,600 acres for rice and 
upland crops
2,000,000
4. Cashew Project 2,000 acres at Tumu, Wiaga 
Navrongo
322,000
5« Kenaf Project
(Bast Fibre Board)
9*500 acres Bawku District 1*396,500
6. IBRD/Ghana Upper Region 
Cotton Project
50,000 acres at Navrongo, 
Tumu, Wa and Bawku
10,300,000
7« Cotton Development 
Board Project
40,000 acres 8,800,000
8. Ghana Community Farms 
Mango Project
15*000 acres 3 ,105,000
9* Ghana Community Farms 
Yam Project
500 acres 176,500
10. Ghana Community Farms 
Maize Project
2,500 acres 382,500
11. Ghana Community Farms 
Rice Project
10,000 acres 2,240,000
12. Ghana Community Farms 
Cotton Project
5,000 acres 1,025,000
13. Ghana Community Farms 
Groundnut Project
3,000 acres 498,000
14. IBRD/Ghana Upper Region 
Groundnut Project
63,000 acres 10,460,000
15. Fish Culture Project At Kussanaba - Bawku 
District.
At Tizza - Lawra
81,000
16. Fish Repair Depots - 140,000
17* Farm Machinery Project Vehicle, Machinery and 
Spare Parts
1,300,000
18. Workshop 8c Tools 
Project
Bawku 8c Zuarungu 226,000
19* Land Clearing Equipment 
Project
Savannah areas 1,450,000
Total 67,902,500
Source: Five Year Development Plan, 1975/76 - 1979/80.
359
APPENDIX 3
Survey questionnaire administered to rice farmers in Northern Ghana
Name Age Tribe
Residence
Educational background
Marital status No. of children
1. How many acres did you have under rice cultivation last year?
2. How many acres are you cultivating this year?
3* Which of the following crops do you cultivate, and how much of each?
Millet ••••••••••••• Maize •••••••••••• Yams ••••••••••••
Groundnuts ••••••••••• Guinea Com •••••••••••• Others ••••••
4. How long is it since you started farming?
5. When did you first start to cultivate rice commercially?
6. What were your main reasons for starting to cultivate rice?
7« Do you have any other business or occupation besides rice farming?
8. If so, do you consider this to be more profitable than rice farming?
9. How much rice did you produce last year?
10. Can you tell me how much you produced each year over the last 
five years?
11. Have you experienced any bush fires over the last five years?
If so, give details.
12. How much of the other crops did you produce last year?
Millet ••••••••••••• Maize     Yams ...
Groundnuts  ......   Guinea Corn ••••••• Others
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13-. How much of your rice do you sell to the Rice Mills?
To whom do you sell the rest?
15. If you own any farm machinery, please give details.
a) tractors
b) combine harvesters
c) implements
16. How did you obtain these?
17* Do you hire out your machinery to other farmers?
18. How much do you charge?
19* (If a non-owner) from whom do you obtain the services of
a) tractor
b) combine harvester
20. How much did you pay for such services?
21. If you use bullocks to plough your land, can you tell me where
you had them trained?
22. Have you ever received a bank loan for your farming purposes?
23. If yes, please give details.
2*f. If not in receipt of such a loan, have you ever applied for one?
If so, what was the outcome?
25* Have you had a loan from any other source for use with your farming?
26. If so, please give details.
27. If you employ "by day" (casual labour) on your farm, can you
please state
a) where you recruit from
b) how much do you pay
28. Give details of any other forms of labour that you use.
29. From whom do you obtain your fertilizer supplies?
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30. . How much do you pay for it?
31• Do you experience difficulties in obtaining your full requirements?
Can you explain these difficulties?
32. Would you like to increase the size of your rice farm?
33. What are your main reasons for wanting to or not wanting to 
increase your rice farm?
34. Would you like to expand on your other crops? If yes, give 
details.
35. If you are a member of the RGA, when did you join?
36. What benefits do you receive from the Association?
37* Can you tell me anything about the activities of the Association?
33. If not a member of the Association, can you explain why you
have not become a member?
39. Do you belong to any other farmers* organisations? If so, give 
details.
40. Where is your present farm situated?
41. How long have you been farming your present plot?
42. Where were you farming before that?
43. Why did you change?
44. Did you experience any problems in getting land from the chief?
45. Are you satisfied with the help that you are getting from the
government as far as rice farming is concerned?
46. If you are not satisfied, can you explain why, and what do you 
think can be done to improve the situation?
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k7m . Are you related to any chief in the North? If bo, which one?
*f8. Do you support Andani or Abudulai?
*f9« Do you think that chieftaincy is important in deciding whether or
not a farmer here in the North will get help with his farming?
50. (If a non-supporter of the ruling gate) why don*t you support the 
side which is more likely to benefit you with your farming 
activities?
51 • Do you think that it would be better for small farmers to concentrate
upon cultivating traditional foodcrops, while rice farming was left 
to the big farmers?
52. If yes, can you explain why?
53* Can you tell me anything more about rice farming which we have not 
covered in this interview, in particular about the general 
problems facing the rice farmers in the North?
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APPENDIX k
Questionnaire for Electoral Survey of Rice Partners in Northern Ghana
(1979)
Name:
Tribe: Dagomba ••••••••• Non-Dagomba ........ .
Age
Family Size
Educational background
Type of farming enterprise
1. What kind of help would you like to see the government give to rice 
farmers in the North?
2. Do you think that the newly-elected government will give more help 
to all rice farmers in the North than did Acheampong?
3* What is the reason for your answer?
4. For which party did you vote during the first round of the elections?
5. What were your main reasons for supporting this party?
6. Which candidate did you support during the second round of the
elections?
7. Why did you vote for him?
8. Did you support this candidate because you think that his party
represented the interests of the chieftaincy gate that you support?
9. Do you think that on the whole Dagombas voted according to which 
party or candidate supported their chieftaincy side?
10. Are you a member of the RGA?
11. As far as you are aware, did the leaders of the Association advise 
their followers to vote for a particular party or candidate?
12. If yes, how were these members advised to vote?
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13. Did you attend any political meetings during the election 
campaign?
1*f. In what way did the party say they were going to help the farmers?
15. Have you ever voted in any previous elections?
16. Which of these parties have you supported in the past?
CPP ••••••••• PP •••.••••••• Any other........ .
17. Do you think that the PNP stood for the same policies and ideas 
of the CPP?
18. If yesf can you give me an example of such a policy?
19. Do you think that the PFP stood for the same policies and ideas
as the Progress Party?
20. If yes, can you give me an example?
21. Why do you think that Limann won the North so convincingly?
22. In your opinion, why didn’t the SDF perform better in Dagbon?
23. Do you think that Ibrahim Mahama was the right leader for the SDF?
2km Why do you think that he was or wasn’t?
25. Why do you think that Owusu failed to beat Limann in Dagbon
during the second round elections?
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